The U.S Mediation Team’s Role in Camp David II: A Constructive or Disruptive Role?

By

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Dedication Page

To the loving memory of my grandfathers Antoine Maalouf and Salim El Khoury
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The U.S Mediation Team’s Role in Camp David II: A Constructive or Disruptive Role?

Nicholas Maalouf

ABSTRACT

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict dates back to 1882 with the first Jewish immigration to Palestine and its intensification in the 1900s. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict eventually escalated and expanded to include other Arab countries in the Middle East. Several wars and violent confrontations ensued between the Palestinians and Israelis. After several attempts at reaching a peaceful settlement failed, a last-ditch effort was made by the United States under the Clinton administration, whose main foreign policy objective was peace in the Middle East. This attempt culminated in the Camp David Peace Summit in 2000, also known as Camp David II, mediated by the United States and more importantly President Clinton himself. After 15 days of negotiations, the summit failed, and violence continues to this day. This thesis examines the role of the American mediation team led by President Clinton during the Camp David II summit to determine whether their role was constructive or disruptive for the negotiations.

Keywords: Mediation, Conflicts, Palestine, Arabs, Israel, Negotiations, Settlement, Resolution
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Chapter One

Introduction

In 1991, with the end of the cold war, President George H. W. Bush decided to use his country’s new pre-eminent position to force all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict to the negotiating table in Madrid, Spain in 1991. This process would be known as the Madrid Peace Conference. Unbeknownst to him at the time, the Oslo talks were in full swing, and it would be the Norwegians who would help both sides, specifically the Palestinians and Israelis, pave a roadmap to peace (“The 50 years war”, 2000). In 1993, President George H. W. Bush’s successor Bill Clinton would host both sides for the signing ceremony of the Oslo Agreement on the White House lawn. Inspired by this momentous achievement, President Clinton and his team formulated a foreign policy plan for his administration that would revolve around bringing peace to the Middle East through four Arab-Israeli peace agreements. This achievement, it was hoped, would bring peace to a tumultuous region and shape a great legacy for President Clinton (Indyk, 2017).

However, President Clinton’s dream of being the one to bring about an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict was shattered with the failure of the Camp David II summit which is considered to be the last serious attempt at reaching a Palestinian-Israeli peace. This thesis will be using a mediation and discourse analysis-based framework to study the effects the U.S Mediation Team had on the Camp David II summit.
This chapter will be introducing the three main tenets of this thesis; its subject, its purpose and relevance, and its methodology. This chapter will do so through its three parts. The first part will talk about the background of the Palestine-Israeli conflict within the context of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict and the evolution of U.S Mediation within the confines of this conflict. The second part will tackle this thesis’ research question, relevance, and limitations. Lastly, the third part will tackle the methodology that will be used to answer the research question.

1.1 Background to the Palestine-Israel Conflict and U.S Mediation

1.1.1 Background to the Palestine Israel Conflict

After World War I, Palestine was mandated to the British Empire responsible, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), for helping the Palestinian people lay solid foundations for a future state. However, Jewish immigration, which first started in 1882, began to increase under the British Mandate. This increase reached unprecedented levels between the years 1904 and 1914, but also between 1933 and 1936 (Morris, 2008). This increase in the Jewish population, which threatened to shift the country's demographics in favor of the Jewish population, faced stiff resistance from Arab Palestinians plunging both groups into a cycle of violence that began in 1936 and continues till this day (“The 50 years war”, 2000).

This new reality saw two people on one land, both claiming ownership of this land with one side, the Palestinians, having a factual claim to the land having lived on it for generations while the other, the non-Palestinian Jews, laying a biblical claim to it. This led the mandate authorities to ask the UN for a solution. The UN formed the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which was sent to Palestine to provide a solution to the dilemma of 'two peoples-one land.' After visiting Arab villages, Jewish settlements, talking to locals, being lobbied by Zionists, and carefully deliberating, a partition plan was announced by UNSCOP, voted on by the UN General Assembly, and passed as Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947 (Morris, 2008). The partition plan led to an increase in the number and intensity of inter-communal attacks reaching its apex with the Massacre at the village of Deir Yassine in 1948 where 254 Arab villagers were killed by Irgun and Stern Gang combatants, who were considered terrorist organizations by the mandate authorities (Wright, 2014).

On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency executive committee, declared the founding of the Jewish state of Israel in its UN-allocated land in Palestine. The very next day, on May 15, 1948, and contrary to the initial plan, the first Arab-Israeli war began with the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan moving into the Arab-allocated UN parts of the partition plan and the Lebanese Army being placed on the defensive. The Arabs lost the war, and a series of armistice agreements were signed between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. The Arabs refused to acknowledge the state of Israel (Shlaim, 2014). The Arab military defeat and the initial political refusal of the Arab states to either recognize or make peace with Israel led to the exacerbation of the conflict.

After the bilateral armistice treaties, which Israel broke unilaterally by launching unsanctioned attacks against the Arabs, war broke out repeatedly (Shlaim, 2014). These included the Suez war of 1956, the six-day war of 1967, the war of attrition of 1970, and the Yom Kippur/October war of 1973, along with others the last of which was in 2014.
when Israel attacked Gaza in Operation Protective Edge (Shlaim, 2014). The conflict, starting from the Al Nakbah/War of Independence up until Operation Protective Edge, has led to more than 92,934 deaths as illustrated in Figure 1.1 (“Casualties of Mideast wars, 1991) (“Fatalities in the First Intifada”) (“Gaza Crisis”, 2014) (OCHA, 2007) below.

Figure 1.1: Estimated number of deaths from the Arab-Israeli conflict

In the past 65 years, several attempts at peace between Israel and the Palestinians were made. The most prominent were the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo I Accord in 1993, the Oslo II Accord in 1995, the Camp David summit in 2000, and the Taba talks in 2001 (Shlaim, 2014).

The Arabs, along with their Palestinian kin and the Israelis, have sensed the urgency for peace and have undergone several peace initiatives such as the Camp David I Egyptian-Israeli Peace Conference in 1978, Jordanian-Israeli Washington talks in 1994, and the Israeli-Syrian Geneva Peace talks in 2000.
Yet out of all these peace initiatives, only a few stand out; the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David which yielded the Camp David Accords of 1978, the Jordanian-Israeli Washington Talks which resulted in the Wadi Araba peace treaty of 1994, and the Palestinian-Israeli Camp David peace summit in 2000 which unfortunately failed (Quandt, 2005).

This paper will be focusing on Camp David II, the peace summit considered to be the last serious peace initiative between the Palestinians and Israelis which has engendered a blame game by many scholars and experts regarding who is to blame for its failure (Quandt, 2005).

1.1.2 U.S Mediation’s road to Camp David II

The Camp David II summit did not happen overnight but was rather a culmination of a series of negotiations. This subsection shows the importance of the successive Palestinian-Israeli peace processes and how they led to Camp David II.

Oslo I

In January 1993, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, who were both Israeli academics and peace activists began to lay the foundation of a prospective peace process with Palestinians in the city of London. Through a series of contacts, they eventually met Ahmed Querie, the PLO finance minister who expressed his readiness to participate in such a process. Hirschfeld and Pundak thus informed Yossi Beilin, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, who gave them his approval and Ahmed Querie informed Arafat who gave him his approval as well (Tyler, 2012). Hearing of this, the Norwegian
social scientist Terje Rod Larsen and Norwegian foreign minister Johan Joergen Holst enthusiastically offered their support and thus began the secret talks in Oslo, the capital of Norway, in late January 1993. A range of issues were comfortably discussed away from the prying eyes of the media and ranged from the two-state solution to economic cooperation (Shlaim, 2014). What started as informal talks in late January soon gained official status in May. As a result, Uri Savir and Yoel Singer from the foreign ministry flew into Oslo to represent the Israeli government meanwhile Ahmed Querie remained the PLO representative in the negotiations. The secret talks lasted until August. By that time, Rabin and Arafat had revised and approved the resulting ‘Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements’ also known as the ‘Oslo Agreement’ (Tyler, 2012). The time was ripe for both leaders to support the agreement. For Rabin, the peace camp in Israel was strong, and the Israelis were starting to question the necessity of the occupation considering the economic and moral costs it had on Israel. For Arafat, he needed a boost of influence and international support to solidify his legitimacy after a series of political miscalculations had weakened him. Both Rabin and Arafat also shared enmity with Hamas that was firing rockets into Israel and challenging Arafat’s leadership role simultaneously (Shlaim, 2014).

After its approval, the Norwegians, knowing the extent of the conflict’s asymmetrical character, suggested that the United States be the one to follow through on the implementation of the Oslo agreement since it was the only one that could bring some balance in the negotiation process between the two sides (Fixdal, 2012). The Oslo Agreement was, in essence, a five-year plan of negotiations in which both sides would follow a functionalist approach in building trust and finally end the period with a Final
Status Negotiations summit where highly sensitive issues like Jerusalem and Refugees would be discussed (Tyler, 2012).

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<td>2000</td>
<td>Camp David II Summit</td>
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Table 1.1: Timeline of Palestine-Israel Peace Agreements/Accord/Memorandums

The U.S., who found the Oslo talks unrealistic at first (Kurtzer, 2013), invited both parties to a signing ceremony of the agreement on the Whitehouse lawn. This would mark the active return of U.S. intervention in the Palestine-Israel conflict after the brief Norwegian interlude. On September 13, 1993, the agreement was signed and witnessed the famous handshake of two bitter enemies; Rabin and Arafat (“The 50 years war”, 2000).

In the evening of September 13, 1993, a reception at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington was held in honor of the peacemakers. If the Rabin-Arafat handshake was
considered to be a shock to the world, what came next proved to be even more of a shock. On the podium with the U.S President Clinton and Vice President Gore, Arafat and Rabin were, to their surprise, called upon to give speeches. Arafat took the chance to give a few warm words. Rabin replied noting that “Jews were not famous for their sporting abilities, except when it came to speechmaking, at which they were Olympic Champions. It seems to me Mr. Chairman that, that you are a little Jewish” (Indyk, 2017, p. 1-3). Arafat replied, “Yes, yes, Rachel is my aunt!” (Indyk, 2017, p. 1-3). Everyone present found this public humor and display of affection between both sides to be groundbreaking. However, groundbreaking still, was Rabin speaking that night of Palestinian right for self-determination and about an independent Palestinian state saying “separation, not because of hatred, but because of respect” (Indyk, 2017, p. 3). This showed Rabin’s faith that the Palestinians were serious about peace, especially after their recognition of the state of Israel on September 9, 1993, their recognition of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and their support for the revocation of UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 which equates Zionism with Racism. (Swisher, 2004) All of this showed how solid the Arafat-Rabin peace partnership was.

After the Oslo agreement was signed, spoilers on both sides spared no time to try and sabotage the agreement. On the Palestinian side, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were releasing statements condemning the agreement, calling it a legitimization of the occupation, and accusing Arafat of being a traitor. On the Israeli side, the right wing and religious zealots like Ariel Sharon, Rehavam Ze’evi, and Rafael Eitan went to work condemning Rabin and the agreement via statements (Helmick, 2004). Benyamin
Netanyahu also stirred up the Israeli right wing and held mass rallies in opposition to the peace process (Swisher, 2004).

Opposition to the agreement was not limited to verbal condemnation but also took more violent forms. On February 25, 1994, Israeli settler and right-winger Baruch Goldstein entered the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and opened fire with his Uzi. Twenty-nine people who were praying were murdered, and seventy-nine were wounded (Helmick, 2004). On July 1995, Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up at Ramat Gan in Tel Aviv killing ten Israeli citizens and wounding hundreds of them (Tyler, 2012). These spoilers of the peace process on both sides would continue to attack the peace process initiated in Oslo until the bitter end.

Regarding implementation, two committees were put in charge to oversee the Oslo process. The first was to be on a ministerial level and chaired by Mahmoud Abbas for the Palestinian side and Shimon Peres for the Israeli side. The second committee consisted of a panel of experts that meet every other week to come up with an agenda and deal with military affairs and transfer of authority. The second committee included Nabil Sha’ath from the Palestinian side and Major General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak from the Israeli side. Rabin’s appointments would prove to be a hindrance to the peace process. Rabin, while knowing the ineffectiveness and stubbornness of the military, appointed high ranking officers to take part in the negotiations to both appease the military and make sure that Shimon Peres does not give too many concessions. The military disliked the Oslo Accord since, in the words of Chief of Staff Barak who would later become Prime Minister, “it conceded too much to the PLO” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 541). From that point on, Israel would either give fewer concessions than the ones
agreed upon or change them in a manner acceptable to it. The rate of backtracking and changing varied from one Prime Minister to another (Helmick, 2004).

Cairo Agreement

Four months after the Oslo implementation committee was established, negotiators on both sides reached a two-part agreement. The first part was on general principles and the second was on border crossings. Both Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres signed the two-part agreement, which is referred to as the Cairo Agreement, on February 9, 1994, in Cairo. This agreement founded numerous liaison committees in which both sides were equally represented. Yet, this parity was only for show since the agreement put the Israelis at an advantage. It was shown that any issue that could not be resolved via negotiations was subject to Israeli law instead of International law (Shlaim, 2014).

After the signing of this agreement, a Palestinian police force entered Gaza from the Rafah border crossing with Egypt to assume internal security as stated in Article VIII of Oslo I. The Israelis, however, did not withdraw as specified by Article V and VI of Oslo. However, in what would become a constant action, they reformulated withdrawal and undertook ‘controlled withdrawal’ in which they redeployed to areas outside of city centers and near Israeli settlements (Laquer & Schueftan, 2016).

Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip “Oslo II”

Pushing through the negotiation’s rough patches, the protests by the Israeli right, and the attacks launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad(PIJ) and Hamas, the Palestinians and Israelis reached their next agreement. On September 28, 1995, both sides signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip also referred to as Oslo II. This
agreement, unlike previous agreements, was more comprehensive and was over three hundred pages. It talked about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from distinctly Palestinian population centers, elections to a Palestinian Council, and the transfer of legislative authority to the aforementioned council (Shlaim, 2014). The main tenet, however, was the division of the West Bank into three areas: Area A includes Palestinian urban areas and towns, Area B includes Palestinian villages and areas that are less densely populated, and Area C includes confiscated land that contains settlements and roads. Palestinian control would vary depending on the area; Palestinians would have exclusive control of Area A, civilian authority over Area B, and no control over Area C. Oslo II proved to be a disappointment since it was assumed that there would be peace during the transition. In reality, there was not. There were constant Israeli border closures that led to a drop in the standard of living, and a deterioration of human rights to enhance security by both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (Quandt, 2005). The agreement, however, showed that Oslo had lasted for two years despite the attacks by the hawks on both sides and that territory for a future Palestinian state was starting to take shape (Tyler, 2012).

On November 4, 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin held a rally in support of the Oslo Peace Process as a response to the anti-Oslo rallies held by Netanyahu. After finishing singing songs of peace and descending from the stage, Prime Minister Rabin was shot three times by an Israeli student and fanatic called Yigal Amir dealing a huge blow to the Oslo Peace Process (“Netanyahu, Rabin, and the Assassination,” 2016).

Despite the delay in delivering certain concessions and the reformulation of others, Rabin respected Arafat’s concerns, (Indyk, 2017) he was ready to make important
concessions and sacrifices for the sake of peace, (Swisher, 2004) he did his best to contain the spoilers from his side, he apologized for any violence that might have sprung up from his end, he accepted the dangers to come as a result of his work, (“Netanyahu, Rabin, and the Assassination”, 2016) and he recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination as well as Palestinian statehood (Indyk, 2017). His death was a major loss for the peace camp in Israel, his PLO partners, and President Clinton who had based his Middle East peace plan on Rabin’s blueprints.

Rabin’s death changed the U.S role in the peace process. Initially, the United States was not given any monitoring role by Oslo; the U.S government thus confined its role to defusing crises and propping up the Palestinian Authority with security assistance and economic aid. After the tragic death of Prime Minister Rabin, the Clinton administration decided to be more actively involved by shifting from facilitative mediation to procedural mediation (Office of the Historian).

After Rabin’s demise, work to salvage what was left of Oslo, and the peace process began. Peres was placed as acting Prime Minister and was supported by both Clinton and Arafat. The mission now was getting a pro-peace candidate to hold the Israeli Premiership. With elections coming up and Netanyahu running for the premiership against Peres, the competition was fierce (Tyler. 2012). In a phone call with Peres, Arafat swore to keep up the pressure on spoilers from his side and block terrorist attacks. Clinton used his popularity in Israel to try and tip the election scales in Peres’s favor; he appeared alongside Peres at Rabin’s gravesite, he held a summit for Arab leaders in Sharam El-Sheikh with both Peres and Arafat in attendance, and held an event for them
both in Washington where he pledged $1 billion dollars to help Israel fight terrorism (Swisher, 2004).

Despite the efforts made by Clinton, Arafat, and members of the Israeli peace camp, Peres’ actions would ultimately lead to him losing the elections to Netanyahu. Constantly opposing heavy-handed military options when the time came to deal with terrorists gave the image that Peres was soft. In an attempt to shed himself of this image, he ordered a major attack on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. This attack resulted in the shelling of the UN refugee camp of Qana and the death of over one-hundred civilians. At that point, he lost the Israeli Arabs’ vote which consisted of twenty percent of the Israeli population who now labeled him as a ‘war criminal’ (Swisher, 2004).

*Hebron Accords*

On May 29, 1996, Benyamin Netanyahu, a staunch opponent of the Oslo Peace Process was elected as Prime Minister of Israel. His role proved to be more disruptive than productive when it came to the peace process. He refused to view the Palestinians as peace partners and did not honor previous agreements; he did not establish a safe passage from the West Bank to Gaza, pull out of Hebron, and did not further redeploy from the West Bank. As a result, the Palestinian standard of living deteriorated further. Palestinian-Israeli relations worsened and to add insult to injury, Netanyahu blew open an archeological tunnel close to the Al-Aqsa Mosque on September 25. This further enraged the Palestinians (Shlaim, 2014). Palestinian protestors were met with Israeli soldiers’ gunfire. However, to their surprise, the Israelis were met with gunfire from their counterparts in the Palestinian security forces which further complicated matters. In
October, the United States pressured both sides into continuing negotiations and brought them to the White House to resume talks. Upon their arrival, Clinton hosted them for lunch and left them to negotiate alone. Clinton ended up being more of a facilitator than a mediator that day. On January 15, 1997, the PLO and Israel signed the Hebron Agreement that came to be known as the Hebron Accords (Quandt, 2005). The agreement divided Hebron into two parts; H1 & H2. H1 was the Palestinian Zone that constituted 80 percent of Hebron meanwhile H2, the Israeli zone, was 20 percent of Hebron. The Hebron Accords, besides the withdrawal from H1, committed the Israelis to conduct three other redeployments in the West Bank over the coming eighteen months (Shlaim, 2014). Netanyahu, however, would not stop complicating matters there. After the Hebron Accords, he began construction of a settlement between Bethlehem and Jerusalem called Har Homa which put the peace process in mortal danger once again (Tyler, 2012).

*Wye River Memorandum*

Despite all the rough times, the peace process was going through in Netanyahu’s era; negotiations continued under American pressure. On October 1998, Netanyahu was forced to attend a summit meeting with Arafat at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. After seventy-two hours of negotiations, President Clinton succeeded in helping both parties reach a deal. On October 23, 1998, the deal was signed (Shlaim, 2014). The Memorandum stated that Israel would release a number of Palestinian prisoners and withdraw from thirteen percent of the West Bank in nine months thus giving the Palestinian Authority full or partial control over forty percent of the territory. It also stated that the Palestinians would have to assist the CIA in arresting *Hamas* and PIJ.
extremists (Quandt, 2005). Yet, upon his return to Israel, Netanyahu suspended the Wye River Memorandum after *Hamas* and PIJ attacks on Israel due to Arafat’s arrest of *Hamas* leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Only under intense pressure from Clinton did Netanyahu continue the implementation of the withdrawal. Yet, despite the pressure, he refused to release some prisoners as promised (Tyler, 2012).

The peace process was not the only thing disrupted during Netanyahu’s Premiership. Netanyahu’s actions and policies had caused a polarization in Israeli society and intensified internal divisions. Seeing this, Ehud Barak, member of Israel’s labor party decided to run for elections under the banner of unifying Israel and finishing the work Rabin started; seeing the peace process through to completion (Shlaim, 2014). However, in 1999, the Knesset saw an increase in the number of seats of small religious and settler parties like Shas and Yisrael BaAliyah respectively and a decrease in the number of seats of the two major traditional parties. This had a great effect on Barak’s rhetoric and decisions since he would need to rely on religious, settler, and other hardliner parties to maintain his government (Mahler, 2011).

Barak, with Clinton’s endorsement and Arafat’s plea to the Israeli Arab voter, eventually won the 1999 election and became the 10th Prime Minister of the State of Israel. His victory speech was a reflection of how paradoxical his campaign slogans and actions would be:

“I would like to mention in particular that one special person who had a unique role in our reaching this moment, somebody who was my commander and guide and the person who led me into politics, our teacher and guiding light: Yitzhak Rabin. I know that if
Yitzhak is looking down at us from heaven, he is proud of us today, just as we are proud of him, and he knows that together we will fulfill his heritage. We will move quickly toward separation from the Palestinians within four security Red Lines: a united Jerusalem under our sovereignty as the capital of Israel for eternity, period; under no conditions will we return to the 1967 borders; no foreign army west of the Jordan River; and most of the settlers in Judea and Samaria will be in settlement blocs under our sovereignty. Any permanent arrangement will be put to a national referendum. In the long run, you, the people of Israel, will decide” (Swisher, 2004, p. 15).

Barak, the former Chief of Staff initially opposed to Oslo, proved to be worse than Netanyahu in many aspects. His desire to fulfill his campaign slogans, his personal views regarding Oslo, and pressure from hardliners in his coalition government were all factors that butt heads (Freleich, 2012) and had caused Barak to constantly backtrack and attempt to outsmart his peace partner Arafat to get out of commitments previously made to the PLO chairman (Kurtzer, 2013). Settlement building authorization under Barak was even higher than the number of authorizations under Netanyahu (Helmick, 2004). All of this did not bode well with Arafat who eventually considered Netanyahu to be more trustworthy and even preferred dealing with Sharon over Barak at times (Kurtzer, 2013).

Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum

On July 11, 1999, Barak and Arafat met for the first time at the Erez crossing between Israel and Gaza. In the meeting, Arafat handed Barak a list of unfulfilled Israeli commitments agreed to in the Wye River Memorandum (Shlaim, 2014). These included
the release of Palestinian prisoners, further Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories, and opening a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank (Swisher, 2004). In what came to be a textbook Barak move, the Israeli Prime Minister refused to honor the commitments made by his predecessor. He believed that conceding all of the abovementioned would drastically decrease Israel’s leverage in the final status negotiations which Barak desperately wanted (Shlaim, 2014).

As a result, deadlock ensued until Barak agreed to yield some ground and on September 4, 1999, both parties met at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt. With the U.S Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, President of Egypt, and the King of Jordan present, they both signed on the ‘Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum’ or Wye II. This new memorandum extended the deadline for the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum to January 20, 2000, (Shlaim, 2014) heralded in the time for a permanent settlement and divided this permanent settlement into two phases; ‘Framework Agreement for Permanent Settlement (FAPS)’ which was set for February 2000 and the ‘Comprehensive Agreement for Permanent Settlement (CAPS)’ which was set for September 2000 (Swisher, 2004).

All of the abovementioned agreements, accords, and memorandums eventually led to the Camp David II agreement. As has been a common practice by Israeli prime ministers, Barak did not follow the deadline of the CAPS and pushed for the summit to be held earlier in July even though neither he nor Arafat was properly prepared for it (Shlaim, 2014).
1.2 Research Question, Relevance, and Limitations

1.2.1 Research Question
The literature on Camp David II primarily revolves around a blame game where either Palestinian President Yasser Arafat or Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak are accused of being the reason for the Camp David II peace summit failure. The summit, which was considered the last serious attempt at achieving some semblance of peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, had gone in the annals of history as a missed opportunity. After canvassing the Mediation Literature, the role of the mediator was found to be overlooked. This was highlighted by Dr. Jacob Bercovitch, a prominent Conflict Resolution scholar, in his book ‘Mediation in International Relations’:

“To gain a better understanding of mediation, we must know something about the context of interactions, and the needs, interests, and capabilities of the mediator. Shifting the focus from the disputants to the mediator may seem a pretty obvious point, but it is, nonetheless, one we have neglected to do for far too long.” (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1993, p. 21)

In 2013, Dr. Joyce Neu, a specialist in conflict resolution and founder of ‘Facilitating Peace,’ talked about the concept of ‘International Mediation Theory’ in the International Peace & Security Institute Bologna Symposium (Nyoun, 2013). International Mediation Theory is a specific approach to mediation theory which includes a study of track diplomacy, stages of mediation, and mediation strategy. The abovementioned theory will be used in this Thesis for two main reasons. First, it is highly relevant to mediation studies in general since it is concerned with mediation processes and in specific since it has a mediator-centric component which could address the ‘mediator neglect’ gap.
Second, it is advocated by several conflict resolution scholars such as Saadia Touval, William Zartman, and Jacob Bercovitch who have emphasized the importance of studying the role of the mediator in their work.

This thesis will thus be offering a new perspective with regards to the events that unfolded at Camp David II through hypothesizing that the U.S mediation team played a part in the summit’s failure and will attempt to contribute in filling this gap of ‘mediator neglect’ specifically in the case of these negotiations. It will be combining international mediation theory, Dr. Bercovitch’s qualitative analysis framework found in his book ‘Mediation in International Relations’ which can be viewed in figure 1.2 below, and the Camp David II case study to answer the research question ‘Did the U.S mediation team’s role contribute to the failure of Camp David II?’

1.2.2 Relevance of the Research
The relevance of this research is threefold. First, it narrows the scope of focus by taking a look at the U.S Mediation team’s role in Camp David II through a mediation and discourse analysis instead of joining the prevalent blame-game. Second, it enriches the literature on both its topical component, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its methodological component, namely conflict resolution by providing a new perspective on the reasons behind the failure of the historic summit. Third, it enhances our understanding of the bidirectional relationship between international affairs and conflict resolution.

1.2.3 Research Limitations
There are three main research limitations which this thesis faced; limited primary sources, limited official records, and the absence of a quantitative measurement tool.
There exists a limitation in terms of sources. The information gathered for the writing of this thesis has been solely gathered from secondary sources. The researcher, being a Lebanese Citizen, does not have access to neither Israeli officials nor Palestinian Authority officials in order to take a first-hand account about what they went through in the Camp David summit and their impressions regarding its functionality and usefulness. Also, the researcher, due to the lack of access to the U.S. government and a research grant, did not have access to key U.S government officials who were involved in the mediation process at Camp David. This limitation was overcome by studying existing research on the Arab-Israeli conflict conducted by experts, reading transcripts of interviews conducted with key U.S. officials, reading meeting minutes taken by negotiators who participated in the summit and reading memoirs.

No official record exists on what happened in Camp David II save for the statements and accounts of U.S government officials, but even those are contradictory at times. Dennis Ross, Special Middle East Coordinator, who was in charge of the summit and its record-keeping decided to keep the notes to himself and produce a book titled ‘The Missing Peace’ instead of coming up with a detailed report on the events that occurred to be placed in the U.S government’s archives. This limitation was overcome through gathering day-to-day occurrences by studying the accounts of various mediators and negotiators who participated in the summit in order to form the full picture.

The absence of a quantitative measurement tool prohibits the measurement of the extent of the U.S Mediation team’s contribution to the failure of the Camp David II peace summit. This limitation was overcome through the discourse analysis which utilized testimonies, interview transcripts, and meeting minutes from summit participants from
all three sides to enable us to qualitatively determine the size of this contribution compared to other factors that have led to its failure.
1.3 Methodology

Figure 1. 2: Framework for the Analysis of Mediation Strategy and Behavior

Using the above framework, the research is divided into three parts mirroring the three phases of the above model.

Part 1 will look to identify antecedent conditions that include the nature of dispute, issues, relationship, and parties. Setting the stage is very important in any mediation analysis, even if such an analysis will later solely focus on the mediator’s role. Knowing and highlighting the dispute, issues, and parties both directly and indirectly influence the mediator’s discourse and strategy. The reason is, according to Bercovitch, that mediation evaluation should not be seen as being unidirectional, but rather as being bidirectional with all factors influencing each other (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1993). This will be done through using history books written by historians and political scientists, and experts such as Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Patrick Tyler, and Clayton Swisher, documentaries
by David Ash and Dai Richards, and Shelly Seywell, analytical books on the disputants and their relationship with mediator by experts such as Gregory Mahler, William Quandt, and Dennis Ross, and think-tank reports by the Council of Foreign Relations among others.

Part 2 will show, what was considered at the time, the current conditions of the mediator through looking at the two main variables that will be used for the analysis of the mediation done by the U.S. team. The two variables taken into consideration are first: the identity and rank of the mediator and second: the mediator’s mediation strategy and discourse. The indicators for both variables are outlined in figure 1.3 below.

![Figure 1.3: Variables and Indicators](image)

**Identity and rank of mediator**
- "Type" of Mediator
- International Standing (Rank)
- Availability of Resources from the Mediation Sponsoring Institution(s)

**Mediation strategy and discourse**
- Mediation Strategy
- Use of Resources offered by the Mediation Sponsoring Institution(s)

Figure 1.3: Variables and Indicators

*Identity and Rank of Mediator:*

This variable is based on Dr. Jacob Bercovitch’s mediator typology which identifies six different types of mediators; leaders of regional organizations, representatives of regional organizations, leaders of small governments, representatives of small governments, leaders of large states, and representatives of large states (Bercovitch, 1996). Dr. Bercovitch’s typology was chosen for two main reasons. First, it is an integral...
part of Bercovitch’s ‘Framework for the Analysis of Mediation Strategy and Behavior’ (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1993, p. 20) which this thesis is using as its research methodology. Second, a study on the correlation between the mediator type and mediation success conducted by Dr. Bercovitch has identified these six types to be the most common ones (Bercovitch, 1986). This variable thus identifies who the mediators are, the level of authority they have, the amount and types of leverage/resources they possess. It is important because it is the stepping stone in any analysis of the mediators’ nature, their capabilities, and, consequently, the strategy options available to them. Another reason why this variable is important is that studies in the mediation field have shown a correlation between the successes of different mediation cases and the type of mediator called upon to mediate. Thus, the mediator type has an influence on the mediator’s strategic options and the mediation’s outcome. This will be done by looking at books and journal articles about the components of international mediation by experts such as Jacob Bercovitch, Donetter Willem, and Theodore Anagnoson and analytical books on the Palestine-Israel negotiation process by experts such as Fr. Raymond Helmick, Clayton Swisher, and Martin Indyk.

Mediation Strategy and Discourse:

This variable will be using Bercovitch’s classification of strategies that are based on Sheppard’s taxonomy of mediator behavior. The classification lists three main mediation strategies that are found all along the continuum ranging from high intervention to low intervention (Bercovitch, 1996). Bercovitch’s classification was chosen because it is a clear-cut summary of previous classifications done by scholars such as Kressel, Kolb,
Stein, and Touval. Bercovitch’s classification, along with the intervention spectrum, is presented in table 1.1 and figure 1.4 below respectively.

### Mediation Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication-facilitation strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Maintain a Channel of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Little control over substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Encourage meaningful communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Make sure interests of all parties are discussed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedural strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Choose meetings site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manage Spoilers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Control timing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Structure agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Keep parties at the table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Keep process focused on issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directive strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Providing incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Issuing ultimatums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Offering rewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Offering punishments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Introducing new proposals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2: Mediation Strategies
Figure 1. 4: Spectrum of Mediation Strategy Intervention

Communication-Facilitation strategies are passive strategies where the mediator has no control over the substance and content of agreements reached between both sides. In this strategy, the mediator is the channel of communication between both sides and makes sure that the communication between both sides is clear (Bercovitch et al., 2009).

Procedural strategies involve the mediator taking formal control of the mediation process, regarding the environment in which the mediation will take place. The mediator is the one who picks the location, the degree of media publicity it will have, and what the structure of the agenda will look like. At this point it also falls on the mediator too, if he/she has the resources, to manage spoilers and make sure that both parties stay at the negotiating table (Bercovitch et al., 2009).

Directive strategies are active strategies in the sense that they are directly involved with the content of the agreement and in pushing both sides to reach an agreement. At this stage, the mediator observes the demands and needs of both sides and submits a proposal to both. Also, if he/she has the leverage and/or ability to do so, the mediator can push
both sides either through incentives or punishments to reach an agreement (Bercovitch et al., 2009).

This variable shows the strategy/mode which the mediators chose, and one cannot seek to analyze a mediating team’s role without showing their strategy and discourse. The mediators’ choice of strategy is important since it can also influence the outcome of the mediation process (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009). This chosen strategy shows the amount of resources the mediators want to commit and their behavior. This variable is pivotal to the determination of mediation success or failure. The chosen strategy, its planning, and its implementation vis-à-vis the disputants give a lot of information about the process, its positive points, and its negative ones. This will be done by looking at journal articles on international mediation strategy written by mediation experts Saadia Touval and William Zartman, books about the components of international mediation by experts such as Jacob Bercovitch, Morton Deutsch, and Hugh Mial, memoirs and meeting minutes written by participants in the Camp David II Peace summit such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, William Quandt, Ahmed Qurie, and Shlomo Ben-Ami, journal articles written on the summit by summit participants such as Robert Malley and experts such as Hussein Agha, books on the peace process by experts such as Fr. Raymond Helmick and Clayton Swisher, and documentaries on the peace process directed by Mark Anderson.

Part three will be responsible for evaluating the U.S mediation team’s role and showing the consequent conditions through the use of subjective and objective criteria. The criteria can be found in figure 1.5 below.
Subjective Criteria:

- Parties’ Satisfaction: Whether or not the parties were satisfied with the outcome of the mediation process
- Fairness: Whether or not the disputants thought that they were being treated fairly
- Efficiency: The amount of time it takes and the costs involved
- Effectiveness: The implementability and permanence of a settlement

Objective Criteria:

- Behavior of the parties after Mediation
- Interaction between the parties after Mediation

The Objective criteria listed below will be measured by using negotiator statements, mediator statements, press releases, and history books.

- Behavior of the Parties: The way the disputants behaved after mediation was over
Interaction between the parties: The way the disputants interacted after the mediation was over

This will be done by looking at history books written by historians of the Arab-Israeli conflict such as Avi Shlaim, Patrick Tyler, Benny Morris, and Ilan Pappe, analytical books on the Arab-Israeli conflict by experts such as Patrick Tyler and Clayton Swisher, documentaries on the peace process directed by Mark Anderson, and memoirs written by participants in the Camp David II Peace summit such as Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, William Quandt, Ahmed Qurie, and Shlomo Ben-Ami.

There are challenges contributing to weakness in my thesis from the outset; it is solely based on secondary sources due to the lack of access to officials from the mediation team and the disputing parties, the case studies’ accompanying respective flaws, which involve overlooking other contributions to the way the studied process unfolds, the inability to remove counterfactual explanations because of missing control groups, overlooking other factors and variables that might have contributed to the failure of Camp David II, and the absence of methods that measure the extent of the impact the U.S mediation team’s role on the peace summit.
Conflict in the Middle East has been exacerbated by the founding of the State of Israel. It is conflicts like these that have given the international community and academics the sense of urgency to find ways to resolve conflicts. It is thus no surprise in a conflict as complex and intense as the Palestine-Israel conflict that a failed peace summit would attract a large amount of controversy and academic inquiry.

The literature review conducted for this thesis covers existing literature on conflict resolution/mediation theories that have been developed to address the subject of international mediation and the existing theories and literature regarding the failure of the Camp David II negotiations.

2.1 Conflict Resolution/Mediation Theories

Mediation, simply put, is a conflict resolution method which involves a third party helping two or more disputants reach their solution to the problem. However, when it comes to finding an exact definition, you find that there are several that have been put forth by different scholars. Doob defines it as "the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution” (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 13). Mitchell defines mediation as "any intermediary activity undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending
disruptive conflict behavior” (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 13). Froberg and Taylor define it as "the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs” (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 13). Moore defines mediation as "the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute” (Kriesberg et al., 2007, p. 166). Singer defines mediation as a "form of third-party assistance [that] involves an outsider to the dispute who lacks the power to make decisions for the parties” (Kriesberg et al., 2007, p. 166).

Mediation is arguably one of the most popular and frequently used technique when it comes to peaceful political conflict resolution. It was the preferred method of intervention in one-fifth of interstate conflicts between 1945 and the year 2000. Its use has continued well into the post-cold war era and branched out to include intervention in intrastate conflicts (Beber, 2012). What sets mediation apart from other third-party conflict resolution methods is that it is initiated and ended upon request and that the mediator (third-party) has no decision-making power and leaves it with the disputants (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009). Despite the convenience and popularity of such a conflict resolution technique, there are specific conditions in which mediation is most likely to be used. According to Bercovitch, there are four conditions: a conflict has been dragging on for a long period of time, the peacemaking efforts of the individuals or actors involved in the conflict have proved to be futile, neither party to the conflict is prepared
to bear further costs or escalation, and/or both parties are open to some form of mediation to keep a direct or indirect channel of communication going between them. Mediation can thus be considered an extension of the negotiation process (Bercovitch, 1996).

With regards to political mediation, conflict resolution scholars, based on Jacob Bercovitch's categorization, attribute mediation success to one or more of the four different types of factors as illustrated in Table 2.1 (Bercovitch, 1996):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory/ Factor of Success</th>
<th>Authors Supporting the Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Disputes</td>
<td>Arthur S. Lall, Dean G. Pruitt, Frederick Samuel Northedge, Joel Brockner, John Hill Burton, Jacob Bercovitch, Michael D. Donelan, Marvin C. Ott, Oran R. Young, Saadia Touval, William Zartman, Debra L. Shapiro, David A. Brookmire, Dean G. Pruitt, Daniel Frei, Elmore Jackson, Frank Edmead, Frederick Samuel Northedge, Frank Sistrunk, Guy-Oliver Faure, Jeanne M. Brett, Jacob Bercovitch, Janice Gross Stein, Jeffrey Cruikshank, Kenneth Kressel, Lawrence Susskind, Michael D. Donelan, Oran R. Young, Peter Carnevale, Paul Ernest Wehr, Rita Drieghe, Saadia Touval, Thomas A. Kochan, William P. Smith, William Zartman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Mediator</td>
<td>Debra L. Shapiro, David A. Brookmire, Dean G. Pruitt, Daniel Frei, Elmore Jackson, Frank Edmead, Frederick Samuel Northedge, Frank Sistrunk, Guy-Oliver Faure, Jeanne M. Brett, Jacob Bercovitch, Janice Gross Stein, Jeffrey Cruikshank, Kenneth Kressel, Lawrence Susskind, Michael D. Donelan, Oran R. Young, Peter Carnevale, Paul Ernest Wehr, Rita Drieghe, Saadia Touval, Thomas A. Kochan, William P. Smith, William Zartman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation Process</td>
<td>Deborah M. Kolb, Donette L. Wille, Jean Marie Hiltrop, Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The scholars Bercovitch, Brockner, Burton, Donelan, Lall, Northedge, Ott, Pruitt, Touval, Young, and Zartman believe that the nature of the dispute, involving timing of intervention, fatalities and conflict intensity at the time of intervention, and the duration of the conflict, is an important determinant of mediation success. The scholars above state that the duration of the conflict and the moment of intervention can be a determinant of success. They are however divided on when the right moment for mediation is. Edmead (1971) states that it is better to start mediation at an early stage of the conflict whereas Northedge & Donelan (1971), Ott (1972), and Pruitt (2013) claim that the chances of success are much higher when mediation follows conflict rather than precedes the intensification of the conflict. Zartman & Touval (2001), however, do not attest to any specific time for third-party intervention to take place but rather state that intervention is most successful when the time is ‘ripe’ to do so. The ripe moment, according to Zartman & Touval (2001), is when there is a mutually hurting stalemate and both parties are convinced that there is a peaceful alternative that is less costly than war. There is also a consensus that the number of fatalities in conflict also determines mediations’ success yet there is also disagreement on whether an increased number of fatalities makes success more likely or less likely. Young (1967) claims that the greater the intensity of a dispute, the more likely that mediation will lead to success meanwhile

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1 The 'Environment Factor' encompasses two main points; Location and Surroundings. The location, whether it is at a place owned or run by one of the disputants or is a neutral location for all disputants has a significant effect on the course of the mediation. Surroundings, whether or not the mediation is taking place behind closed doors or is open to the public eye, also have a significant impact on the mediation process.
Brockner (1982) and Burton (1987), claim that higher losses lead to more polarization. With regards to the issue of contention, there are several points of view. Ott (1972) states that the absence of pivotal national security interests and territorial disputes is an important precondition for successful mediation. Lall (1966) states that it is even difficult to resort to mediation when territory is at stake since the party in possession of the territory would resist involving a third-party. However, they all seem to agree that the adversaries' perception of the issue is what determines whether or not a mediation initiative will be selected and whether or not it will have much success.

Scholars like Brett, Bercovitch, Brookmire, Carnevale, Cruikshank, Dreighe, Donelan, Edmead, Frei, Faure, Gross-Stein, Jackson, Northedge, Kressel, Pruitt, Sistrunk, Susskind, Shapiro, Smith, Touval, Wehr, Young, and Zartman believe that the nature of the mediator, involving mediator rank and relationship with the parties, is an important determinant of success. Wehr (1979) believes that an effective mediator is one who knows the conflict, sense of timing, active listening skills, procedural skills, communication skills, and crisis management skills is pivotal for mediation success. Bercovitch (1986) believes that intelligence, stamina, energy, and a good sense of humor should be the cornerstone of the mediator's nature. Karim & Pegnetter (1983), and Landsberger (1960) found that trust, credibility, and a high degree of skill and competence are necessary preconditions of an effective mediator and a successful mediation. Young (1967), Northedge, and Donelan (1971) believe that even-handedness is the key to effective mediation. Touval & Zartman (1985) believe that the key is the leverage that the mediator possesses. Bercovitch believes that mediator rank holds clout over whether or not mediation will be successful or not (Bercovitch, 1986). The success
rates measured by him dependent on mediator rank can be found in table 2.2 below (Bercovitch, 1996).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediator Rank</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of regional organization</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of regional organizations</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of small governments</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of small governments</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of large states</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of large states</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Mediator Rank-Success Rate Correlation

There is a consensus among all the previously mentioned scholars that there is a higher chance of success if the mediator had a past relationship with both disputants, or had some alignment, be it religious, economic, or ideological, with the adversaries.

Abdolali, Burton, Bercovitch, Deutsch, Kegley, Kressel, Moaz, Modelski, Mack, Ott, Pruitt, Raymond, Snyder, Young, and Zartman agree that it is the nature of the disputing parties, including their Political and Cultural System, Power Status, and Previous
Relationship with Parties, that are an important determinant of mediation success. Mack & Snyder (1957) state that democratic states are less likely to show external aggression since they can accommodate internal discontent. Moaz & Abdolali (1989) found it to be highly unlikely that democratic states be in dispute with one another. Bercovitch (1996) found that out of all the five regime types (monarchies, military regimes, one-party states, multi-party democratic states) democratic states only account for 30 percent of all mediation cases since they only resort to mediation with parties with different regime types and tend to easily solve disputes with other democracies. With regard to power symmetry, Bercovitch & Houston (2011) found that symmetric disputes have a 53 percent success rate meanwhile asymmetric disputes have a 41 percent success rate. Ott (1972) and Young (1967) found that the smaller the power difference between the disputants, the more effective the mediation. Zartman (2001) states that when two sides either have power parity or are equal in strength, then that would lead them to a mutually hurting stalemate that may force them to consider a peaceful solution to their conflict. Deutsch (1973) identified the dynamism of the previous relationship of disputants to affect the success rate dramatically; if the previous relationship between the disputants were friendly, then the success rate would be 80 percent higher (Deutsch, 1973).

Finally, scholars like Agnoson, Bercovitch, Carnevale, Donohue, Hiltrop, Jick, Kressel, Kolb, Kochan, Pegnetter, Touval, Wille believe that the mediation process, including initiators, mediation environment, and strategies, is the main determinant of mediation success. With regard to initiation, Hiltrop (1985) states that mediation, since it is of a voluntary nature, is most effective when both disputing parties request it. Bercovitch &
Houston (2011) support Hiltrop's claim with an analysis of their dataset whose results can be found in table 2.3 (Bercovitch, 1996) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both disputing parties</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One party</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Organizations</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mediator</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Initiator-Success Rate Correlation

With regard to the mediation environment, there is a consensus among the scholars mentioned above that mediation is most effective when it takes place in a neutral territory without the presence of external pressure or media influence. Bercovitch & Houston's data confirms this and are illustrated in table 2.4 (Bercovitch & Houston, 2011) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation Environment</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

37
Neutral ground | 49.5%-54.4%  
On one of the parties' territory | 45%  
On several territories | 36.4%  

Table 2.4: Mediator Environment-Success Rate Correlation

With regards to mediation strategies, Kochan & Jick (1978), and Touval (1985) see that measuring and conceptualizing the mediator's role, behavior, and strategies is a vital factor that affects the mediation outcome. When it comes to strategic and behavioral typologies, Bercovitch, Kochan, Jick, Kressel, and Kolb all provide their own. Touval and Zartman (1985) also contribute to typologies by coming up with a behavioral continuum ranging from low intervention to high intervention. Kochan and Jick (1978) found that mediators who use high intervention strategies were more successful than mediators who used low intervention. On the other hand, Carnevale & Pegnetter (1985) found that low intervention is more effective. Bercovitch's (1996) study support Kochan and Jick's claim and finds that high intervention strategies have a 52.3 percent success rate meanwhile low intervention yields a 32.2 percent success rate.
2.2 Camp David II
This section introduces the case study, Camp David II, in detail through two sections.

The first section shows us the prelude to Camp David II by providing a historical background starting from the Oslo I, the peace process’ point of origin, and continues through to the other agreements, accords, and memorandums leading up to it. The second section shows us the existing literature composed of the historical texts and analyses on Camp David II.
Literature regarding Camp David II unanimously agrees on the failure of the peace summit but can be categorized as follows: literature blaming Ehud Barak for the failure, literature blaming Dennis Ross, and literature blaming Arafat for the failure.

In 'Negotiating Outside the Law,' Raymond Helmick takes the reader on his journey to aid in achieving Middle East peace by providing insight into the peace deals and using his connections. Along the way, he points out the series of concessions made by the Palestinians to the Israelis in the hopes that a serious negotiation would enable them to achieve statehood. He points out that the Israelis did not fulfill their obligations towards their Palestinian counterparts so that they can push for more concessions from them. Helmick concludes by saying that Israeli feet-dragging is what discouraged the Palestinians from making proper concessions which would have led to a peace agreement and thus blames Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak for the summit's failure (Helmick, 2004). In 'beyond Oslo,' Ahmed Qurie, a Palestinian negotiator present through the entire peace process, recounts his experience and the journey which the Palestinian negotiating team took from the Oslo Accords up until Camp David II. In his book, Qurie talks about his negotiations and conversations with the Israelis in minutiae details and demonstrates the Israeli negotiating team's readiness to make concessions along with Barak's constant reluctance to deliver those concessions. Qurie then defends his delegation against accusations thrown at them for the failure of the conference and shows that Barak's constant backtracking is what caused the Palestinians to be overcautious and ask an abundant number of questions before making concessions. (Qurie, 2008) In 'Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,' Robert Malley and Hussein Agha come to the defense of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat at a time when Western
Media and a certain part of the international academic community were labeling him as the sole cause for the negotiation’s failure. In doing so, they criticize Barak for his ‘all-or-nothing’ approach which caused the summit to occur prematurely without the Palestinians being ready for it. They demonstrate that the Palestinian delegation showed great flexibility and attributed the conference's failure to Barak's backtracking and the small amount of time used for the Taba talks that would have led to a breakthrough if it had been given more time (Malley & Agha, 2001). In an Interview with Middle East Policy, Avi Shlaim puts the main blame on Barak saying "But the Camp David summit failed, and I think the main person responsible for that failure was not Yasser Arafat, but Ehud Barak." Shlaim attributed Barak's failure to his ‘take it or leave it' approach and his refusal to take an interim approach with regards to Palestinian statehood (Shlaim, 2014).

With regards to blaming Ross, the literature mentions numerous acts which the American diplomat did to place hurdles in front of the Palestinian delegation and reduce the peace summit's effectiveness. In 'The Truth about Camp David,' Clayton Swisher talks about Dennis Ross's numerous attempts to force the failure of the Camp David Peace Summit because of his bias towards Israel. The author then moves to talk about administrative hurdles which Ross put in the Palestinians’ way. One example is Ross’ prevention of the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit, which is composed of expat Palestinian advisers and experts, from entry to the summit with ease to help the Palestinian negotiators gain a better understanding of Israeli proposals and issuing counter-proposals. Ross and his biased handling of the list of participants of the conference also put the Palestinians at a disadvantage by barring pro-Arab American
diplomats and officials from taking part in the summit (Swisher, 2004). In 'The Peace Puzzle,' Kurtzer et al. state that Ross was conveniently positioned as Special Middle East Coordinator and housed in the State Department. Nevertheless, he was still U.S President Bill Clinton's point man and had to report to both the White House and State Department. He was accused of having a monopoly on information and giving detailed, and minutiae reports to the white house while keeping the state department under-informed and disregarding its advice (Kurtzer, 2013). In 'The Camp David II Negotiations,' Norman Finkelstein states that Ross constantly and purposefully based the negotiations on needs instead of international law. Basing the negotiations on needs, besides being unjust, put the Palestinians at a grave disadvantage considering that they had international law on their side (Finkelstein, 2007).

In 'The Peace Puzzle,' William B. Quandt criticizes President Clinton, Yasser Arafat, Dennis Ross, and Ehud Barak by showing all of the negative and positive actions they were taking during the Camp David II summit. He did all of this while explaining to the reader the limitations of each of the aforementioned people to somehow justify their actions. He also talked about the main issues in the summit and about the difficulty of reaching an agreement regarding Jerusalem which was the main stumbling block in the agreement (Kurtzer, 2013). Quandt, later on, expands the arguments mentioned in the Clinton administration chapter of the ‘Peace Process’ in ‘Peace Puzzle’ (Quandt, 2005). In 'War, Peace, and American politics,' World Policy Journal interviewed Zbigniew Brzezinski who criticized everyone's role in the Camp David II summit. He blamed the Americans and Israelis for putting forth vague proposals with no maps which Arafat could not accept. He also blamed Arafat for giving the impression that he was rejecting
the proposals when in truth he was only stalling. According to Brzezinski, the combination of vague/unacceptable proposals and Arafat's perceived rejection of proposals caused the falling out at Camp David II (Power, 2007). In his article 'Visions in Collision,' Jeremy Pressman points out the strong points and weak points of both the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. He criticizes the Palestinians for not acknowledging the unprecedented concessions made by the Israeli delegation as well as not putting forward proposals of their own. He also criticizes the Israeli delegation for its vague proposals as well as its brutal response to the second intifada. In a nutshell, he blamed both sides for the deterioration and failure of the summit (Pressman, 2003).

With regards to blaming Yasser Arafat, U.S lead negotiator Dennis Ross was one of the first to do so in his book 'The Missing Peace' which is the only quasi-official record of the Camp David II summit. In the 'Missing Peace,' Ross tells the reader of his time as a special U.S negotiator on the Middle East extending from the Madrid Peace Conference up until the Camp David II summit. The book's main objective, however, is to show that the Clinton Parameters were the solution which the Palestinians dreamed of yet rejected, absolves himself of blame directed at him for being biased towards Israel, and blames Arafat for the failure of the summit. The author criticizes Arafat for not accepting the Clinton Parameters and complains about Arafat's request to ask questions and seek clarifications on the content of the Clinton Parameters document before accepting it or rejecting it. Besides his complaint regarding Arafat's rejection of the Clinton parameters, Ross constantly complains about Arafat's continuous rejection of proposals put forth by the American-Israeli team. In a nutshell, Ross holds Arafat personally responsible for the failure of Camp David II (Ross, 2004). In his book ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Negotiations, 1999-2001,’ Israeli negotiator Gilead Sher talks about his journey with the Israeli team in an attempt to reach a peaceful solution with the Palestinians. Sher provided an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict from his extensive experience negotiating to help find a solution for it. Sher, who was present at Camp David II, analyzes the performance of both Israeli and Palestinian delegations’ performance at the summit and states what the high and low points for both delegations were. However, he concludes that the concessions which Ehud Barak made were unprecedented and that the blame for failure falls upon Arafat for not accepting the deal that he was offered (Sher, 2006). In his book ‘Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002,’ Charles Enderlin interviews leaders and negotiators on all sides to take the reader on the journey which led to the collapse of the peace with the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada. In the chapter on Camp David II, he shows the perspectives of all sides regarding the summit and the working groups held on all the important issues. However, he also acknowledges how unprecedented Barak’s offer was and that Arafat was wrong to refuse it (Enderlin, 2003).
Chapter Three
Case Analysis

This chapter represents the core of this thesis and draws upon Dr. Jacob Bercovitch’s methodology that was presented in chapter 1 to answer the question ‘Did the U.S Mediation Team Contribute to the failure of Camp David II’? The case analysis will be divided into three parts as indicated by Bercovitch’s model; antecedent conditions, current conditions, and consequent conditions. The analysis will begin with the antecedent conditions which will identify the nature of dispute, issues, relationship, and parties to determine what aspects of the conflict’s nature, directly and indirectly, influence the mediator’s discourse and strategy. It will then move on to the current conditions which will analyze the mediator’s identity, strategy options, chosen strategy, and discourse. Finally, it will move to the consequent conditions in which the evaluation of the mediator’s performance will take place.

3.1 Antecedent Conditions

This section will cover the first part of the analysis; the antecedent conditions. It will tackle the nature of the dispute, issues, parties, and relationship. This section is key to setting the stage for the core of the analysis that will take place in parts 2 and 3 of the model. It enables us to be more familiar with the conflict and understand its inner-workings better. Also, knowing the nature of the conflict and its characteristics shows us what may, directly and indirectly, influence the mediator’s discourse, strategy, and choices.
3.1.1 Nature of the Dispute
This subsection will talk about the nature of the dispute between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Palestine-Israel conflict is a deep-rooted asymmetrical conflict over territory which also includes both cultural and religious differences between the disputants. A brief history of the conflict, as described by Shlaim, can be viewed in the timeline shown in figure 3.1 (Shlaim, 2014) below. This subsection will talk about the dispute’s three main components as identified by the mainstream literature: territory, religion, and culture (Quandt, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events as viewed by the Palestinians</th>
<th>Events as viewed by the Israelis/Jewish Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians question the arrival of Non-Palestinian Jews to their shores and express concern</td>
<td>World Zionist Congress and Jewish Agency view the travel of Non-Palestinian Jews to Palestine as a right</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians question the arrival of Non-Palestinian Jews to their shores and express concern</td>
<td>World Zionist Congress and Jewish Agency view the travel of Non-Palestinian Jews to Palestine as a right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians view the Balfour Declaration as a treacherous act</td>
<td>The World Zionist Congress expresses joy at the Balfour Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Arabs view Non-Palestinian Jewish Settlers as invaders</td>
<td>Non-Palestinian Jewish Settlers view Palestinian Arabs with hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Palestine National Movement is born under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Hussein as a reaction to the continued arrival of Non-Palestinian Jews</td>
<td>Non-Palestinian Jewish Settlers retaliate against Palestinian attempts at stopping more Jewish refugees from arriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinians view the UN Resolution for the partition of Palestine as unjust</td>
<td>The Jewish Agency views the UN Resolution for the partition of Palestine as a victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Arabs view this as an act of war</td>
<td>Jewish Agency proclaims the State of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Arabs, with the help of neighboring countries, fight the Israelis and name the war “Al Nakba”</td>
<td>The Israelis defend the land given to them by the UN and then attack to grab more Arab land. They refer to the war as the War of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians and their allies sign an armistice with Israel</td>
<td>Israelis sign an armistice with the Palestinians and their allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians view this as an act of aggression and as a will to expand the occupation</td>
<td>Israel attacks the Arab countries pre-emptively and takes the remaining Palestinian land from Arab control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Palestinians attend Madrid Peace conference 1991
Palestinians sign the Oslo Peace Accords with the Israelis which is the first step of a long peace process 1993
Palestinians sign the Gaza-Jericho Agreement with the Israelis giving the Palestinians limited autonomy and establishing the Palestinian Authority 1994
Palestinians consider the massacre of Palestinian worshippers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs to be a vile act 1994
Palestinians sign Oslo II with the Israelis 1995
Hamas suicide bomber blows up a bus in the city of Jerusalem 1995
Palestinians consider this act as an encroachment and violation of an Islamic holy place 1996
Four Hamas suicide bombers kill 59 Israeli citizens 1996
Palestinians sign the Hebron Protocol with the Israelis 1997
Palestinians sign the Wye River Memorandum with the Israelis 1998
Palestinians sign the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum with the Israelis 1999
Palestinians attend the Camp David Peace Summit 2000
Israelis attend Madrid Peace Conference 1991
Israelis sign the Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinians which is the first step of a long peace process 1993
Israelis sign the Gaza-Jericho Agreement with the Palestinians giving the Palestinians limited autonomy and establishing the Palestinian Authority 1994
A Jewish settler in Hebron opens fire on a group of Palestinian worshippers at the tomb of the Patriarchs killing 26 of them in what came to be known as the Hebron Massacre. 1996
Israelis sign Oslo II with the Palestinians 1995
Israelis view the suicide attack as an act of terror 1996
The Israelis open a tunnel near the foundations of the al-Aqsa Mosque 1996
Israelis view the suicide attack as an act of terror 1996
Israelis sign the Hebron Protocol with the Palestinians 1997
Israelis sign the Wye River Memorandum with the Palestinians 1998
Israelis sign the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum with the Palestinians 1999
Israelis attend the Camp David Peace Summit 2000

Figure 3. 1: Timeline of the Palestine-Israel Conflict

Territory

The dispute over the land of Palestine between its native Palestinian people and the occupying state of Israel has been ongoing for the past 70 years until the time of this writing. The borders of the lands occupied by both parties, after the UN Resolution for partition 181 (II) and the 1967 war, have become blurred and at times interwoven with the building of Israeli settlements on the remaining Palestinian controlled land (Shlaim, 2014). This has led both sides to, as President Carter says, “suffer each other’s presence” (Wright, 2014, p. 165). Consequently, daily confrontations occur between Palestinian resistance movements and the Israeli military who try to contain Palestinian disgruntlement by force. The pinnacle of territorial conflict is over the West Bank. The
Jordanians took it in 1948 and then the Israelis occupied it in 1967 (Shlaim, 2014). This piece of land is referred to as Judea and Samaria by the Israelis and is considered to be the true ancestral home of the Jewish people meanwhile it is considered to be an indivisible part of the Palestinian national homeland by the Palestinians. At the time of this writing, Israel continues to build settlements on that land so it can de-facto control it while the Palestinians continue to resist this occupation expansion in various ways (Helmick, 2004). Gaza is another piece of contested land. At the time of this writing, it is now firmly in Palestinian hands after Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to have occupying Israeli military forces leave it in 2005 and evacuate all settlers from it. However, it is under an Israeli siege that controls all access points to it. The people of Gaza live in squalor, and it has become a ghetto because of the siege.

Religion

Adding on top of the already complicated issue of territorial settlement, both societies have different religious characteristics. The Palestinian Arabs are predominantly Sunni Muslim with a minority of Eastern Christian denominations and Palestinian Jews (Quandt et al., 1973). The Israelis are mostly Jewish yet have a sizable Arab community composed of Muslims and Christians. However, most of the political power and influence is in the hands of the Jewish community leaving the Arab community marginalized. Despite all three being Abrahamic religions, the conflict is often portrayed as a Muslim-Christian struggle with the Jews, which gives this conflict, a religious aspect (Helmick, 2004). To make matters worse, a Jewish exodus happened from the Arab countries, including Palestine, to the newly formed state of Israel due to the association made in these Arab countries between Jews and Israelis. Jews who have
been living in Arab countries for centuries were suddenly labeled as traitors for sharing the same faith that the settlers did. This further increased and polarized the religious divide (Morris, 2008).

Complimentary to the religious character of the conflict is the conflict over religious sites, especially the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The Temple Mount has been a major source of dispute between the two people. For Palestinian Arab Muslims, it is considered to be the third most sacred place where Al-Aqsa mosque is located, the place from where Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven (Ma’oz, 2014). For the Palestinian Arab Christians, it is a place where a key historical event took place in the life of Jesus Christ; when Christ cleansed the Temple by expelling the merchants and traders from it (Domeris, 2015). For the Israeli Jews, it is the location where the Temple of Solomon was built, and its return is a wish which Jews in the diaspora pray for in sayings such as “If I forget thee Jerusalem, may my right arm wither” and “Next year in Jerusalem” (Ma’oz, 2014, p. 60). In the Ottoman era, Jews and Muslims respected each other’s holy places in Jerusalem, and neither expressed a desire to take over the other’s holy place. However, the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the 1967 war have increased Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamophobia thus making the holy sites in Jerusalem a major issue in the Palestine-Israel conflict (Ma’oz, 2014).

Culture

Culture is also another factor that furthers the conflict’s complexity. The Palestinians have an Eastern, oriental, and collectivist culture (Quandt et al., 1973) meanwhile the Israelis are both western and oriental. Ashkenazi Jews, who are Jewish immigrants from Europe, are western and individualistic meanwhile Israeli Arabs and Sephardic Jews,
who are Jews of Middle Eastern origins, share an Eastern, oriental, and collectivist culture (Mahler, 2011). However, regardless of the diversity, the Ashkenazi-led state of Israel and its founders push to give Israel a Western identity (Shlaim, 2014). The way of life of both peoples is different (Morris, 2008). However, the core of the cultural struggle between both sides lies in the way the Israelis and their Zionist founders view Arab culture. According to Avi Shlaim, Theodore Herzl, father of Zionism, “viewed the natives [Palestinians] as primitive and backward, and his attitude toward them was rather patronizing” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 4). He also thought that the Israeli Jews were “the bearers of all the benefits of Western Civilization” and that they “might be welcomed by the residents of the backward East” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 4). Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Herzl’s disciple, says “We Jews have nothing in common with what denotes ‘the East,’ and we thank God for that. The East represents psychological passivity, social, and cultural stagnation, and political despotism” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 12). This sense of cultural superiority prevented Israelis from viewing the Palestinian Arabs as equals which hindered negotiations between the two sides (Shlaim, 2014).

3.1.2 Nature of the Issues

This subsection will address the five main issues of the Palestine-Israel conflict as identified by experts such as William Quandt and Martin Indyk along with scores of other experts. These five main issues are security, borders, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem.

Security
Israel, in all its past negotiations with Arab countries, emphasized that security was of paramount importance for it. In its successful negotiations with Egypt in 1978, the Israelis included a ‘Limitation of Forces and Armaments’ section where it made sure that troops stationed by Egypt on the border do not have a sufficient amount to launch a full-scale attack (Laquer & Schueftan, 2016). In their unsuccessful negotiations with Syria, the Israelis and Syrians agreed to a limitation of forces, the placement of American, French, and Israeli observers on Syrian territory and placing radar sensors that would hang from a balloon as well as electronic sensors on the Golan Heights (Swisher, 2004). This incorporation of clauses that hampers the other party’s ability to conduct a surprise attack and gives Israel a military advantage in almost every peace agreement shows that security is a basic need and even a pre-requisite for negotiations to begin.

After Oslo was signed in 1993, Arafat embarked on building a small police force consisting of 40,000 armed men and women including twenty intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies dubbed the Preventative Security Organization (PSO). The PSO was trained and equipped by the Israelis and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the sole purpose of combatting terrorists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the occupied territories to guarantee Israel’s security (Swisher, 2004). The PSO’s role, however, was not limited to crackdowns on terrorist cells, but also intelligence sharing which Israel found to be very valuable. The Palestinians had thus fulfilled this rite of passage to continue peace talks with Israel.

_Borders_
Due to the proximity of areas inhabited by both peoples, the Israeli settlements that can be found on Palestinian land, and the physical separation of the West Bank and Gaza, the borders issue is a difficult one. During several stages of the negotiations, including the discussions regarding Israeli troops withdrawal, negotiators and mediators had to maneuver around settlements and areas that Israel considered to be of vital strategic and security importance.

*Settlements*

Settlements are towns and cities where an exclusively Jewish Israeli civilian community lives beyond the green line, which is the name given to the 1949 Armistice borders, meaning within Palestinian territory (Reinhart, 2002). These settlements are illegal, and President Jimmy Carter declared this in the Camp David Peace Summit in 1978 (Helmick, 2004). The Israeli settlements exist for two main reasons; the first is to keep the Jewish demographic advantage (Shlaim, 2014) and the second is to gain leverage in the negotiation process (Reinhart, 2002). The state of Israel prides and identifies itself on being a home of the Jews and on being the only democracy in the Middle East. According to Israeli officials, the only way to maintain Israel’s Jewish character and the democratic political system is through maintaining a Jewish majority. One of the ways Israel maintains this majority is through incentivizing Jews from abroad to come and live in settlements on Palestinian territory (Shlaim, 2014). Settlements are also used as a playing card by Israeli officials in peace negotiations. When Rabin was negotiating with Arafat pre and post-Oslo, a significant number of settlers were asking to sell their houses, get governmental financial aid for housing, and move to central Israel. Rabin’s response to the settlers’ request was “*Not Now!*” (Reinhart, 2002, p. 46). The issue of
settlements has always been an advantageous bargaining chip in previous negotiations and is seen as a major concession once given up (Reinhart, 2002).

Refugees

In 1948, the Al-Nakba/War of Independence led to the creation of a refugee problem. 700,000 Palestinian refugees streamed into the neighboring Arab countries of Palestine either because of fear that spread from rumors of rape and mistreatment by Jewish forces after the Deir Yassine massacre or due to expulsion by the Haganah and other Jewish combatting factions (Morris, 2008). On December 11, 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194. Article 11 of the resolution states “Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, p. 1). Israel has been refusing to let the refugees back into Palestine because they consider that they left willingly and that no one forced them to leave (Morris, 2008). With time, this issue got more complicated since the number of Palestinian refugees had increased to 3.7 million by the year 2000 (Reinhart, 2002). Housing 3.7 million refugees on the land already inhabited by around 11 million people is difficult (CIA World Factbook, 2017). Making things even more complicated is the fact that these refugees’ property and land have already been taken over by others.

Jerusalem
In 1948, the Jordanian Arab Legion entered East Jerusalem and secured it while the Haganah took the Jewish Quarter of the city known as West Jerusalem (Morris, 2008). East Jerusalem, which is composed of the Christian, Muslim, and Armenian quarters of the city, stayed in Jordanian hands until the six-day war in 1967 when the Israeli Defense Forces took it from the Jordanians (Tyler, 2012). The Israelis viewed this as divine intervention and fulfillment of their constant prayer to God to take them back to it “next year” (Ma’oz, 2014, p. 60). They considered an undivided and united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel to be a fundamental expression of the country’s Jewish nationhood. This perception became very popular to the extent that ruining it would mean political suicide for any official who dared divide the holy city. On the other hand, Jerusalem was of paramount importance to the Palestinians, especially the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The Palestinians have always aspired for a Palestinian state “with Jerusalem as its capital” (Indyk, 2017, p. 299). Arafat, being considered the custodian of the Muslim and Christian holy places in the city, found it near impossible to give up Eastern Jerusalem including the Temple Mount (Indyk, 2017).

The Temple Mount is where issues of territory and religion mix. This holy site contains the Al-Aqsa Mosque which is Islam’s third holiest site erected by Caliph Umar after he had conquered Jerusalem. The problem is that this Mosque was built over the ruins of a Jewish temple that was taken down by the Romans in 70 AD. The Dome of the rock is said to have been the location where the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven. This whole area including the site above is known as Haram al-Sharif or the Noble Sanctuary also known as the Temple Mount which is illustrated in the image (Pixabay) below (Indyk, 2017).
When it comes to Jerusalem, its possession is a near-messianic need for both sides who have holy sites in the city, with al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest mosque in Islam, standing over the ruins of a Jewish temple. Thus, dividing the city in two, even the two holy places that are on top of each other has proven to be an impossible task. This is why the UN partition plan of 1947 proposed a special regime for the city of Jerusalem outlined in Part III of the resolution 181 (Laquer & Schueftan, 2016).

3.1.3 Nature of the Parties
This subsection will tackle the nature of the two disputants, Palestine and Israel. It will first start out by talking about their respective political contexts which include their regime’s organizational structure and type and the nature of their leadership. Talking about the third-party, which is the United States of America, will be done in the ‘Mediation Team’ subsection in the second part of this chapter.
**Palestine**

Political Context

In its 1964 summit in Cairo, the Arab League declared the creation of an organization known as the Palestine Liberation Organization which will play a dual purpose; representing the Palestinian people and freeing Palestine from occupation through armed struggle. In 1967, and after the six-day war and the defeat of the Arab world’s hero, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Palestinians looked to themselves to liberate the land and ceased their hope that neighboring armies would liberate the land for them. Thus, the organization stepped up its training and attacks on the occupied territories via the borders of Lebanon and Jordan. With time, it was made apparent that the PLO was an organization of loosely united factions vying for resources and influence and getting help from different sides. An illustration of that fact can be found in table 3.1 (Quandt et al., 1973) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian Armed Faction</th>
<th>Source of Aid</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine National Liberation Movement(Fatah)</td>
<td>Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Saud Arabia, Algeria, Palestinian Diaspora</td>
<td>5,000 – 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Region(s)</td>
<td>Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Liberation Army</td>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>5,000 – 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5,000 – 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1000 - 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1000 - 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
<td>Syria, then Iraq and Libya</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Liberation Front</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Arab Palestine</td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>UAR, Kuwait</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Popular Struggle Front</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ansar</td>
<td>Arab Communist Parties</td>
<td>100 - 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: List of PLO Factions

The PLO was thus structured in a way to accommodate, unify, and coordinate the activities of the different factions and their military wing. The structure can be found in figure 3.2 (Quandt et al., 1973) below.
The fact of the matter is that the Palestine National Liberation Movement also known as *Fatah* was the main and largest group in the PLO. This led all other factions to float in its orbit. This meant that the PLO was a quasi-democratic, one-party state organization. Also, this near *Fatah*-dominance of the PLO is what led Yasser Arafat to become chairman.

In 1993, the Oslo accords were signed, and the Palestine Liberation Organization saw a major transformation. Article I of the Oslo Accords, states “The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip...”(Laquer & Schueftan, 2016, p. 375). Thus, the Palestine National Authority
(PNA) was born to manage the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to be composed of governmental institutions that would serve the Palestinian people and represent them (Ghanem, 2002). The PNA was composed of three major branches of government: Legislative Authority, Executive Authority, and the Judicial Authority. The structure, along with its components can be found in figure 3.3 (Ghanem, 2002) below.

Figure 3.3: Power Structure of the Palestine National Authority

The difference between the PLO and PNA Structure is quite noticeable. The PNA’s institutions are made to govern and manage a territory along with its population while the PLO has a decision-making structure that focuses mostly on directing its
combatants’ attacks. For the PLO, namely *Fatah*, this newly established structure was a saving grace for two main reasons. First, it saved the PLO from its military and political collapse following its defeat in Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait\(^2\) and the rise of Palestinian factions independent of the PLO who wanted to challenge its leadership and influence by giving it international legitimacy. Second, it gave the PLO breathing room politically and militarily to function and gave the newly independent factions a forum in which they can express their discontent and deliberate with the PLO’s factions. This newly formed authority, however, inherited the *Fatah* dominance and consequently the shortcomings of its PLO predecessor, namely existing divisions.

*Leadership*

The leadership of the Palestinian people and their cause was embodied by the persona of Yasser Arafat. Previously, Arafat was a revolutionary, combatant, and political unknown until his rise to fame in 1968 in the battle of Karamah (Quandt et al., 1973). After a roadside explosive in the Negev targeted a school bus that killed two school children, the Israel Defense Forces decided to retaliate and launched an invasion that included one hundred tanks and artillery pieces into Jordan to destroy Fedayeen training camps and kill Arafat himself. The Israeli invaders ended up facing stiff resistance from the Palestinian militants and the Jordanian army. The Israelis ended up retreating with thirty dead soldiers, seventy wounded, four destroyed tanks and thirty damaged ones. This rare

\(^2\) The PLO’s armed wing was dealt a heavy blow after its defeat in Jordan in 1971 and Lebanon in 1982 militarily. It also lost a lot of political capital by siding with the losing Saddam in 1991 in his invasion of Kuwait. The Palestine National Authority was the makeover the PLO needed to bury its mistakes and start anew.
defeat of Israel at Palestinian hands made Arafat popular across the Arab world. He would soon become the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Tyler, 2012). Arafat did not fully trust his aides and members of the government. This prompted him to be a micro-manager and involved himself in all significant aspects of government (Swisher, 2004). He had direct control over all of the Palestine Authority’s security, intelligence, and counter-intelligence offices. He also had control over the financial agencies such as the Palestine National Fund, and most of the political and financial newspapers in the Palestinian territories. He refused to appoint a deputy in the executive committee of which he was the head so he could remain the only decision-maker (Ghanem, 2002). He also worked through a system of patronage pitting his aids against one another and intentionally intensifying the intra-Palestinian divisions to solidify his hold over the Palestinian Authority (Qurie, 2008). This made Arafat a dictator running a quasi-democratic system.

*Peace-Process Divisions in Palestine*

While the multi-factional divisions in the PA dragged on, new ones were formed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Oslo I in 1993. These new divisions were ideological and peace-process related. While the PLO was initially the only major Palestinian Organization, other major organizations appeared. In 1979, Palestine Islamic Jihad, a Palestinian nationalist Islamist group was founded after the Iranian Revolution occurred and they called for the implementation of Islamic rule over all of Palestine (Holly, 2008). In 1987, Hamas, another Islamist Palestinian Organization was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yassine that called for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment
of Islamic rule over it as well. Thus, there became two polarized and separate ideologies in Palestinian politics and society; the secular and leftist ideology led by Fatah and the Islamist ideology led by Hamas.

Another division would be over the peace process and two-state solution. The sides who are for and against are portrayed in table 3.2 (Quandt et al., 1973) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favor of the Peace Process</th>
<th>Rejectionist Front</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Fatah</td>
<td>● Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● DFLP</td>
<td>● Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Palestine Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Hamas (Switches sides in 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Palestinian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. 2: Positions of Palestinian Factions on Two-State Solution
Israel

Political Context

On May 14, 1948, in the Tel Aviv Museum, David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, declared the establishment of the State of Israel. Afterward, the Jewish Agency was hard at work to build the branches of government that would form the pillars of the Israeli state and consolidate its Jewish and democratic character. Three main branches of government were formed; legislative, executive, and judicial headed by the head of state (Shlaim, 2014). The structure can be found in figure 3.4 (Mahler, 2011) below.

Figure 3.4: Structure of the Israeli Government

Israel has been a Western-style democracy with a multiparty system. This is made clear by the make-up of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which is the principal legislative and
political body in the country. Serving a four-year term, the Knesset is responsible for passing laws on any subject, supervising the government’s work through its different committees, and electing or removing the President and State Comptroller. The multiparty system and election dynamics have been both a blessing and a curse. They give more segments of Israeli society the opportunity to express their viewpoints and gain deputy positions but at the expense of creating a deadlock and increasing divisiveness. This is apparent in the Knesset’s history ever since the founding of the state of Israel. After elections, the party with the largest number of seats gets to choose the Prime Minister and usually appoints party members from the small parties allied with it at the time to form a coalition government. From 1949 until 2001 alone, there have been 28 different coalition governments when there should have been 13 full 4-year term governments (Mahler, 2011).

Leadership

The Israeli leadership under Ehud Barak, unlike that of the Palestine Authority where Arafat had a firm grip on power, was very fragile and divisive. This is due to the makeup of governments whose members are on opposite sides of the political spectrum. It is not uncommon to find secular, religious zealots, right wing, and left wing individuals all in the same government. The Prime Minister thus has to juggle between running the state and keeping his party’s coalition partners in the government. Any action that Barak would take regarding foreign policy would affect domestic politics. Any decision made by the Prime Minister outside the borders of Israel would have to be in line with the coalition partners’ opinion on the matter or else the government would crumble like a house of cards (Mahler, 2011).
Just like Arafat as well as previous Israeli premiers, Barak did not trust the members of his cabinet, and he was right to do so since successive Israeli governments have suffered from a symptom called “Semi-organizational anarchy” (Freleich, 2012, p. 43). This means ministers are pressuring the Premier to make difficult decisions he does not deem necessary and an enormous amount of press leaks is taking place from the cabinet and staff meetings. The leaks were bad to the extent that Barak had to hire a think tank in the United States to write his proposal for Camp David II instead of his own staff due to his fear of leaks (Freleich, 2012).

**Peace-Process Divisions in Israel**

In Israel, divisions with regards to the peace process are clear cut. *Mapai*, the left-wing party under the leadership of Ehud Barak has been advocating for peace with the Palestinians along with its left-leaning allies. The right-wing *Likud*, on the other hand, led by Benyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon opposed the peace process and believed that appeasing the Palestinians would be a sign of weakness. Joining the *Likud* were other right-wing and religious conservative parties (Mahler, 2011). The parties with and against the two-state solution are shown in table 3.3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In favor of the Peace Process</th>
<th>Rejectionist Front</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mapai</td>
<td>• Likud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meretz</td>
<td>• Shas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This subsection will be looking at the power parity between both sides. It is important that power parity be measured to see whether the conflict is symmetrical or asymmetrical. Determining the symmetry of conflict helps evaluate the complexity of the conflict. The power parity between the two sides is measured using a power index created by the University of Michigan’s Correlates of War project titled the ‘Composite Index of National Capability.’ This index determines a country’s power by looking at six main components that assess National Material Capabilities that are: urban population, energy consumption, iron, and steel production, total population, military expenditure, and military personnel. The results in the dataset for Palestine and Israel are displayed in table 3.4 (Singer et al., 1972) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel production (Thousands of tons)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4: Correlates of War Project - National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data Documentation (2000)

The results show Israeli superiority in all six components of the Index. Israel is far more powerful than the Palestine Authority making this an undoubtedly asymmetrical conflict.

Previous Relationship between Parties

The relationship between the Palestinians and Israelis has always been characterized by animosity and violence. Ever since the first Non-Palestinian Jews came to Palestine, there have been quarrels between both sides. Several wars and Palestinian uprisings were waged such as the Al-Nakba/War of Independence, First Intifada, Operation Summer Rain, Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, and Operation Protective Edge. All of these instances of violent confrontation between both sides have led to an estimated number of 30,500 casualties not counting the Israelis and Palestinians who fought and died in the other Arab-Israeli wars. When there is no war, there are Israeli checkpoints harassing Palestinians, Israeli settlements being established
and robbing Palestinians of their land, livelihood and freedoms, Palestinian attacks on military and civilian Israeli targets, Israeli jets bombing Gaza, and Palestinians getting shot. As a result, Israeli soldiers are being targeted by Palestinians with knives, small arms and home-made explosives but mostly pummeled with rocks during protests and other types of confrontations (Tyler, 2012).

In 1993, an attempt at peace was made at Oslo which resulted in mutual recognition and a decrease in violence up until Sharon’s visit to the Haram El Sharif/Temple Mount in 2001. However, the violence never completely stopped. Rogue elements on both sides attempted to incite violence with small attacks. Violence remained the only constant between both sides (Shlaim, 2014).

3.1.4 Nature of Relationship
This subsection will tackle the relationships between the three parties involved in the Camp David II negotiations; Palestine, Israel, and the United States. Relationships between the negotiators themselves and between them and the mediator can reveal a lot about the mediation’s inner-dynamics. This can tell us whether or not the mediator is truly neutral from an interest-based point of view. It can show other factors such as military alliances, trade, and economic aid, that might be able to indirectly influence the mediator’s fairness.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole and the Palestine-Israel conflict in specific, the United States is not the only actor that influences the relationship dynamics between the two sides. Regional actors play an important role in the conflict and can exert a sizable amount of influence to either end or exacerbate the conflict. There are regional actors such as Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco who have good relationships with both sides, have
facilitated negotiations between both sides in the past, and have familiarity with the issues that enable them to provide constructive solutions. There are also regional actors such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran who wish to bury the peace processes between Palestine and Israel for political reasons.\(^3\)

However, since this thesis tackles mediation in the Camp David II summit, this subsection will not be talking about the relationship between the above-mentioned regional actors and the disputants since they were not directly involved in the summit’s negotiations.

U.S-Palestinian Relationship

U.S-Palestinian relations have been tense since 1947 and have only gotten better in the 1990s. The U.S did not give the PLO much attention at first. It was not recognized as the legal representative of the Palestinian People by the U.S government, which was made apparent by the Non-PLO make-up of the Palestinian negotiating team that was accepted in the Madrid Peace Conference (Office of the Historian, 1970). Several Palestinian groups represented within the PLO such as the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF), and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) were and are still considered to be terrorist organizations by the U.S government (U.S State Department, 2017). The U.S government, under Bill Clinton, recognized the Fatah-dominated PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people after the PLO recognized the state of Israel as a pre-condition for the Oslo talks (Shlaim, \(^3\) Iraq, Syria, and Iran wanted the Palestine-Israel conflict alive since their military aid to the Palestinians in their struggle shows them as the protectors of Palestine unlike Egypt and Jordan who have made peace with Israel. This gave Iraq, Iran, and Syria significant political influence in a region that still believes in the righteousness of the Palestinian cause.
2014). After that recognition, U.S-Palestinian relations started to develop at the official level. Four million U.S. dollars in 1994 (The American Presidency Project, 1994) and five million U.S. dollars in 1995 were given to the Palestinian Authority to train, equip, and build a Palestinian police force (The American Presidency Project, 1995). The PLO was also allowed to open a ‘PLO Mission to the U.S’ office in Washington (Ghanem, 2002).

The PLO was always interested in gaining American recognition due to the increased financial aid, political legitimacy, leverage, and international support that such a move would bring. Also, being a superpower, the Palestinians considered having the United States on their side to be a tremendous asset in any deal they might want to strike with a third-party including the Israelis (Ross, 2004). One event, however, elevated the importance of the United States in the eyes of the Palestinians. In 1956, when the tripartite aggression was underway with French, British, and Israeli troops attacking the newly nationalized Suez Canal in Egypt, President Eisenhower of the United States threatened the attackers with economic and military sanctions if they did not cease and retreat. This brought about the perception that the United States could do anything it decided to do and that it was the only power truly able to pressure the Israelis. This thought never left the mind of Palestinian leaders, which was why they chose and agreed to the United States being the mediator (Indyk, 2017).

U.S-Israeli Relationship

The United States’ relationship with Israel has predominantly been an amicable one. The first country to give de-facto recognition to the State of Israel was the United States of
America on May 14, 1948, and later give it a de-jure recognition on January 31, 1949, under the Truman administration (Truman Library). Afterward, a solid relationship was to be born where Israel would constantly receive financial and military support from the United States to hold Arab countries at bay and subdue them in exchange for it being the West’s foothold in the Middle East and protector of its interests in the region. Besides the strategic value which Israel had for the United States, it was also the most Westernized country in the region and one which shared a common identity with it (Hannah, 2016). This relationship was put to paper with the US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding titled ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel on Strategic Cooperation’ in 1981 in the Reagan era. Another MOU was signed in 1999 in the Clinton era that promised to provide the state of Israel with military aid for the next ten years (Sharp, 2016). This level of cooperation continued to grow despite personal differences at many times between U.S Presidents and Israeli Prime Ministers because both countries needed each other at a strategic level (Ross, 2015).

The Israelis initially always preferred to settle their disputes with Arab states in bilateral negotiations with each one individually where they had the upper hand. Israel was constantly reserved about getting a third party involved in its negotiations with the Palestinians for fear that the mediator would be biased towards the Palestinians or that the mediator would put pressure on Israel. Israel viewed the United States to be the latter; the party that was going to pressure them into a settlement. However, due to the international conditions, which we will be talking about later on, among other factors,
Israel was inclined to accept the United States over other potential mediators since it considered it to be an ally ("The 50 years war", 2000).

Figure 3.5 below illustrates the relationship between all three parties involved in the Camp David II summit through conflict mapping.

Figure 3.5: Conflict Mapping / US-Disputants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>△</td>
<td>Actor who is indirectly involved and can constructively contribute to the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⊙</td>
<td>Actors (Size of the circle represents the power of each actor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solid Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Conflict Map Legend
3.2 Current Conditions
This section represents the second part of Bercovitch’s mediation analysis model. It will be focusing on the mediator and will analyze him/her/them through two main variables; identity and rank of mediator, and mediation strategy and discourse. This section will enable us to know the identity of the mediator, and his classification within existing mediator typologies, the leverage he/she/they possess according to the identity and rank, the inner dynamics of the mediation team, and the mediation strategies available to the mediator.

3.2.1 Identity and Rank of Mediator

In this section, we will be focusing on the mediator in two detailed parts. In the first part, an analysis of the U.S mediation team that was put together will take place. The analysis will include an overview of their roles, titles, responsibilities, and see how the team’s composition positively or negatively affects the internal team’s group dynamic. In the second part, an analysis of the identity and rank of the mediator will take place which will help determine the mediator’s possible influence and leverage he/she/they possess over both disputants.

Mediation Team
This subsection will talk about the composition of the U.S mediation team which participated in Camp David II.

As the date for the Final Status Negotiations approached, the United States decided to take a step further by mediating between both parties. For that purpose, President
Clinton put a mediation team together, composed of White House and State Department officials, to assist him in his peace endeavor. The list of his team can be found in table 3.6 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill Clinton</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeleine Albright</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Indyk</td>
<td>U.S Ambassador to Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Ross</td>
<td>Special Middle East Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Malley</td>
<td>Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs and Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Herbst</td>
<td>U.S Consul General in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Quandt</td>
<td>Member of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Miller</td>
<td>Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toni Verstandig</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel “Sandy” Berger</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemal Helal</td>
<td>Interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Schwartz</td>
<td>Deputy Legal Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Riedel</td>
<td>Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Podesta</td>
<td>White House Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Echavaste</td>
<td>White House Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, the make-up of this team was as disruptive as it was useful due to the divisions and competition. State Department and White House Officials were competing for influence over the President and gaining his favor. There were also complaints about the withholding of information by the Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross. Ross, who was a White House Employee but housed in the State Department had information flowing from both and had to report to both at the same time. However, state department officials who worked with Ross often reported that he would withhold information from them, would not record or write down information, would not read reports sent to him by them, and would only keep the White House informed of developments in detail (Kurtzer, 2013).

There were also concerns of bias among the U.S Mediation team since the overwhelming majority of the U.S team members were of Jewish religious backgrounds; Aaron Miller, Robert Malley, Martin Indyk, Dennis Ross, Madeleine Albright. However, the concerns of bias were the most serious for two specific peace team members who were Ambassador Martin Indyk and Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross. Indyk had begun his career in Washington with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) which is a well-known Israel lobby in the United States. Ambassador Indyk also eventually co-founded, with Dennis Ross, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy with the funding and support of AIPAC (Indyk, 2017). The personal relationships, along with the common religious/ethnic identity, which Indyk
and Ross share with the Israel lobby raises serious questions about their ability to remain neutral during the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

After the team’s assembly, President Clinton chose the presidential country retreat of Camp David located in the Catoctin Mountain Park in Maryland. On the surface, it is a beautiful resort with Cabins, but in reality, according to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan who toured it, it is “A sort of Presidential Command Post in the event of an atomic war. It holds fifty of the President’s staff in one place and one hundred and fifty Defense staff in another. The fortress is underneath the innocent looking huts in which we lived, hewn out of the rock. It cost 10 million dollars” (Wright, 2014, p.45). This meant that the privacy of this place was not only maintained by its seclusion but guaranteed by the security surrounding the location for both, the resort’s strategic value and for the President’s safety (Wright, 2014).

Identity and Rank
This subsection will analyze the identity and rank of the mediator which will help determine the mediator’s possible influence and leverage he/she/they possess over both disputants.

The identity of the main mediator of the Camp David II Peace Summit is President Bill Clinton whose rank, according to the literature, is classified as leader of a large state. While the rank is considered to be ‘leader of a large state,’ factually, President Clinton was, at the time, the leader of the world’s sole superpower; the United States of America. As the highest official in the country, President Clinton’s presence as a mediator was considered important since it was shown that the involvement of top-level
officials was necessary for solving deep-rooted conflicts as the experience in Camp David I and the experience of Raymond Helmick in dealing with US officials in the Arab-Israeli peace process both showed (Helmick, 2004). However, President Clinton was not the only person following through the mediation but rather had a whole team consisting of White House, State Department, and National Security Council officials assisting him.

Consequently, as the leader of the United States of America, President Clinton had the resources of the country at his disposal as permitted to him by the constitution and the legislative bodies of his government. The resources available to President Clinton can tell us what his capabilities are and consequently, the mediation strategies available for him to follow. Besides the team’s possession of enormous economic and military resources, the United States of America, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, is especially important for both disputants due to the massive amounts of aid it provides. U.S Aid enables Israel to save itself from economic recessions, and financial burdens brought about by the continuous flow of Jewish immigrants into the country and allow Israel to possess a military advantage over other states in the Middle East. U.S Aid would enable Palestine to pay off its creditors, keep its governmental institutions functioning, and keep the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) running. The types and extent of U.S Aid are displayed in table 3.7 (Sharp, 2016) (Zanotti, 2016) (“The American Presidency Project,” 1994) (The American Presidency Project, 1995) below.

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4 Fr. Raymond Helmick attempted to start a Palestinian-Israeli backchannel with the help of mid-level U.S Officials. However, when the topic was brought up, these officials denied that they were asked to do so. This showed that Fr. Helmick that only a top-level official would have the political clout and authority to deal with such a sensitive issue.
### U.S Aid To Israel

- **(1949-2000) U.S-Israel Bilateral Aid:**
  - $73,375,850
- **(1990-2000) U.S Contributions to Israel's Arrow Missile Program:**
  - $631,800,000
- **1949 Export-Import Bank Loan:**
  - $100,000,000
- **1971 military loans:**
  - $545,000,000
- **1979 “Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979” (P.L. 96-35):**
  - $7,500,000,000
- **1985 U.S-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG):**
  - $1,500,000,000
- **1991 Loan for the absorption of Russian Jews after U.S.S.R Collapse:**
  - $10,000,000,000
- **1998 Wye River Memorandum Troop Movement Assistance:**
  - $1,200,000,000
- **2000 American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA):**
  - $2,750,000

### U.S Aid to Palestine

- **(1950-2000) U.S Contributions to UNRWA:**
  - $2,305,700,000
- **(1990-2000) U.S-Palestine Bilateral Aid:**
  - $674,000,000
- **1994 Palestine Security Organization Funding:**
  - $4,000,000
- **1995 Palestine Security Organization Funding:**
  - $5,000,000

Table 3. 7: U.S Aid to Both Disputing Parties(Up Until the Year 2000, the year of the summit)

These facts provide President Clinton with a level of leverage that is above-average due to the pivotal role that the United States plays in helping both parties stay afloat economically and militarily. This means that all mediation strategy options that were
discussed in the methodology section of chapter 1 are available for the President to pursue.

3.2.2 Mediation Strategy and Discourse
This section is divided into two parts. The first part tackles the United States’s mediation strategy. It will briefly introduce the U.S’s initial role as a facilitator and guarantor of the survival of the peace process prior to Camp David II. It will then move to analyze the strategy and discourse followed by U.S President Clinton and his mediation team. The second part tackles the discourse. It will provide a detailed account of the important events that occurred during the fifteen days at Camp David II by using eye-witness accounts and meeting minutes. The content of the second part will be vital to determining the mediation team’s discourse throughout the summit.

Mediation Strategy

The road paved by the previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements eventually led to the Camp David II summit. At that time the United States’ role was three-fold; it was the peace process’ lifeline, a facilitator, and a spoiler-manager. At several instances, such as the time of the Wye River Memorandum, the United States would pressure both sides to go back to the negotiating table and would prevent negotiation deadlocks from becoming an insurmountable obstacle to peace negotiations. The United States acted as a facilitator by providing the venue for both parties to meet and even giving access to third or fourth parties such as the Egyptians or Jordanians if it thought that their presence would help. In terms of spoiler-management, the United States dealt with both local and Regional Spoilers; local being Hamas and the PIJ and Regional being Iraq and Iran (Indyk, 2017). When it came to the local extremist Palestinian factions, the United States
propped up the Palestinian Preventative Security Organization (PSO) to keep these groups in check (Swisher, 2004). Iraq had always been a legitimate threat to the state of Israel and a staunch proponent of the Palestinian cause who had proven its dedication to it through participating in the wars of 1948 and 1973. Iran, after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, declared its enmity towards the state of Israel and expressed its desire on seeing it destroyed. Both countries who have anti-Zionist ideologies ingrained in their national psyche did not want the struggle for Palestine to die out and did what they could through direct military threats, financing, and arming of local combatants to disrupt the peace process (Indyk, 2017). The United States, for its part, placed containment strategies on both countries that were a mixture of sanctions and attempted coup plots. Despite the failure of said containment strategies, they did, however, mitigate the effect and extent of support Iraq and Iran gave to local spoilers on the Palestinian side (Indyk, 2017).

As the date of Camp David II approached, the U.S mediation team needed a solid strategy. Knowing the identity and rank of President Clinton as a mediator, it is clear that he has the capability of implementing all of the previously-mentioned strategies and move along the spectrum comfortably. This was partially demonstrated in Clinton’s actions regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process beginning from Oslo up until the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum by his use of Procedural strategies. Under procedural strategies, President Clinton managed spoilers by imposing sanctions on Iraq and Iran, (Indyk, 2017) creating and arming the PSO to crackdown on Hamas and PIJ, and giving Israel $1 billion to fight terrorism (Swisher, 2004). He also supported Peres and Barak’s campaigns for Prime Minister personally so the peace camp can stay in power to continue negotiations, (Swisher, 2004) and pressured Netanyahu and Arafat to continue
talks and invited them to hold their negotiations at the Wye River Plantation (Shlaim, 2014). Hence, President Clinton did all he could during the Pre-Camp David II negotiations to assist both sides in reaching results and did what he could to “achieve four Arab-Israeli peace agreements in his first term as president” like Martin Indyk promised him he would if he pursued peace between the Arabs and Israelis as a main foreign policy priority (Indyk, 2017).

President Clinton’s advisers decided to put forth a plan that was to include directive strategies. Their plan was based on the notes left by President Carter from Camp David I and his recipe for a successful mediation. After reading the notes, President Clinton saw the need to be tough on certain issues, to seem resolute, and to be prepared to shuttle between both parties if they refuse to meet each other in person (Indyk, 2017).

Discourse

The Camp David II summit lasted for fifteen days. During the summit, a lot of strategy shifts, statements, negotiation tactics, concessions, and impasses occurred. This part will take a look at the discourse by covering these eventful fifteen days based on eye-witness accounts and meeting minutes taken by summit participants and highlighting the important events and discussions that took place in each one.

Day 1

On, July 11, 2000, before noon, President Clinton welcomed Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Barak to the abovementioned highly secure Camp David presidential compound to begin negotiations away from the prying eyes and ears of the outside world and away from its influence. From the cabins that dotted the
compound, the U.S team showed the two leaders and their teams their pre-prepared accommodation (Quandt, 2005). President Arafat and Prime Minister Barak were given the cabins that were at an equal distance from the President’s cabin. Both leaders brought with them a sizable delegation that came from different professions, levels of expertise, and branches of government (Swisher, 2004).

President Arafat’s official delegation mainly consisted of ministers and Palestinian Authority officials as shown in table 3.8 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yasser Arafat</td>
<td>President of the Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud(Abu Mazen)</td>
<td>Speaker of the Palestinian Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasser Abed Rabbo</td>
<td>Minister of Information and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabil Shaath</td>
<td>Minister of Planning &amp; International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeb Erekat</td>
<td>Minister of Local government and Spokesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Asfour</td>
<td>Head of Negotiations Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akram Hanieh</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Dahlan</td>
<td>Chief of Preventative Security for Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Rashid</td>
<td>Arafat’s Business Partner(Responsible for economic issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabil Abu Rudeineh</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8: Palestinian Camp David II Delegation
Prime Minister Barak’s official delegation, on the other hand, consisted of a cocktail of foreign affairs and military officials, experts, and lawyers as can be shown in table 3.9 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ehud Barak</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilead Sher</td>
<td>Chairman of the Negotiating Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shlomo Ben Ami</td>
<td>Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs &amp; Minister of Internal Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnon Lipkin Shahak</td>
<td>Israeli Negotiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danny Yatom</td>
<td>Chief of Staff &amp; Senior Security Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shlomo Yanai</td>
<td>Military Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Meridor</td>
<td>Chair of Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elyakim Rubenstein</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. 9: Israeli Camp David II Delegation

Besides the official delegations, there were also unofficial delegates on the side of all three parties. On the Palestinian side, lawyers from the Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) composed mainly of Palestinian expats assisted in forming legal opinions. On the Israeli side, Yossi Ginossar (Israel-Palestine go-between), Israel Hasson (Former director of the Shin Bet), and Gidi Grinstein (Secretary and note-taker) participated in the summit. On the American side, Wendy Sherman, Albright’s closest adviser, also took part (Swisher, 2004).
Despite all of these summit participants pouring in, admittance to the summit was not smooth. Dennis Ross, the Special Middle East Coordinator, was responsible for handling the participant list of the summit at first. He refused entry of State Department officials such as Ambassador Ned Walker and Diplomat Ron Schlicher both of whom have significant experience in dealing with both the Arab and Israeli parts of the Middle East. Ross even attempted to block the entry of Wendy Sherman, Albright’s adviser and would have succeeded in doing so had Albright not intervened in person. Members of the NSU were given a hard time each time they wanted to enter as well (Swisher, 2004).

The Palestinians and Israelis brought more than their delegates with them. They brought the knowledge that their actions at Camp David would divide their people at home where some, especially the hardliners, viewed what they were about to do as an act of treachery. Arafat was put under pressure from Hamas who, at the time, viewed armed struggle and liberation of all of Palestine through military means as the only way to achieve real peace. Hamas’ rhetoric was reinforced two months prior to the mediation. On May 14, 2000, the Israeli Defense Forces withdrew from South Lebanon unconditionally after coming under constant guerilla attacks by Hezbollah (Helmick, 2004). Barak, whose problems on the home front were more severe after the vote of no-confidence against his government, also lost the support of his foreign minister David Levy who resigned over Barak’s pursuance of the peace process (Ben-Ami, 2006). Clinton had thus, the unenviable task of trying to make the negotiations symmetrical between the woefully unequal parties while taking the problems of both sides into consideration.
After all of the summit participants were settled in, President Clinton and Dennis Ross went to meet with Arafat first to get him past using the Palestinian victim rhetoric and to encourage him on focusing to find a solution for his conflict with the Israelis instead. Clinton talked to Arafat about what he would gain if the peace deal goes through and about how he would love to be there when the Palestinian flag is raised over the lands of the new state of Palestine. Arafat seemed excited about the prospect (Ross, 2004). After meeting with Arafat, Clinton went to meet with Barak and presented him with a parameters paper which he and his aides had previously prepared (Indyk, 2017). The paper consisted of points and was the culmination of his understanding of the conflict and his vision of what the solution might be from all of the reports, maps, and briefings he had read. The purpose of the paper was to put forth a set of concrete parameters that include the core issues which need to be discussed and solved (Ross, 2004). However, after presenting Barak with the paper, Barak refused to put it forth as a base to start negotiations and said: “The key point of decision should only come Sunday night, July 16, five days after the start of the summit” (Ross, 2004, p. 654). However, after sifting through it more, Barak agreed only on the condition that it be modified, and Clinton agreed to Barak’s request. (Ross, 2004) Clinton’s immediate compliance with the Israeli request was considered to be a breach in the Carter-based directive strategy prepared for mediating the summit. The Israelis would later reveal to Martin Indyk their shock at how easily Clinton gave up. What was clearly a bargaining tactic at first, ended up being an indication that Clinton’s mind can be changed (Indyk, 2017).

At noon, both sides met at Laurel Cabin, also known as Holly, conference room. The President and his aides sat at the head of the 15-meter Oak table with Arafat and his
delegation sitting to his right and Barak and his delegation sitting to his left. That meeting was the official opening of the summit in which President Clinton said his welcoming words to the participants (Qurie, 2008). After his welcoming words, he emphasized the help which he is ready to give both participants to reach a resolution and the importance of the opportunity that is before them:

“We have come to the point where we have to make a choice. I believe that this is an opportunity from which both parties can benefit. However, it is your responsibility to make the decisions, and the role of the United States to make this conference successful. We will determine the agenda and set up the committees. But the issues themselves have to be decided by you, not in the light of short-term gains but of the long-term future you are seeking to build. I know that both President Arafat and Prime Minister Barak have initiatives they will brief you on. The question is whether we are ready to take the historic decisions that lie before us. These decisions must be yours and not mine” (Qurie, 2008, p. 176),

He continued to say that the summit has a time limit in order for him to pressure them saying:

“I want to talk about the time available to us. In a few days time, I shall be leaving to attend the G8 summit in Okinawa. If you are able to reach an agreement before then, it will be excellent, as I will be able to present it to the leaders of the major powers, in order to gain their support for your efforts” (Qurie, 2008, p. 177).

Lastly, he emphasized the importance of secrecy when it comes to negotiations saying:
“What is important is for us is to make a start without talking to anyone outside about the topics that are discussed here. If you together decide to announce something useful, we will have no objection. If, for instance, you were able to say something about water, that could be declared. I would like in due course to know your opinion. I am happy with whatever you decide. In any event, no substantive information about the functioning of this conference will be passed on to the media. Everything here will remain confidential until you both decide when to brief people. Even if there is no agreement, I want neither of you to brief the media about the other party’s position” (Quirie, 2008, p. 177).

President Clinton then ended his welcome speech by focusing on two key points; both sides will receive impressively large financial contributions if they reach a solution and that the American team will be presenting a draft agreement to both sides on July 13 (In two days). Barak agreed to this and said that his team would also present their version of the paper meanwhile Arafat and his team just accepted that the Americans were going to submit a paper (Ross, 2004).

Day 2

The next day, on July 12, 2000, Ross met with Jon Schwartz from the American team in the morning. After the meeting and being called by Albright and Berger to meet them, Ross gave him the task of writing the American Draft Agreement and Principles Paper (Ross, 2004). Several meetings were held. During the day, an American-Palestinian bilateral meeting was held where Secretary of State Albright headed the American team, and Abu Ala headed the Palestinian team. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issue of frontiers, to see where the Palestinians envisioned the frontiers to be
and to see how far the Palestinians can go to meet the Israelis’ security needs. Important points were discussed which enabled the American team to familiarize themselves better with the Palestinian position (Qurie, 2008).

In the evening, a trilateral meeting took place where the Israeli delegation, headed by Shlomo Ben Ami, joined the talks. In the trilateral meeting, discussions of old arguments and previously-known positions took place. This made the discussions redundant. This can be shown by Shlomo Ben Ami’s responses to Albright after asking him about what they envision the margin of the frontiers to be (Qurie, 2008):

“The Palestinians have already made a response to some of our security requirements. I worked with Abu Ala in Sweden on the refugee issue, on the assumption that the solution would lie in the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 194, and on the basis that the solution to the frontier issue is the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 242” (Qurie, 2008, P. 184).

Albright, who could have helped the discussions take off with some suggestions, lacked, according to Swisher, the knowledge regarding the conflict’s details (Swisher, 2004). The meetings ended up being highly unproductive, and this was later shown in Albright telling the participants “None of you yet defined your parameters. We want to know precisely what you want” (Qurie, 2008, p. 184).

After the trilateral meeting, another American-Palestinian bilateral meeting took place, but this time President Clinton himself was chairing it. The meeting seemed to be more of a coaching session than an actual meeting since the bulk of it consisted of the
American team preparing the Palestinian team for the submission of the American paper the next day (Qurie, 2008). Clinton said:

“We would like to put the American Paper on the conference table but we are concerned that you may afterwards come to us to say you want an amendment here or an amendment there. I have told President Arafat that I received an encouraging response from Prime Minister Barak. Before we present our paper, it is essential that we hear from you about the extent to which you can live with it...” (Qurie, 2008, p. 186)

“...The feasibility of an agreement will depend on the principles, while its robustness will come from the details. I believe we have a major opportunity to agree on all the issues, except for Jerusalem because this issue carries such emotional, historical, and political baggage that it is more intractable than the other issues. However, we are prepared if you want to discuss Jerusalem, which you can do earlier with myself or with any member of the American delegation” (Qurie, 2008, p. 186).

Clinton then proceeded to remind the Palestinians again of the time constraint:

“Our time is limited, and I want an agreement as soon as possible. I need to attend the G8 summit. I want an agreement to take to the Congress and the American people, to get their backing for it” (Qurie, 2008, p. 187).

While the second American-Palestinian bilateral meeting was taking place, Aaron Miller, Martin Indyk, Dennis Ross, John Herbst, and Robert Malley went over the draft agreement and principles paper which were prepared by Jon Schwartz. After getting the approval, Jon met with Gidi Grinstein, the Secretary and note-taker of the Israeli team, around midnight to see what the Israelis had prepared. It was said that the Israelis had
prepared a draft agreement. Seeing this, Ross decided to let go of the principles paper and focus on presenting a draft agreement since the Israelis were clearly ready for negotiating one instead of discussing the generalities of a principles paper. At that point, Jon was instructed to incorporate some new ideas found in the Israeli draft into the American draft in a way that would mask the Israeli traces of influence on it (Ross, 2004).

Day 3

On the early morning of July 13, 2000, President Clinton left Camp David to address the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) National Convention in Baltimore. At that time, Ross was meeting with Shlomo, Gilead, Gidi, and Amnon at Laurel (Holly) Cabin to present them with the draft that was inclusive of the Israeli ideas which Jon Schwartz had prepared. The Israelis went over it and disliked that the draft mentioned that the Western borders needed to be set according to the 1967 lines including modifications based on strategic and demographic means. Then they commented on the paper’s section on refugees which state that Israel has the responsibility to help resolve the refugee problem. Afterward, they asked Ross to put the language they contributed to the draft in brackets. Ross objected to their bracket request saying that this would defeat the purpose of making this look like an American draft with no Israeli influence. Despite Ross’ objections, the Israeli team insisted and said that they would inform Barak about this (Ross, 2004). This was a clear indicator that the Israelis were wasting/delaying time since they had previously agreed to a two-state solution along the 1967 border as well as requested that land swaps be made so that land containing large concentrations of settlers be included in the state of Israel. This should
have been a signal for the Americans to be tougher instead of giving in and having the Israeli language bracketed.

After meeting with the Israelis, Ross met with Abu Ala, Mohammad Dahlan, Saeb Erekat, and Hassan Asfour from the Palestinian delegation. He showed them the structure and categorization of the paper they were planning on presenting. During the presentation, the Palestinian delegates were silent and listened intently to what Ross was saying. The Palestinian team’s only concern was regarding Jerusalem. Abu Ala said that the paper “should not go light on Jerusalem” (Ross, 2004, p. 659). It was clear that the Palestinians wanted no question marks to remain when it came to the issue of the Holy City (Ross, 2004).

President Clinton returned to Camp David from Baltimore at around 5:00 PM. Thirty minutes after his arrival, he met with Sandy, Madeleine, Bruce Reidel, Ross, Rob, and John Podesta in Aspen Cabin to be updated on the running of the summit and the status of the negotiations (Ross, 2004). Ross showed Clinton the draft paper and informed him of the Israeli team’s reaction to it. After reading it, Clinton stated that he liked it but that he should not force it on Barak at this time and considered such a move to be premature (Qurie, 2008). Instead, he proposed that a parameter exercise paper, also known as an ‘I’ and ‘P’ paper be written. Such a paper would include the Israeli and Palestinian positions on major issues as well as solutions suggested by all three sides on the major issues (Ross, 2004). The American team worked and followed President Clinton’s instructions to complete a twelve-page long ‘I’ and ‘P’ paper referred to as ‘Israeli-Palestinian Framework Agreement on Permanent Status’ (Qurie, 2008). After the ‘I’ and ‘P’ paper’s completion, Clinton met with Barak and went over the paper with him and
told him that he needed to present the paper on that day. However, he did not let him read it saying that the American team had modified the entire paper to meet Barak’s needs. The Israeli Prime minister neither commented nor resisted (Ross, 2004).

Immediately after meeting with Barak, Clinton asked to see Arafat. The two met in Aspen, and Clinton briefed Arafat on the content of the paper he would present him later on in the day, on the committees he was setting up for each major issue, and on what the Palestinians needed to do to be ready for the ‘I’ and ‘P’ paper-based meetings (Ross, 2004). After Clinton’s meeting with Arafat, Ross and Sandy went to visit him in Aspen. After several discussions, Sandy proceeded to remind the President that time was running out and that he needed to begin pushing both parties to be serious in the negotiations and make key decisions. Ross, on the other hand, said that no positive results should be expected soon regardless of a push since he considered that both parties would only make overtures at the last minute. Ross’s statements ticked off Sandy and resulted in a confrontation that caused some tension between them (Ross, 2004).

Day 4

On July 14, 2000, at 1:00 AM, the Israeli team revised the paper after receiving it and did not like it. As a result, Ross was summoned to Barak’s cabin where he was informed of the articles which the Israelis found to be unacceptable. First, Barak told him that Article IV on Jerusalem of the ‘I’ and ‘P’ paper was unacceptable (Swisher, 2004).

Article IV: “The Jerusalem municipal area will host the national capitals of both Israel and the Palestinian State” (Swisher, 2004, p. 267).
Barak claimed that it would disrupt his attempt at making the town of Abu Dis the capital of Palestine instead of East Jerusalem which was what the Palestinians were demanding. Ross succumbed to Barak’s demand and made an improvised correction (Swisher, 2004).

Article IV (With Ross’ Correction): “The expanded area of Jerusalem will host the national capitals of both Israel and the Palestinian State” (Swisher, 2004, p. 268)

Second, Barak demanded that the following perambulatory clause be changed:

“REITERATING their commitment to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and confirming their understanding that the FAPS is based upon and will lead to the implementation of Resolution 242 and 338 between them;” (Swisher, 2004, p. 258)

Barak wanted to get the Palestinians away from having Resolution 242\(^5\) as the base of the negotiations. Ross made another modification again, and the preamble was changed into the following:

“REITERATING their commitment to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and confirming their understanding that the FAPS is the basis for their implementation and will lead the implementation of Resolution 242 and 338 between them;” (Swisher, 2004, p. 259)

There were two things that were wrong with Ross’ act of modifying the proposal based on the Israeli request. First, his readiness to make these modifications as soon as the

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\(^5\) It is a United Nations Security Council Resolution released on November 22, 1967 after the six-day war. Some of its main points include: the withdrawal of Israelis forces from all occupied areas and mutual acknowledgement of sovereignty.
Israelis asked for it gave the Israelis the perception that the American mediation team members are pushovers. Second, Ross, who is not an international law expert, made these modifications unilaterally without consulting international law experts on his team like Robert Malley. Third, Ross’s modification of the preamble which removed Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations complicated matters and would lead to several incidents throughout the summit, especially in the Frontiers and Security Committee.

At around 2:00 am, Arafat received the paper with the hand-written modifications and scribbles done by Ross and went over it with his advisers. Ross’ presentation of the paper in this manner conveyed unprofessionalism to both parties and indicated the mediators’ lack of seriousness towards the process and the parties. Akram Hannieh commented, “It was a bad paper by any standard and made clear the fact that the American peace team had deliberately distorted the Palestinian positions to President Clinton, enabling them to make bridging proposals that suited them” (Swisher, 2004, p. 270). Gilead Sher from the Israeli team also said “The first American document that landed on our desks was a cut-and-paste document of quite a lousy quality. It had a lot of mistakes in it and a lot of loopholes” (Sher, 2006, p. 270). Enraged by what he had read, Arafat tasked his team to inform the Americans of their serious comments and their rejection of the paper. Thirty minutes later, Abu Ala and Saeb Erekat informed Gamal and Ross that they wanted to see Secretary Albright. They were very upset about the contents of the paper and considered it to be an Israeli paper written by Americans (Swisher, 2004). Abu Ala’s assessment of the paper was that its aim was “To promote as far as possible the Israeli position, presented as a package of American proposals. The
objective appeared to be to persuade the Palestinians to lower their expectations.” “To impair and undermine the Palestinian position,” and “To return the negotiations to their original starting point in an attempt to destroy the Palestinian negotiating principle of rejecting the discussion of secondary issues before the completion of the principal issues such as the frontiers,” and “To confine the talks to separate negotiating committees on the separate issues, in an attempt to set aside the comprehensive procedure initiated in the Swedish Track” (Qurie, 2008, p. 189-190). Abu Ala and Saeb Erekat were able to meet with Secretary Albright around 3:00 AM to express their disapproval to which she said: “that they can consider the paper to be null and void” (Qurie, 2008, p. 190). The Palestinians had managed to reject an American paper without resistance too (Qurie, 2008).

In the early afternoon, bilateral negotiations began between both sides with their negotiators divided into three committees with each tackling a major issue: frontiers and security, Jerusalem, and refugees. Each party had placed two of its negotiators in each committee except for the frontiers and security committee which had three negotiators from each side. Any progress that was made was only trivial meanwhile most of the committees, like frontiers and security, faced a deadlock with both sides staunchly sticking to their positions. In the early evening, around 8:00 PM. President Clinton was going around to visit the committees, encouraging them to cooperate, reminding them that time was scarce, attempting to help out by suggesting solutions and advising negotiators on what to focus on. For example, the negotiators in the frontiers and security were not making any progress since Abu Ala was refusing to negotiate unless the Israelis agreed to use the June 4, 1967, line as the basis where to start frontier
negotiations from (Ross, 2004). Seeing this happening President Clinton stepped in and said:

“(Addressing the Israelis) If you do not make progress by tomorrow time will have run out. Israel agreed to come to the conference table here on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, and the principle of exchange of territory does not take precedence over that. However, the eastern frontier is a security issue, and Israel has a need for security in the future. An international or American presence is something that could be put in place. I must say to the Palestinians that if they do not agree on something by tomorrow, there will be no agreement. Let us try to resolve questions other than the Jordan River question. On the issue of settlements, regardless of the amount of territory involved or the percentage, what would be the alternative? As far as we are concerned, you are now in possession of territory that is the subject of Security Council Resolution 242. The objective is, first of all, to get something on the table. Then we can look into your concerns so that you can accept it” (Qurie, 2008, p. 193-194).

The President succeeded in loosening the parties’ hard grip on their positions and got promises that they would try to accommodate each other (Ross, 2004).

Before the day was almost over, the American team was informed of a Palestinian-Israeli back channel that had been formed inside the summit. It was made up of Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Rashid from the Palestinian side and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Shlomo Yanai, and Yossi Ginossar from the Israeli side. This news
pleased the President and Ross since it meant that a space was available for new ideas to be tested, and possibly be included in the summit’s proposals (Ross, 2004).

Day 5

July 15, 2000, was an eventful day for the summit participants. The day began with the meetings of all three committees. In the frontiers and security committee, no progress was being made for the second day. The Israeli team was instructed not to give any concessions, especially after the arrival of Dan Meridor\(^6\), and to wait for the Palestinians to make the first overture. On the Palestinian side, Abu Ala refused to budge from the 1967 border baseline before getting an agreement from the Israelis that border modifications would be done based on the principle of reciprocity. The meeting was heated, and with no backing down, shouts were eventually heard emanating from the meeting room. President Clinton eventually intervened to see what the problem was. He discovered that Abu Ala was rejecting an Israeli proposal that included a map without providing an alternative. After trying to reason with Abu Ala and suggesting that the Palestinians submit a counterproposal, Abu Ala’s obstinance finally got to President Clinton, and he blew up in his face saying (Ross, 2004):

“I am here to hold a summit meeting, not to waste time. The Israelis have presented their plan, and I agreed with Arafat yesterday that all issues were open to discussion. Now you (pointing his finger at Abu Ala) want them to change their positions and maps. If you want to give lectures and deliver speeches on Security Council resolutions, you can go to the United Nations, where you can say whatever you like, but you should not

\(^6\) Dan Meridor was a Minister without portfolio in Barak’s cabinet who was a conservative on most of the core issues.
waste my time here. I will pack up here and leave, holding you personally responsible for the failure of this summit. This is not the way to seek an agreement. Thanks to you, your people will miss the chance to solve your problems and enjoy freedom within a state of your own” (Qurie, 2008, p. 197).

This incident was a bad move for two reasons. First, the obvious reason, President Clinton should not have shouted at Abu Ala in a room full of people. It was highly unprofessional and, according to Abu Ala, confirmed his suspicions that the Americans were siding with the Israelis and did not want to consider the Palestinians’ position (Qurie, 2008). Gilead Sher described what had happened saying “The yelling was heard all over the cabin. Abu Ala, white as a sheet, left the room, very hurt. This was a breaking point of greater significance than was initially thought. Abu Ala lost faith in the fairness of the American mediation, convinced that Americans accepted the Israeli positions without considering the Palestinians” (Sher, 2006, p. 68). Second, it showed a lack of situational awareness on the part of President Clinton. What he did not realize was that Abu Ala could not give a counter-proposal since Palestinian support staff from the NSU were constantly delayed in entering Camp David and could not produce timely reports and counter-proposals because of that.

This dramatic incident consequently led Abu Ala to skip meetings and public gatherings for the rest of the day (Qurie, 2008).

Seeing that the official channels were clogged, Dennis Ross went to visit the members of the back channel. The mood amongst both sides seemed gloomy. Mohammad Rashid updated Ross on what was proposed; 92 percent of the territory with 2-3 percent swaps,
shared the responsibility of the Old City and sovereignty in the remaining neighborhoods (Ross, 2004). A shocked Ross asked whether these propositions were agreeable with Arafat, Rashid said: “When I say these things, they are more representative of Arafat than they are of Barak” (Ross, 2004, p. 669-670). The Israelis confirmed that they could not contribute since they did not know what their leader’s position is. Dan Meridor’s arrival and Barak’s tough-guy posturing to please him had rendered the back channel unproductive (Ross, 2004).

At 6:00 PM, the Jerusalem committee meets. Yasser Abed Rabo, Gilead Sher, Dan Meridor, President Clinton, and Sandy Berger are present at the meeting. In the meeting, something unprecedented occurs. Berger, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, proposed that the Jews be allowed to pray at the Haram al-Sharif (Enderlin, 2003). The conversation can be found below:

“Berger(to the Palestinians): Why wouldn’t you agree that a certain number of Jews could pray on the Plaza of the Mosque?

Abed Rabbo: What you’re saying is very dangerous. We came here to make peace, not to set off another war of religions. It’s as though I were to claim the right of Muslims to go and pray in front of the Wailing Wall. Can you imagine what would happen then?” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 203).

The Israelis were silent during the exchange, but a shaken and agitated Abed Rabbo continued:

“Abed Rabbo(to Gilead Sher): Explain to him that what he’s saying is very dangerous. Why aren’t you saying anything?[turning to Clinton] On the Haram al-Sharif, today, we
accept the Israeli rules that forbid any foreign individual to pray on the Plaza of the Mosques. Why do you want things to change after the conclusion of an agreement?” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 204).

Clinton attempted to calm the situation down during the meeting, but Abed Rabbo remained agitated. After the meeting was over, Abed Rabbo exited the room and found Robert Malley who attempted to convince him that Berger did not mean any harm. Abed Rabbo replies “Tell Sandy, your boss, that this proposal is very dangerous. I don’t even want Arafat to know about it” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 204). Ever since Moshe Dayan entered East Jerusalem in 1967, he placed a rule which forbade Jews from praying in the Haram because he knew the religious sensitivities which existed over that Holy Place. Its sanctity and exclusivity for Muslims is one of the few matters which both sides agree on. Sandy’s proposal was extremely dangerous because it had broken a very dangerous taboo by mentioning it in official negotiations and because it showed how little familiarity he had with the details of the conflict. The Palestinians who had expected such a proposal to come from the Israelis were petrified to have it come from a member of the American mediation team (Enderlin, 2003).

At 10:00 PM, President Clinton went to see Barak. After hearing from Gilead the potential American proposals given by Ross, Barak complained about suggesting potential territory swaps now since that would alter the Palestinian perception of their starting point. Clinton got angry at Barak and said that he had hammered the Palestinians for doing nothing but complaining and continued saying that Barak was doing the same thing. Clinton then told Barak to choose two of his negotiators to meet with the Palestinians for an overnight session without any constraints. After this meeting with
Barak, Clinton met with Arafat and requested that he choose two negotiators from his side as well to meet with the Israelis for an overnight session too (Ross, 2004).

Both leaders abided by President Clinton’s instructions and chose two negotiators to take part in the overnight negotiations. The Israeli side chose Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher meanwhile the Palestinians chose Mohammad Dahlan and Saeb Erekat (Enderlin, 2003).

*Day 6*

July 16, 2000, began with President Clinton giving the four chosen negotiators words of encouragement. He reminded them of what was on the line, told them that any new ideas and propositions they come up with will be a great help, told them that they had immunity for whatever they do and propose and that he would bear responsibility for everything that will result from the meeting. The four negotiators were sent to the President’s office in Laurel Cabin to meet there and discuss all the core issues (Ross, 2004).

In the meeting, the Israelis had put forth proposals regarding Jerusalem and the borders. On Jerusalem, the Israelis proposed that the outer ring of the Holy City come under Palestinian Sovereignty, that the municipality of ‘Arab Jerusalem’ would be located outside the city limits, that the Armenian, Muslim, and Christian quarters of the old city be placed under Palestinian administration and Israeli sovereignty, and that the Temple Mount would be placed under Palestinian custodianship and Israeli sovereignty. On borders, they proposed that they be given 10.5% of the West Bank in exchange for docks at the port of Ashdod and a terminal at Ben Gurion Airport, that another 10 percent of
the West Bank consisting of the Jordan Valley be placed under Israeli control for twenty years, and that Palestinian airspace would remain under Israeli control. The Palestinians on the other hand, stuck to their claims and their desire for UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 197 be the basis from which negotiations are done (Enderlin, 2003).

After hours of grueling negotiations, the Palestinians and Israelis reached an impasse. As a result, the four negotiators went to visit President Clinton at 2:00 PM to tell him the results. The summary that President Clinton was presented with was that the Israelis made concessions and the Palestinian refused them (Sher, 2006). As a result, President Clinton goes to see Arafat who was agitated at the Israeli proposals and at how the negotiations were going so far. Arafat tells Clinton “It makes no sense to say that Barak has taken a step because this step has to do with the districts outside Jerusalem that he wants to separate from” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 212). Clinton, in turn, asked Arafat to clearly present his objections and to answer a few questions such as “What is your reaction to Barak’s wanting to annex 10.1 percent of the West Bank?” and “Do you accept a limited Israeli presence on the border with Jordan?” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 212). Complying with Clinton’s request, the Palestinian delegation drafted a letter outlining its objections and answering Clinton’s questions. After the letter was drafted, Arafat, accompanied by Saeb Erekat, went to see the President. Accounts regarding Clinton’s reaction during that meeting are mixed; Erekat said it was amiciable meanwhile Sandy Berger said it was tense (Enderlin, 2003).

Regardless of the mood in which the last Clinton-Arafat meeting was set in, President Clinton saw the impasse and concluded that it was a dead end and decided to change his
strategy. At 10:30 PM, Madeleine Albright informs both sides that President Clinton will be shuttling back and forth between them (Enderlin, 2003).

Day 7

July 17, 2000, was referred to by all sides as ‘Jerusalem day.’ All sides were going to seriously tackle the Gordian Knot of the Palestine-Israel conflict. However, the Israeli team was nowhere to be found (Sher, 2006). They had closeted themselves in the Prime Minister’s cabin since 1 AM for a marathon session of meetings to talk about their delegation’s position regarding Jerusalem. Only Barak and two other members would exit Dogwood to meet with the Americans and Palestinians (Swisher, 2004). At 9:30 AM, the American team met with the President to discuss their strategy for the day and to pool new ideas on the Jerusalem issue. Jon Schwartz had found a possible solution for the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount issue which involves placing it under a Palestinian sovereign-like status or custodianship. The rest of the American team loved the idea (Ross, 2004).

At 3:00 PM Albright met with the Palestinian delegation and saw the documentation and maps which they had presented to outline their position on all the aspects of the Jerusalem issue. Albright then attempted to implement a ‘mini-coup strategy’ she had devised with Ross and other State Department officials which aimed at turning Palestinian delegates on Arafat (Swisher, 2004). She proceeded to talk to Abu Ala and Abu Mazen individually to try and get them to turn on Arafat (Qurie, 2008). Below is the conversation that happened between Abu Mazen and Madeline Albright:

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7 The “mini coup strategy” consisted of dividing the Palestinians amongst themselves and creating internal pressure on Arafat to accept the American proposals.
“Abu Mazen: No, I wouldn’t go against him. If I disagree with his position. I’ll resign!

Albright: What about a partial accord? Would you accept it?

Abu Mazen: No, I won’t accept any partial solution! Any agreement without Jerusalem would endanger Arafat’s life!” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 215)

Below is the conversation that happened between Abu Ala and Albright:

“Albright: Are you prepared to continue to support Mr. Arafat?

Abu Ala: Naturally, President Arafat is the leader of Palestinian people. He is our leader and leader of the Palestinian delegation here, and we will support him always

Albright: And over difficult decisions, are you prepared to support him?

Abu Ala: Yes, so long as those decisions are within the limits of our agreed positions. If we were to do anything other, we have children and grandchildren to whom we are answerable and who we want to be proud of us, and we also wish to be proud of what we achieve for them and for our people” (Qurie, 2008, p. 207).

Ultimately, both declined, and instead of doing some good, Albright ended up reinforcing the Palestinian perception of American bias in favor of the Israelis and caused the Palestinians to be more hesitant when it came to cooperation (Qurie, 2008).

The Americans and Palestinians had waited for most of the day for the Israelis, and still, no word came from them. President Clinton had run out of patience and decided to break up the Israeli meeting. Barak was called to meet the President and, even after making the President wait a whole day, he was half an hour late to their meeting. An already angry
Clinton, read the paper that resulted from the Israeli day-long meeting and was infuriated (Ross, 2004). The Israelis had retracted the positions they had presented the day before. Ross, who was present during the meeting said

“Now, instead of 10.5 percent, the territory to be annexed was 11.3 percent; now, instead of at least three villages in the current municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem to become part of sovereign Al-Quds, it was one village. On almost every issue there was a retreat. This is what Barak had put us on hold for thirteen hours to do” (Ross, 2004, p. 684).

Upon reading the paper and hearing this, President Clinton’s face turned red, and with a voice that just kept getting louder he said:

“You kept us and Arafat waiting all day, and you want me to present something less than what Shlomo presented as our idea? I won’t do it. I just won’t do it. I would have no credibility. I can’t go see Arafat with a retrenchment. You want to present these ideas directly to Arafat, to the Palestinians, you go ahead and see if you can sell it. There is no way I can. This is not real. This is not serious. I went to Shepherdstown and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding. I will not let it happen here. I simply will not” (Ross, 2004, p. 684).

Barak gave a muffled response saying he cannot allow himself ‘morally and politically’ that goes beyond the document the Israeli team had presented. However, he softened up and promised that he would do his best to change the positions to allow some convergence with the Palestinians to happen. He also asked the President not to let his positions to be known to the Palestinians just yet (Sher, 2006).
At 10 PM, President Clinton met with Arafat and presented him with a bridging proposal produced by Schwartz and Ross. It included the idea of Palestinian custodianship. President Clinton considered it to be the most convenient for both sides. Arafat rejected it and said “This is a Dennis Ross invention. Albright and Ross are working for the Israelis, not for you” (Sher, 2006, p. 83).

Meanwhile, Erekat, Dahlan, Sher, and Ben-Ami were still working on the Jerusalem issue to try and find some solution. Both sides put forth some ideas, but they could not agree on any. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were willing to push themselves to the other’s side any further (Sher, 2006). The clock was ticking fast, and the President was due to leave to Okinawa in one day.

Day 8

There was a hustle and bustle at Camp David with staff members in a hurry to prepare President Clinton for his departure to Okinawa. The American mediation team was in no less hurry than the staff to try and salvage what they can from the progress made at the summit.

At midday, President Clinton met with Arafat to inform him that he will be staying a little longer to try and see a deal through. The President told Arafat his personal ideas for a solution that can be summed up as follows; Arafat would be the Custodian of the holy places, a Palestinian flag raised over Haram El Sharif, Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarter of the city, sovereignty over Arab areas and suburbs outside of the city, 80 percent of the Jordan Valley will fall under Palestinian sovereignty, and 10 percent of the West Bank along with 1 percent of Gaza will be
annexed by Israel. In response, Arafat refused saying “Dennis Ross cooked up these ideas with Barak” (Ross, 2004, p. 690). He also said “I cannot go back to my people without Holy Jerusalem. I prefer to die under occupation rather than to give concessions or accept servility” and “We shall not exchange occupation for permanent Israeli sovereignty” (Qurie, 2008, p. 213). He then suggested that the summit be postponed for two weeks. (Qurie, 2008)

Upon continuously hearing of Dennis’ bias towards the Israelis from Arafat and his team, Clinton met with Berger and decided to begin to alienate Dennis from the talks discreetly. The reason wasn’t that of his lack of expertise but because the Americans wanted to rid the Palestinians of an excuse to reject their proposals because of Ross’ involvement in them (Swisher, 2004).

After Clinton left Arafat, he met with his team to brief them on Arafat’s response to the ideas he suggested. After the briefing, they discussed the different ways of moving forward and making progress. Dennis Ross suggested a ‘Shock Treatment; strategy where both sides would be informed that the President has had enough and was ready to end the conference unless both sides come up with something in the next 2 hours. The president approved this strategy, and it was set into motion. As a result, Ross went to Amnon’s cabin where the back-channel negotiators usually meet. Ross found Amnon and Shlomo present and informed them of the president’s ‘decision’ as well. As a result, all of them went to their respective teams to inform them of the President’s decision. (Ross, 2004)
Several hours passed and the American team heard nothing from either side. However, they would soon find out that both sides were talking to each other (Ross, 2004). Yet, despite a channel of communication being opened between both sides, they were each facing a crisis of their own. The Israelis were arguing amongst themselves on how far they should go regarding Jerusalem (Enderlin, 2003). The Palestinians, on the other hand, were divided amongst themselves. Abu Ala, Abu Mazen, and Yasser Abed Rabbo represented the traditionalists of the team who wanted to dig their heels in and rejected any hint regarding Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem meanwhile Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Rashid represented the somewhat cooperative youth who were pushing Arafat to at least give a response (Sher, 2006).

The Americans noticed this division in their dealings with the Palestinian delegates and decided to capitalize on it. Members of the state department, fooled by Dahlan and Rashid’s personal traits and willingness to negotiate, attempted their ‘mini-coup strategy’ on them. Dahlan, sensing that he had been giving them the illusion of flexibility constantly reminded them saying “Look, on the serious issues there is no flexibility. Arafat is the most flexible person in the Palestinian leadership! No one could ever dare or deny when President Arafat acknowledged Resolution 242. It simply gives the Israelis 78 percent of the land of historical Palestine!” (Swisher, 2004, p. 278) John Podesta, Clinton’s chief of staff, would later comment on this matter and say “I think it was partly conscious and partly subconscious. It was conscious in the sense that the younger guys had more capacity to deal. The subconscious part was that the younger guys were more simpathico, if you will. . . ” (Swisher, 2004, p. 278) The ‘mini-coup
strategy’ only made the Palestinian delegation wearier of the American team and resulted in even more dissension and gridlock (Swisher, 2004).

At 10:30 PM, Barak visited Clinton’s Cabin (Percy, 2005) and proposed the following: 9 percent annexation of the West Bank, swapping 1 percent of Gaza, the Palestinians would have sovereignty over 85 percent of the Jordan valley, Christian and Muslim quarters would be under Palestinian sovereignty, seven out of eight outer neighborhoods would fall under Palestinian sovereignty, Arafat would have custodianship over the Jordan Valley for the next twelve years. After presenting his new proposal, Barak asked Clinton to present these to Arafat as his own ideas (Ross, 2004).  

After Clinton’s meeting with Barak, Arafat was asked to go to the President’s cabin. Arafat arrived at Aspen alone. In the meeting, only Clinton, Gamal, and Arafat were present (Percy, 2005). With Gamal interpreting, the President presented the new ideas given by Barak as an amended version of his previous proposals given that day and told him that he is sure that the Israelis would accept these ideas if Arafat agrees to them. After presenting the proposals, President Clinton, for the sake of veracity, asked Gamal to explain the concept of Custodianship to Arafat in Arabic. Seeing that Arafat was still hesitant, President Clinton decided to pull on his heart strings by telling him that he wants to help him and that if he would accept the custodianship, then he would help him put pressure on Barak on other areas (Ross, 2004). He then proceeded to make padded threats by telling Arafat that if his refusal of the new proposal leads to the failure of the summit, then Arafat would lose his friendship and the support of the U.S government.

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After the meeting, Arafat went back to discuss Clinton’s proposal with his team and draft a response (Percy, 2005).

Day 9

On July 19, 2000, at 1:30 AM, only hours after Arafat left Aspen, the Palestinian team went to see Gamal (Qurie, 2008) for two reasons; to hand him a memorandum of rejection which they had drafted without their NSU legal team and to inquire about some of the ideas in Clinton’s proposal. After taking down their questions, Gamal immediately informed Sandy. Sandy held a meeting composed solely of NSC and White House staff to draft responses to the Palestinian questions. Afterward, Gamal visited the Palestinians’ cabin and handed them the answers (Swisher, 2004).

At 3:00 AM, the White House/NSC meeting participants phone the Palestinians to see if their response has changed after the clarifications. As a result, Erekat delivers a rejection letter to Bruce Riedel stating, “These ideas do not form a basis for negotiations” (Swisher, 2004, p. 303). In the morning, Clinton wakes up and is handed the Palestinian rejection and their proposition of postponing the summit for two weeks. Upon hearing this, Barak believes that the Palestinians do not want an agreement and prepares a letter to announce the end of the Israeli delegation’s participation in the summit (Enderlin, 2003).

Right before the American team’s meeting with President Clinton, a screaming match breaks out between Albright and Berger. Albright and Ross had been angry with Sandy for not waking them up to take part in the meeting. Ross did not confront Sandy since, as he says, “the secretary’s anger was sufficient for the both of us” (Ross, 2004, p. 691).
However, Ross did confront Rob and Gamal to express his discontent regarding his exclusion (Ross, 2004). The Clinton-Berger plan to purposefully exclude Ross had backfired and caused an even larger rift within the U.S Mediation Team. After being asked some questions by the Palestinians regarding Clinton’s proposal, Berger, Helal, and Malley met without Albright and Ross. This infuriated Ross who was already at odds with Berger and created a rift with Malley and Helal. Albright’s exclusion, which was due to inter-departmental discord, further aggravated the White House/NSC – State Department rivalry (Ross, 2004). One Israeli negotiator said “Albright and Berger were fighting over the – not fighting, you know, between friends – for the attention of the president . . . . There wasn’t a coherent logic that goes all the way from top to bottom” (Swisher, 2004, p. 303).

This inter-departmental rift had caused the American team’s administration of the summit to become erratic and led them to switch strategies four times in seven days. Maria Echaveste, the President’s Deputy Chief of Staff talked about how this rivalry had also affected the President’s work. She said: “There were times, especially at the beginning, when it was like [Clinton] was sitting there as one of the staff people figuring out how this should run. That’s not what the president should be doing!” (Swisher, 2004, p. 293). She then continued to talk about the confusion that resulted from rivalry saying “So we had to really push. He shouldn’t have to be sitting there with Dennis and Rob and Bruce and Madeleine and Sandy – let’s not forget Sandy. That was a huge tension between Sandy and Madeleine as to who was sort of orchestrating the pace of the discussions and what’s being discussed” (Swisher, 2004, p. 293). Tony Verstandig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, also disapproved of the
American team’s disunity and noted how it affected the team’s preparations and organized work saying “I don’t think we were prepared going into the meetings as well as we should have. I am a structured, detail-oriented person. I don’t think we did the kind of paper preparation, ganging-up, this happens, and then you do this; this is the fallback. It was very loo-sy-goosy...” (Swisher, 2004, p. 293). Gilead Sher from the Israeli team noticed the negative impact from the summit’s mismanagement saying “Preliminary positions on the various issues were presented, one after the other, by the working groups from both delegations, to President Clinton in the first few days....But this orderly process of presenting positions, mapping interests, and giving the sides “homework” did not have any follow-up, which could have provided the impetus for decision-making. The process dissolved, and the relevance and substance that characterized its beginning faded away. The beginnings of many concrete and assertive processes lingered without being continued” (Sher, 2006, p. 70).

At 9 AM, the American team met with President Clinton and briefed him on the recent developments. After updating him, both Berger and Albright concluded that Arafat was leading the summit to failure and advised that he should be tougher on him. Ross suggested certain statements that the President could say to Arafat to put pressure on him so that he can accept (Ross, 2004).

At 10 AM, President Clinton had his first of many meetings with Arafat on that day. Right off the bat, President Clinton began applying pressure saying

“I’m very disappointed. You’re going to lose my friendship. You’re going to ruin the opportunity to conclude an agreement for twenty years. Barak will form a government of
national unity. You’re making me lose eight years of effort (Enderlin, 2003, p. 233-235).”

Clinton continued applying pressure, and when Jerusalem was brought up again, Arafat said:

“When it comes to Jerusalem and taking into account the fact that the solution we’ve been offered to all intents and purposes gives Israel sovereignty over the city. .. and that Israel would [de facto] annex Jerusalem in its totality, I have to consult with the entire Arab world, not just the Palestinians” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 233-235).

Noting that Arafat cannot move without the support of the Arab world, Clinton begins a plan to call various Arab leaders; King Abdullah of Jordan, President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (Enderlin, 2003). In order to get a better view on the matter, Clinton summons Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador Ned Walker to Camp David for one day to consult him on the positions of the Arab world regarding the proposals. Ambassador Walker, who had been refused entry into Camp David since day one, told the President that the Arabs were completely in the dark about what was happening inside Camp David except for the few intercepted phone calls Arafat made to them. Clinton, who had promised Barak not to disclose the proposals he made at Camp David, had asked Arab leaders for their support in pressuring Arafat to accept his proposal without being able to tell them what the proposal is (Swisher, 2004). President Mubarak of Egypt recounts what happened when he was contacted:
“I was stunned! I get a call from the president of the United States, who tells me I’ve got to call Arafat and push him to take a compromise on Jerusalem. I asked him, “Well, what is the background? What are the terms?” And the President said, “I can’t tell you because I pledged not to reveal the details of the negotiations in advance.” [So I said,] thank you, Mr. President. There’s nothing I can do for you” (Swisher, 2004, p. 306-309).

Clinton, who had contacted all Arab leaders, could not get them to support his proposal. At 5:15 PM, he went to visit Arafat. Clinton updated Arafat on the results of his calls and stated that King Abdullah and President Mubarak suggested that the Jerusalem issue be postponed for two years. Clinton continued saying that Barak’s concessions are important and might not happen again. Arafat asked the President for two more weeks. Clinton asked if things can be completed in two weeks to which Arafat replied “Yes! In fact, for me, the real negotiation began just two or three days ago” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 236-237).

While Clinton was meeting with Arafat, Albright and Indyk met with Abu Ala, Abu Mazen, and Yasser Abed Rabbo to convince them to accept the proposal. Indyk said “The Israelis cannot go as far as you want them to. In fact, no one in Israel could do that” (Qurie, 2008, p. 210-211). Albright reminded them of the importance of reaching an agreement saying “We are at a dead end, and if we leave Camp David without a solution, chaos could erupt” (Qurie, 2008, p. 210-211). Abu Ala replied, “We will not accept any deals that do not give us full sovereignty over East Jerusalem” (Qurie, 2008, p. 210-211).
After dinner, Clinton visits Arafat to meet with him for the third time that day. The President tells Arafat “You have to agree to continue the discussion on the basis of my latest proposal and do no more than raise objections with regard to sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 238-239). Arafat replies “Mr. President, thank you very much for your efforts. I’ll send you an invitation to my funeral after my assassination if you insist on this point” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 238-239).

At that point, things were looking bleak; the Israelis had released a statement hours earlier stating that they will no longer be participating in the summit and that they gave their best effort. Vans had loaded the luggage of the Palestinian and Israeli teams and were ready to go. However, while Barak and Arafat no longer believed that a solution could be reached, their teams did not. Hassan Asfour and Mohammad Dahlan spoke with President Clinton asking him to continue to host them for a bit longer, so they can get things moving, but they were met with silence. Then they told Arafat of their conversation with Clinton hoping to entice him to accept an extension (Enderlin, 2003). On the other side, the Israeli team was hard at work to convince Barak to stay. Ginossar explained to him how hard it is for the Palestinians to negotiate in an environment where everything is imposed on them. Ben-Ami then suggested that Arafat be shown more respect because that is what he needs and that is what will make him more flexible. Sher ended it by saying “Something has started moving over the past twenty-four hours. We assumed there would be a crisis at some point, and we got it. We need to take advantage of this newfound vigor” (Sher, 2006, p. 87). At 11:30 PM, Barak contacted Clinton informing him that he would stay on the condition that negotiations be based on
Clinton’s proposal (Sher, 2006). Almost immediately, Clinton heads to meet Arafat and says:

“I’ve revised my position. If we stop the summit like this, the results will be negative and the consequences dangerous on the ground. I’m asking you to stay here. I’m leaving for Japan and will be back Sunday. I’m authorizing Madeleine Albright to continue the negotiations. But, please, try to find a solution for the Temple Mount, the Haram al-Sharif. It’s not necessary to put everything down on paper. Open the subject up. Think about this question and others. I’ve spoken with Barak (Enderlin, 2003, p. 239-240).”

Arafat replies saying “I take what you’ve just said as an order, and I accept it” (Qurie, 2008, p. 222). Clinton succeeded in keeping both sides at Camp David during his absence but had created a miscommunication problem that would render the next three days useless. After making sure that both sides wanted to and will stay, President Clinton took off to Okinawa to attend the G-8 summit for the next three days. He tasked Albright with taking charge of the talks (Qurie, 2008).

Day 10

On July 20, 2000, Clinton’s absence could be immediately felt. Work proceeded at a much slower pace, and members of both teams could be seen resting and walking around Camp David. Hours go by without anything being done until Albright meets with Arafat and Abu Ala. Arafat complains about the time being wasted, and Albright informs Arafat that Barak wants Clinton’s recent proposals as the basis of negotiations (Enderlin, 2003). Arafat replies saying “Forget that!” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 240) Afterward, Albright tells Arafat that she wants to reinstate the working committees and begin with a meeting
on security. Arafat says that security must be linked with territory and nominates Abu Ala from his side to be the representative. He then chooses Nabil Shaath as the representative for the refugees committee (Qurie, 2008).

Seeing that Clinton had promised Barak that negotiations would continue on the basis of the American paper and seeing that Arafat rejected that, Albright apologized for the misunderstanding and accepted full responsibility. To solve this problem, she said: “The American document is withdrawn from the table and agenda” (Sher, 2006, p. 94) Albright’s decision to withdraw Clinton’s proposal had set back the progress made at the summit (Sher, 2006).

At dinner, Barak avoids Arafat when he approaches him to greet him. Then Barak proceeds to lock himself in his cabin and does not allow anyone to see him or any phone calls to go through. Later in the evening, the committee on security and borders and the committee on refugees convenes but make no meaningful progress (Enderlin, 2003, p. 241).

Day 11

On July 21, 2000, Barak was still locking himself inside his cabin, but the rest of the summit participants were hard at work (Ross, 2004). At 1:00 AM, the committee on security and borders meets again. An hour and a half later, the Palestinians, with the help of their cartographer Samih el-Abed who was allowed in just for that meeting, presented the Israelis with their map. The Israelis reject the map (Enderlin, 2003).
At 11:00 AM, the committee on refugees meets. The Israelis state their position while the Palestinians responded with theirs. During the meeting, Albright was taking notes (Enderlin, 2003).

While the meetings were taking place in Albright’s presence, Ross was working behind the scenes with, what he viewed to be, the most productive individuals at the summit; Dahlan, Ben-Ami, Lipkin-Shahak, Rashid, and Ginossar. In those meetings with Ross, the participants discussed the issue of Jerusalem and more specifically, the Temple Mount. After exploring various options, everyone present saw that this was an obstacle that is most difficult to overcome (Indyk, 2017).

In the evening, all the delegates went to the President’s movie room to watch a screening of ‘U 571.’ Later on, Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gilead Sher, and Saeb Erekat and his assistant Gaith el-Omari met for several hours to exchange ideas but found no success (Enderlin, 2003).

**Day 12**

On July 22, 2000, the main highlight was Barak opening his cabin to members of his delegation after almost two days of isolating himself from the outside world. During the day, negotiators from both sides held meetings but made no progress. As if time had not been wasted enough, Albright invites Arafat to her farm to spend the day. In the evening, all of the summit participants were invited to a screening of ‘Gladiator’ (Enderlin, 2003).

**Day 13**
July 23, 2000, began with the meeting of the three committees. On the security and borders committee, the Palestinians repeated that the principle of reciprocity should be the basis on which the issue of territory is resolved. The Israelis refused this again and came up with an alternate suggestion which would ultimately lead to 15 percent of the West Bank being annexed to Israel. With the two sides entrenched in their positions, no progress was made. On the refugee committee, the Palestinians repeated their desire to implement UN resolution 194 as a solution which would allow the refugees to choose between return and compensation. The Israelis, on the other hand, refused the right of return as a principle and that it be based on UN resolution 194 and instead suggested to allow a limited number to return within the context of a family reunion or for humanitarian reasons. On the Jerusalem committee, there was also no change. Haram al-Sharif remained a logjam for any progress on reaching an agreement in the holy city (Qurie, 2008). Later on, CIA Director George Tenet arrived at Camp David. Albright summoned him at the request of Mohammad Dahlan and Shlomo Yanai, Albright had asked Tenet to attend the summit and help them achieve a breakthrough (Ross, 2004). Tenet had good relations with both the Palestinians and Israelis. The American peace team knew that both sides would listen to him (Indyk, 2017).

Tenet arrived at Camp David and saw a frustrated Arafat. Arafat had told Tenet “Where is Barak? Why won’t he meet with me or talk to me? I came to an agreement with Clinton so that we could use these days profitably and move ahead” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 243-244). While Arafat was talking to Tenet wondering where the Israeli Prime Minister was, Ehud Barak was visiting the Gettysburg National Military Park with Madeleine Albright and Bruce Riedel (Enderlin, 2003). Clinton arrived at Camp David in the early
evening and met with his team who briefed him on the status of the summit. His presence immediately got work moving at a faster pace and yielded progress. At 9:30 PM, he met with Arafat and informed him that a meeting on security would take place soon and asked him to pick two delegates from his side to participate in it. He then informed Arafat that he will be leading the negotiations and that Tenet will be present to help (Ross, 2004).

After Barak’s return to Camp David from his excursion to Gettysburg, he asks to see Ross and Albright. He informs them that he won’t be able to deliver on the proposals put forth by Clinton. He stated that the best he could do is give sovereignty over the inner East Jerusalem neighborhoods and a special regime over the Old City (Ross, 2004).

At 11:30 PM, the meeting begins. The Palestinians had chosen Abu Ala and Mohammad Dahlan meanwhile the Israelis had chosen Gilead Sher and Shlomo Yanai. Several items were on the agenda; early warning detection stations that Israel wanted to keep on the West Bank, Palestinian airspace, maintaining five sectors of emergency deployment, demilitarization of the Palestinian state, control of Palestinian border posts, and the Jordan Valley. The meeting ended with the delegates of both sides feeling that progress has been made (Enderlin, 2003).

*Day 14*

At 3 AM, the meeting participants take a break from a meeting that had begun the previous day and go back to their respective leaders to discuss the results of the meeting (Ross, 2004). Fifteen minutes later, the meeting on security and borders resumes, and both sides are able to shift their positions closer to one another (Enderlin, 2003). In the
late afternoon, the working group on refugees meets with President Clinton in his cabin to present him with what had been discussed so far. Clinton had brought Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, and Rob Malley with him to the meeting. The Palestinians had been represented by Abu Mazen and Nabil Shaath meanwhile the Israelis were represented by Oded Eran and Elyakim Rubenstein (Qurie, 2008). The President was presented with the gaps that exist between the positions of both sides by the Israelis and the difference between the right of return as a principle and as a mechanism of implementation by the Palestinians. In the end, with President Clinton’s help, both sides agreed to implement a maximum cap on the number of refugees that would be returned (Sher, 2006).

At 9:00 PM, Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Robert Malley, and George Tenet meet with Arafat, Abu Ala, and Saeb Erekat. The meeting was emotionally charged. All sides saw that failure was imminent and all of them wanted to avoid it (Enderlin, 2003). After Arafat refused the American proposal again, Clinton exploded in anger saying:

“…You could have gotten sovereignty over the Christian and Muslim districts of the Old City and full jurisdiction over the Haram al-Sharif. This is a political question, not a religious one….You won’t have a state, and relations between America and the Palestinians will be over. Congress will vote to stop the aid you’ve been allocated, and you’ll be treated as a terrorist organization…You haven’t budged; all you’ve done is pocket what Barak was giving” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 253).

Erekat replied saying:
“...Mr. President, you are the leader of the world: don’t threaten my president, treat us fairly. The Palestinian people, under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, have accepted and recognized the State of Israel, 78 percent of historical Palestine. Never in the history of the Palestinians has a leader recognized the State of Israel this way and agreed to base the Palestinian State on 22 percent of the land! Now you’re saying that Arafat did not come a long way! He agreed to the 22 percent because the preceding American administration, and the one before that, and Europe along with them, said they would support those who worked for peace. Well, that’s exactly what I expect of you, Mr. President...” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 254)

At the end of that heated meeting, Clinton informs Arafat that the final discussion regarding Jerusalem will be taking place. He then informs him that Barak had selected Ben-Ami to be the negotiator and asks him to select one. Arafat chooses Erekat. One hour later, the meeting begins (Enderlin, 2003). All three participants discuss the options available to them as a result of this summit in case it fails. Erekat suggests a trilateral communique announcing the continuation of negotiations since a lot of progress has been made and a lot of taboos have been broken (Enderlin, 2003). President Clinton states the suggestions; “trilateral statement announcing the continuation of the negotiations, a communique announcing the collapse of the peace process, postponing the Jerusalem question to a later date and resolving all other problems, and postponing studying the issues concerning certain parts of Jerusalem for two years” (Enderlin, 2003, p. 255-258). Afterward, Ben-Ami put forth a proposal. At its conclusion, Clinton hands Erekat two proposals to give to Arafat and awaits his reply (Enderlin, 2003). Ben-Ami, knowing that Barak’s reaction to the President’s proposals would be negative said:
“For a change, I am not going to comment until the Palestinians reply” (Swisher, 2004, p. 329). Ben-Ami and President Clinton’s proposals can be found in Table 3.10 (Swisher, 2004) (Enderlin, 2003) below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ben Ami’s Proposal</th>
<th>Clinton Proposal #1</th>
<th>Clinton Proposal #2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outer Districts (East Jerusalem):</strong> Placed under full Palestinian Sovereignty</td>
<td><strong>Outer Districts (East Jerusalem):</strong> Placed under Palestinian Sovereignty</td>
<td><strong>Outer Districts (East Jerusalem):</strong> Placed under Palestinian Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inner Districts:</strong> Two districts placed under full Palestinian sovereignty with the others placed under Palestinian functional autonomy</td>
<td><strong>Inner Districts:</strong> Functional Autonomy for the Palestinians</td>
<td><strong>Inner Districts:</strong> Full sovereignty for the Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Old City:</strong> Special Regime will be applied to the Muslim, Christian, Armenian, and Jewish quarters.</td>
<td><strong>Old City:</strong> Palestinian full sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the city and Israeli annexation of the Jewish and Armenian quarters</td>
<td><strong>Old City:</strong> Palestinian functional autonomy over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the city and Israeli annexation of the Jewish and Armenian quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haram al-Sharif:</strong> Palestinians would have custodianship over the Haram al-Sharif, but the Israelis would retain residual sovereignty over it.</td>
<td><strong>Haram al-Sharif:</strong> UNSC10 and Morocco will grant “Sovereign Custody” over the Haram al-Sharif while Israel would retain residual sovereignty over it.</td>
<td><strong>Haram al-Sharif:</strong> UNSC and Morocco will grant “Sovereign Custody” over the Haram al-Sharif while Israel would retain residual sovereignty over it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.10: Camp David Summit - Final Proposals

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9 Practical arrangements would be worked out later
10 Abbreviation for United Nations Security Council
While this was happening, Helal, Tenet, and Malley went to Birch and attempted to convince Arafat to accept the proposal on three separate occasions (Swisher, 2004) (Enderlin, 2003).

Day 15

On July 25, 2000, at 3:15 AM, Saeb Erekat and Mohammad Dahlan head to Aspen with Arafat’s response. The two Palestinian negotiators find Berger, Albright, and Clinton at the cabin. They hand the President the letter which says that the proposal is rejected and that requests further negotiations. Clinton says: “I was expecting a response like this” (Swisher, 2004, p. 331-332). After letting out a sigh, he turns to Albright and Berger and says “I don’t like to fail, particularly at this” (Swisher, 2004, p. 331-332).

After reading the rejection letter, Clinton summoned Arafat and Barak to a meeting and told them that they were going to prepare a joint statement to declare that the summit could not conclude an agreement, that they will be continuing efforts to reach an agreement, and that the United States will remain a partner in the peace process. However, as the Palestinians and Israelis were packing their bags, special broadcasts appear on television stating that Clinton blames the Palestinians, particularly Arafat, for the failure of the summit (Enderlin, 2003). He said:

*Prime Minister Barak showed particularly courage and vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of peace...My remarks should stand for themselves, not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat because this is really hard and never been done before, but in praise of Barak. He came there knowing that he was going to have to*
take bold steps, and he did it. And I think you should look at it more as a positive toward him than as a condemnation of the Palestinian side” (Swisher, 2004, p. 336-337)

Barak would immediately follow suit and blame Arafat with the exact indirect demeanor which President Clinton had done (Swisher, 2004).
3.3 Consequent Conditions
This section will cover the third part of Bercovitch’s mediation analysis model. It will involve the final part of the analysis which are the consequent conditions. The consequent conditions are divided into two main variables; subjective criteria and objective criteria. Each variable has its own set of indicators that play two roles. First, they determine whether or not the mediation failed. Second, they evaluate the mediator’s performance.

3.3.1 Subjective Criteria

Subjective criteria, which include parties’ satisfaction, fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness, are mediator-centric indicators that measure the mediator’s performance in the dispute he/she/they are helping to solve. It should be noted that the efficiency and effectiveness indicators are not mediator-centric under Bercovitch’s model in chapter 1. However, seeing that the summit failed and that there was no settlement, they were made mediator-centric indicators.

Parties’ Satisfaction

None of the parties involved were satisfied with the outcome of the summit. They both wanted to come out with a permanent status agreement and failed to do so. Both parties expressed dissatisfaction with the mediators’ lack of a clear and solid plan and their way of running the summit. Major complaints expressed by both sides included mediator bias, no clear negotiation/mediation procedure, no follow-up to the progress made, no official recordkeeping of the agreements, low-quality American proposals both in content and presentation, and lack of consistency.
Fairness

If the American objective for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were to be summarized in one sentence, that sentence would be ‘Reach peace through creating symmetry between both sides.’ In other words, not to let the power disparity between both sides affect the fairness of the negotiations and their outcome. The United States of America’s ability to do just that is what made the Norwegians comfortable in handing over the mantle of peace in the Middle East to them. Initially, the American mediation team expressed this desire logistically through their seating plan and summit location that both showed neutrality.

However, contrary to what they were supposed to do in bringing about symmetry, the Americans had applied more pressure on the Palestinians than the Israelis. While Barak’s weakness on the home-front was a valid reason to be soft on the Israelis, a lot of indirect and unnecessary forms of pressure were applied on the Palestinians. The ‘mini-coup strategy’ applied on Day 7 and Day 8 to create dissent within the Palestinian team, constantly bringing up the lack of Palestinian counterproposals and hindering the entry of the NSU, and supporting the Israelis’ request to negotiate on the basis of Israeli security needs instead of International Law were all forms of indirect pressure. All of this, however, was dwarfed by the number of times Clinton along with many others such as Tenet, Malley, and Helal attempted to bully, coax, or sweet-talk Arafat into accepting their proposal compared to the one time the president had pressured Barak on Day 7. An
illustration of the asymmetrical dealings with both sides during the conference can be seen in figure 3.6 below.

![Diagram of Asymmetrical Application of Pressure by the Mediation Team]

Figure 3. 6: Asymmetrical Application of Pressure by the Mediation Team

Efficiency

The summit was inefficient for three main reasons; the existence of rivalry within the U.S Mediation team itself, the exclusion of key officials, and the administrative mismanagement which resulted from it.
Inter-departmental rivalry

Inter-departmental rivalry was a major impediment in the U.S mediation team’s efforts. In principle, there were two sides vying for the President’s attention. One was the State Department headed by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and the other was the White/House NSC headed by the National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. Both strove to get ahead, advise the President, and manage the mediation process. However, a third party should be added, and that third party would be the person of Dennis Ross. As mentioned in the ‘Mediation Team’ subsection in chapter 3, Ross had a privileged position as Special Middle East Coordinator working for both the State Department and White House. Despite being housed in the State Department and working for them, he would only give brief updates to the State Department and then hand the detailed reports to the White House. Access to both sides made him very knowledgeable on the subject and the point-man for Clinton during the mediation prior to and during the Camp David II Summit. This privileged position, however, came not only with knowledge but with power as well. Ross’s authority and knowledge enabled him to play both sides, help who he would like to, and hinder who he would like to, regardless of which side they were from. He went against Sandy Berger (White House/NSC) on many occasions and attempted to block Wendy Sherman (State Department)’s entry into Camp David. This factionalizing led to problems which will be discussed below. The three sides competing for the President’s attention can be illustrated in figure 3.7 below.
Figure 3.7: U.S Government Factions Competing for the President’s Favor

Exclusion of Key U.S Government Officials and PA Support Staff

As has been shown, this rivalry has led to many issues, besides disunity being a problem in itself, which had handicapped the U.S Mediation team’s work. First, many important individuals were excluded completely from the negotiations, had their entry hindered, or were asked to intervene too late to make any significant difference. These individuals include key U.S government officials such as Ambassador Ned Walker and CIA Director George Tenet as well as members from the Palestinian Authority’s Negotiation Support Unit. Ambassador Walker, who has had significant dealings with both Israelis and Arabs and knew both sides well, was purposefully forbidden to participate in the conference. His job, if he has been admitted to the summit, would have been to send official U.S government communiques to the Arab states to update them on the progress both sides were making at Camp David. His presence would have kept the Arab governments in the picture, ensured their buy-in, and enabled them to provide some solutions and suggestions. It would have also saved President Clinton from the ridicule...
he faced from Arab heads of state on Day 9. 11 CIA Director George Tenet, who Ross had later confirmed was on standby to help out with the summit, was only called-in two days prior to the conference’s conclusion. Tenet’s participation proved to be useful and insightful. However, there was very little time left for him to make any significant impact. With regards to the Palestinian Authority’s Negotiations Support Unit, their entry to Camp David was regularly hindered due to the extensive screening they had to endure due to Ross’ orders. This hindrance made it difficult for the Palestinian team, who were dependent on the NSU for their legal expertise, to submit timely counterproposals. Had their entry been facilitated, Clinton’s outburst at Abu Ala on Day 5 would not have happened and the initial meetings would have been more productive.12

Administrative Mismanagement

The lack of unity and coherence among the mediation team had caused a certain level of confusion and chaos when running the summit. Martin Indyk, United States Ambassador to Israel, commented on the matter saying “You had all these other people who were kibitzing the president – advising the president – a cacophony of voices . . . . So there was the president, Sandy, Madeleine, Rob Malley, Bruce Riedel, John Podesta, Maria Echaveste, and Dennis. Dennis is just one voice who only had a partial readout to what exactly happened. And so I think it was just a very dysfunctional time” (Swisher, 2004, p. 291). Besides the chaos and confusion engendered with the mismanagement issue, the problem with the organization had resulted in a lack of follow-up on the partial

11 On Day 9 President Clinton had phoned the heads of state of various Arab countries; Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia among others. The Arab states, who were kept in the dark, were asked to pressure Arafat into accepting a proposal whose contents they did not know.
12 Clinton had shouted at Abu Ala for refusing Israeli proposals outright and failing to provide any counterproposals. Clinton’s outburst had made Abu Ala convinced of American bias towards the Israelis and would discourage him from giving his best effort during negotiations.
agreements reached or progress made that was achieved in several meetings. This resulted in the wasting of various opportunities to capitalize on said agreements along with snail-pace progress most of the time. Tony Verstandig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, pointed out how the mismanagement had led to the disorganization of the summit’s process saying “I wish we had taken a more formal structure. That doesn’t mean in a bureaucratic sense. But that means that notes were taken and kept for review; a more formal record of meetings. Dennis was the only one who had them, and they were his personal, chicken-scratch notes. Had we done more complete brainstorming and research we would have been able to push the process along” (Swisher, 2004, p. 294).

Effectiveness

The summit was ineffective for two main reasons; the constant use of strategy shifts by the U.S mediation team and Clinton’s lack of mediator discipline.

*Strategy Shifts*

The Administrative mismanagement, lack of cohesion, and the resulting lack of record-keeping and follow-up led to quick frustration amongst the summit participants and mediators. This, in turn, contributed to various strategy shifts. The carter-based strategy initially called for the development of a draft agreement which would be changed and amended as negotiations proceeded. Instead, the mediation strategy was shifted five times. The shifts can be seen in table 3.11 below.
Quandt, who was present in both summits compared strategies saying “I’ve done one of the key innovations that we used at Camp David I the idea of a simple negotiating text, which we would put forward as our best judgment of what would work. The text was constantly subject to revision. We’d talk to one side about it, then the next side, and it was kind of an attrition process . . . We had twenty-three drafts. By the time we got to the end, we kind of wore them down on all the little stuff . . . and the one or two issues that they really cared about were in sharp focus, and everything else had been agreed upon. I was quite surprised that that technique was totally not explored” (Swisher, 2004, p. 262).

Inter-departmental rivalries had thus snowballed into bigger mistakes; Lack of follow-up, lack or record-keeping, strategy shifts, and exclusion of key government officials. The sum of these mistakes had eventually led to ineffective mediation by the American
team. An illustration of the inter-departmental rivalry’s snowball effect can be viewed in figure 3.8 below.

![Diagram of Inter-Departmental Rivalries]

Figure 3. 8: Effect of Inter-departmental Rivalries

*Clinton’s Lack of Mediator Discipline*

President Clinton is described as being personable, politically skillful, flexible, and intelligent. He knew the details of the conflict very well and was very intuitive. However, there are several actions he took which decreased his chances of success. First, Clinton backing down to Barak on the first day of the summit signaled how easily his mind could be changed. The numerous times in which he backed down after that to both the Israelis and Palestinians showed something worse; that he was a pushover. This
resulted in the real negotiations beginning on Day 7. Second, Clinton’s departures killed the momentum of the summit. In his initial carter-based strategy, it is important that the President be present and involved in the negotiations 24/7. The President’s mere presence gives his team more credibility and the participants more motivation to work towards a solution. The momentum of the conference was noticeable between the days where he was present, and the days he was not at the summit. President Clinton’s trip to Baltimore on Day 3 to address the NAACP and his trip to Japan rendered the meetings on those days to be useless. It was confirmed by Ambassador Indyk, that Vice President Al Gore was ready to fly to Okinawa in the President’s place. Instead, Clinton chose to leave the high-stakes negotiations that were inching towards a solution to attend the G-8 summit. Third, his miscommunication or purposely withholding information on the evening of Day 9 to Arafat about the reason why Barak was staying did not bode well with both sides and created a deadlock. If this was indeed a trick to get both sides to stay, it ended up doing more harm than good and rendered the days in Clinton’s absence useless. All of this showed how, despite being politically skillful, undisciplined Clinton was as a mediator.
3.3.2 Objective Criteria

Objective criteria, which include the behavior of the parties and interaction between the parties, are disputant-centric indicators which show the disputant’s impression of the negotiations and of each other after the end of the negotiations.

Behavior of the Parties

After the mediation was over, both sides were disenchanted with each other. The Palestinians thought that the Israelis were not serious about a reaching a settlement and that their demands were unreasonable. This is reflected in an interview which PBS Frontline conducted with Arafat. In the interview, Arafat says:

“Because there are some points which, if you are in my place, you will not accept it. I will give you the control ... of the airspace. ... And also, I accepted for them ... early-warning station. ... Early warning station, three, with the participation of the Americans and the participation of the Palestinians. But they are insisting to have, also, big -- not only military, big military bases with all armaments in Jordan Valley under their control. What's the meaning of that? And also, the borders between us and the Egyptians. Who can accept that? I told him, OK. Why not to be like Sinai, international forces headed by the Americans? Or like Syria, Golan Heights, or like south Lebanon, also international forces? Why only the Palestinians will accept your conditions? And not only that, some very critical points for our sacred Christian and Muslim holy places. As an example, the control of the Armenian quarter with all its churches. Who can accept this? I told him, "You have to remember" -- in front of Clinton -- "I cannot betray
my brothers to the Armenians.” And also, they have to control the area in which Santa Maria church is there. ... And they didn't reply.” (“Interviews: Yeasser Arafat”)

The Israelis, on the other hand, strongly believed that there was no Palestinian partner for peace and Barak made sure to convince all of the political factions in his country of this belief. After the summit was over, Barak made a statement saying:

“The government of Israel and I as prime minister, acted in the course of the Camp David summit out of moral and personal commitment, and supreme national obligation to do everything possible to bring about an end to the conflict but not at any price while at the same time, strengthening the State of Israel, and Jerusalem as its capital. We touched the most sensitive nerves, but regretfully with no result .... Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat’s positions on Jerusalem are those that prevented the achievement of an agreement. We must not lose hope. The vision of peace is not dead, but it suffered a heavy blow because of the Palestinians’ stubbornness” (Swisher, 2004, p. 337).

Interaction between the parties

Despite this mutual mistrust in the authenticity of the other side’s desire for peace, talks did continue under American auspices. The ideas discussed, and the taboos broken at Camp David served as the basis for the negotiations that continued afterward. However, even as both sides were getting closer to an agreement, the possibility of violence erupting grew stronger day-by-day. While the negotiators on both sides continued their talks and meetings, the Palestinians and Israelis accused each other of betrayal after Camp David’s failure. On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, head of Israel’s Right
Wing Likud Party, went to the Temple Mount to pray. Ever since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, it is forbidden for Israelis to go and pray there since they know that doing so would spark a violent Palestinian reaction. For the purpose of ruining the talks, Sharon made his way there accompanied by his bodyguards, army, and police. As a result, the expected happened and the second intifada had begun. The Palestinians began fighting Israeli troops in the streets along both the West Bank and Gaza.

After some time had passed, both sides returned to the negotiating table, but the bitterness borne out of the violence was still there; a lot of time was spent by the Israelis asking Arafat to stop the Intifada and Arafat denying that he had any control over it. After fifty meetings in the summer and autumn of 2000, President Clinton decided to make his last attempt. On December 23, 2000, both sides were invited to the White House and given a piece of paper called ‘The Clinton Parameters.’ This paper was the sum of all agreements that were made throughout the talks and consisted of ideas that President Clinton thought would bring about the ultimate solution to the conflict. Both sides still had reservations about it and would not adopt it as an agreement. However, they would eventually adopt it as a basis for negotiations the following month (Shlaim, 2014). After that meeting, both sides headed to the Hilton Hotel in the Egyptian resort of Taba, on the Red Sea. The talks lasted there from January 21 until January 27 of 2001 and was the closest that both sides would get to each other’s positions. Unfortunately, the talks ultimately failed since electoral concerns were more important for the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak than actually reaching an agreement (Shlaim, 2014). This can be highlighted in a note that Barak sends to Ben Ami. The note says the following:
“Shlomo Shalom

Enormous readiness for a painful settlement but not a humiliating one.

Vital to preserve hope...but with realism – There is no agreement because we insist on what is vital for Israel (No Right of Return, appropriate settlement blocs, Jerusalem and the holy places and security arrangements).

- The main thing that should be shattered – is Sharon’s attempt to describe the government as trailing behind Arafat. We need to speak assertively about the resolve to reach an agreement – if it is a purposeful struggle against terror – in all our interactions with the Palestinians.

- The results will be much better than the polls.

- Our problems – to arouse the energies among the Left (time of emergency, we’ll all pay the price of a Sharon government) and this for the purpose of scratching another 1-2% from the right and then we’ll win” (Shlaim, 2014, p. 704).
Chapter Four
Conclusion

After the information gathered and analysis conducted, the answer to the research question ‘Did the U.S. mediation team’s role contribute to the failure of Camp David II?’ is yes. The U.S. was incapable to effectively help both sides reach an agreement because of the team’s incoherence, the disorganization, the inability or unwillingness to symmetrize the negotiations, and Clinton’s lack of discipline as a mediator.

This section will explore the thesis’ final findings and recommendations for further inquiry.

4.1 Summary of the Findings
The assessment of the U.S Mediation team’s role was done through three major parts. The first part titled ‘antecedent conditions’ addressed the complexity and nature of the conflict. The second part titled ‘current conditions’ where the core of our analysis happened through process-tracing detailed day-to-day accounts of events that occurred at the Camp David II summit were formed through an amalgam of Palestinian, Israeli, American, and expert sources. The details of the summit fifteen days were used to analyze the mediation and discourse of the U.S team in light of their prior attempts to help the Palestinians and Israelis reach peace. The third part titled ‘consequent conditions’ compared observations made to subjective and objective variables for evaluation. After the analysis was over, three interesting revelations were found which are important to the study of conflict resolution in general and mediation in particular.
The first finding was an often-overlooked factor important for mediation, especially in a summit setting. It was shown that the administrative summit management, along with its byproducts such as process organization, backup planning, record-keeping, pre-meeting preparation, scheduling, and proper team role-assignment can greatly contribute to a mediation’s success or failure. The mismanagement led to numerous blunders, incoherencies, and at times chaos, and confusion that significantly delayed the summit for days from reaching any meaningful progress. The second finding was that the analysis of the events supports the pre-existent theory that mediation team cohesion and team performance are correlated. This was done through showing how the lack of cohesion on the U.S team worsened the mismanagement of the summit. The third finding was the role of another often-overlooked factor that contributes to mediation success; mediator discipline. Of all the good qualities and skills which President Clinton possesses, mediator discipline is not one of them. His conduct led to several breaches in the pre-set strategy which showed him to be a push-over. His failure to ‘stick to his guns’ and factor the asymmetry of the negotiations into the equation was also a contributing element to the failure of the summit.

The failure of Camp David II did not deter the disputants, along with the international community, from continuing to look for a path to peace. Peace talks continued with some semblance of American support until December 23, 2000, when President Clinton offered the ‘Clinton Parameters’ which consisted of points for a peace deal which the President viewed to be fair and sufficient for both sides to accept. After the ‘take it or

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13 A study conducted in 2013 by Philip S. DeOrtentiis, Anthony P. Ammeter, Ceasar Douglas, Gerald R. Ferris, and James K. Summers titled “Cohesion and satisfaction as mediators of the team trust – team effectiveness relationship” proved the correlation between team cohesion and team performance.
leave it’ demeanor in which it was presented both sides replied that they had reservations. At that point, President Clinton declared Arafat a persona non grata in the United States and that he was no longer viewed as a serious peace partner. This view was shared by Clinton’s successor President George W. Bush.

Despite the absence of American support, talks between both sides continued on the basis of the Clinton Parameters in Taba in 2001. However, the exacerbated mistrust from Camp David II, the absence of effective U.S support, and Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, led to the failure of the Taba talks. After the election of Sharon as Prime Minister in Israel, the peace camp in Israel was significantly weakened and with the American refusal of dealing with Arafat, there was a vacuum in the Palestine-Israel peace process. As a result, new actors decided to get involved, and in 2002, the European Union and Russia joined the United States and the United Nations to form a ‘quartet’ which worked on a ‘roadmap for peace.’ In 2003, after Mahmoud Abbas took the place of Yasser Arafat as President of the Palestinian Authority, the plan was introduced. The absence of Arafat yielded several more peace initiatives ranging from bilateral talks between both sides in 2007 and 2009 to negotiations under the auspices of the Obama administration from 2010 until 2014. However, despite the increased frequency of talks after Mahmoud Abbas succeeded Arafat, none of these peace initiatives led to fruition, and none would rival the time, resources, and leadership-driven nature of Camp David II.
4.2 Recommendations for Further Inquiry
Most of the mediation literature in Conflict Resolution studies bases the success or failure of the mediation on several factors such as the timing of intervention, the number of fatalities in the conflict, the intensity of the issues, the duration of the conflict, the rank of the mediator, the identity of the mediator, and the previous relationship between the parties. The findings of this research have revealed that some factors in mediation studies are either overlooked or under-studied. While conflict characteristics and the relationship and nature of conflicting parties are important, more mediator-centric factors should be studied. While it is acknowledged that mediator-centric factors are not wholly overlooked, more of them need to be taken into consideration. Mediators’ studies should go deeper than strategy and identity and reach the core which is mediation management and team performance. Knowing this, two factors need to be considered. First, it is recommended that further studies be conducted on several international mediations in which team/mediator performance and mediation management is assessed and compared. This would yield a mediation success rate comparable to performance which would determine whether such a factor is universal or not. Second, it is recommended that further studies be conducted into the correlation between team cohesion and team performance since the field of international mediation is woefully lacking literature on that subject. In a nutshell, it is recommended that future studies on mediation go back to basics and take a deeper look at those responsible for helping parties in conflict reach a peaceful settlement.
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