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American Foreign Policy Persistent Changes

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Table of Contents

Abstract

Chapter 1	The American Approach to Foreign Policy An Introduction to the phases of American Foreign Policy	5
Chapter 2	American Disengaged 19 th Century Isolationists spirit Prelude to World War I Transitional Engagement America's wartime illusions and the volatile State system	8
Chapter 3	American Engaged America enters World War II America's wartime illusions and the volatile state system Bipolar world	14
Chapter 4	America Expansionists Cold War Containment strategy Expansion to non-democratic states	20
Chapter 5	Post Cold War Interlude: Defining the United States role in the world The New World Order The United States unipolar Selective Engagement Humanitarian Interventions.	38
Chapter 6	September 11: The apparent change in foreign policy dealings Unilateral approach to diplomacy Bush Doctrine of Preemption Bypassing the United Nations State Sovereignty	54
Chapter 7	Persistent Changes Conclusion of the phases in American Foreign Policy	70
References		75

Abstract

What follows is a brief portrayal of the historical phases of American Foreign Policy and the continuous and often persistent changes that the American Foreign Policy has undergone from periods of disengagement to periods of engagement. Thereafter, an analysis of the September 11 terror attacks, the immediate and delayed reaction by the United States and the changes in American Foreign Policy dealings that resulted from the attacks. These include the War on Terror, the Bush Doctrine of Preemption, the bypassing of the United Nations as well as the disregard of state sovereignty, especially with regard to Iraq. I hope to portray that the United States has undergone recurring changes in its conduct of Foreign Policy. I shall then state these changes and depict that they are not as innovative as perceived to be.

The persistent changes in the Foreign Policy have included periods of Isolation and disengagement prior to World War I, followed by a brief engagement during the War and a retreat back to Isolation. Thereafter, the United States entered World War II and was engaged in the conflict, after which it became expansionist in its goal to contain the Soviet Union and the spread of the Communist ideology. The United States continued this policy up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, when the world became unipolar and the United States obtained sole superpower status. Here the United States marveled about its role in the world. A revert to Isolation was no longer an alternative, rather a new world order arose and the United States became more globally engaged.

During this period in time, and more specifically during the later 1980s and 1990s, and up until September 11, a primal focus of the United States Foreign Policy was on spreading democracy and adhering to democratic principles. The principle of humanitarian intervention gained more acceptance during the 1990s. The long held view that the United States inspired democracy and should spread it to the world resurfaced. American policy became the preservation and promotion of democracies and the doctrine of Containment was replaced with the strategy of enlargement of democracies.

It should be noted that in addition to the persistent changes in the American Foreign Policy dealings, the history of American Foreign Policy also shows that integration and preemption are not a new concept, though preventive strike is. The United States followed both concepts during the Cold War. First, when it accelerated the arms race, and worked to achieve a first strike possibility, and second, when it expanded to include other countries in its fight against Communism. What differs nowadays is that the fight is primarily focused on the threat of Terrorism and terrorist networks.

Chapter 1

The American Approach to Foreign Policy

Historically, Isolationism pervaded the American approach to foreign relations. The energies, thoughts and ambitions of the American people were directed inward; they were preoccupied with creating vast wealth and expanding opportunities and spreading the "*American Way of Life*"¹ then engaging themselves internationally. Moreover, the sense of national security was obtained from the geographical distance the United States had with other countries. Isolationism was therefore derived from the preference to remain out of foreign entanglements as well as from the persistent concern of the American society with domestic affairs. To preserve their freedom to act in their own land, Americans were to avoid foreign entanglements.

This disengagements from the world lasted until World War I when the United States, after negotiations for a peaceful outcome failed, was compelled to intervene. Thereafter, and immediately after World War I, the United States disengaged itself and reverted back to isolation. The main reasons were that the War proved too costly and moreover because of its distrust of foreign nations.

The United States remained Isolationist for the most part of the 1920s and 1930s until its entrance in World War II. The United States engagement in World War II and the attacks on Pearl Harbor represented a persistent change in its foreign policy dealings. This marked the end of the United States' isolation from the world and set forth the course that the proceeding American administrations would follow, hence global engagement. One reason, amongst others, for the United States entering World War II was Europe's, and mainly the British's pressure on the United States to play an active role in the world in order to maintain the balance of power. Moreover, the fear of a German domination of Europe and a Japanese domination of Asia was too great for it not to engage itself.

¹ Crabb, Cecil Van Meter. "*American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*", Page 37

The immediate post-World War II era was characterized by mistrust, which emerged with the unstable alliances that had arisen with the Soviet Union during the War. Here the world became bipolar with two contending ideologies, that of the Soviet Union, namely Communism and that of the United States, namely Capitalism. The United States was thus drawn into the Cold War and became expansionist in its foreign policy, as it undertook to contain the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism into Europe, first, and Asia, second. This period represented a major discontinuity with the American history in which the United States became a major actor in the shaping of the post World War II, emerging as a powerful country economically, and militarily.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and hence the end of the Cold War, the next phase in American foreign policy arose. Bipolarity had dissipated and with no imminent threat, the United States questioned its role in the world, hence whether to revert to Isolation or to maintain its presence as a global player and engage itself worldwide. The decision by the United States not to revert to Isolation marked a change in the approach to foreign policy as the United States became the sole superpower and could therefore impose its will in the international arena more powerfully. Moreover, with the New World Order, which eventuated at the end of the Cold War, the United Nations became less meaningful and on occasion, the United States and its allies bypassed the Security Council, particularly Britain, in responding to certain crisis and upheavals, specifically in Kosovo and later in Iraq.

Finally, and as a result of the September 11 attacks, a change in the American foreign policy was took place. Here the United States government adopted new measures to deal with the rest of the world and especially with the threat of Terrorism, which surfaced more in the early 1990s. The United States would exercise unilateral approaches in dealing with foreign aggressors if it saw the need to do so. Internationally, and in the fight against terror and those that harbor terror, state sovereignty became questionable. The United States, who saw itself as the police of the world, would act alone, if the need arose, and could not attain the support of the international community. This was most evident with Iraq. During this phase in time, the issues of preemption

and preventive wars arose to the surface; namely with the Bush Doctrine of Preemption and the War against Terror. Moreover, wars would not be fought *for* the acquiring of territory, rather for the elimination of terror. Containing Terrorism, rather than a specific ideology, became a major foreign policy goal, which would guide the American foreign policy.

On another note, the domino theory, which guided the American foreign policy throughout the Cold War, reemerged after September 11. The prior belief by the United States that a failed state did not threaten its security and thus did not warrant intervention altered. The United States now felt that occurrences internationally can set in place a string of dominos, should they collapse, would touch American lives in most immediate ways. For example; and especially in today's interconnected world, crisis in the Middle East can cause suffering and instability not just in one region but spill over and spark conflict elsewhere. September 11 therefore awakened the United States that its long held view, that it was invulnerable to threats *from* beyond its borders, was not so true. What is also observed is a change in the American foreign policy in its conduct abroad from clandestine operations, example *from* the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, to more overt operations, example; the attack on Iraq.

Chapter 2

America Disengaged.

The United States for the most part of the 19th Century was Isolationist. It was affected by a few conditions, which led to its Isolation, namely its geographical location. Being at such a geographical distance from Asia and Europe provided the United States with a substantial degree of military protection; thereby a large military establishment was seen as unnecessary. During this period in time, the United States was able to enjoy an unprecedented degree of security because a balance of power created at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, existed on the European continent and was effectively maintained by Great Britain together with France. The United States thus felt fairly secure and saw no need to involve itself in the world as European nations were too occupied with conflicts among themselves to be a threat. The United States therefore preferred to remain neutral and proclaimed neutrality in the foreign wars which existed during that era in time.

In addition, the United States was anti-colonial, and rich in natural resources, it could thus expand within its continental boundaries and did not have to engage itself and fight nations to gain territory or reestablish American rule there².

Historically, American people looked upon conflict as abnormal, transitory and avoidable³. According to the American people, hostilities existed among nations not because their vital interests sometimes clashed, but rather because of misunderstandings. Accordingly, these could be eliminated through a variety of measures without having to get too involved. These measures include; reaching diplomatic solutions, agreements to denounce war as an instrument of national policy (which the United States did through the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928), pledges to reduce armaments, formal oaths to respect the territorial integrity of small countries and resounding declarations of high principles, such as the Fourteen Points.

² United States Foreign Policy 1800-1900

³ Crabb, Cecil Van Meter. *"American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age"*, Page 37

The United States therefore came to believe more firmly in its uniqueness and its desire to remain free of foreign entanglements. The United States did not feel that events that occurred in Europe or elsewhere were any threat to its national security.

Furthermore, the United States as a democratic nation, and Americans, felt that they had to democratize the world, and crusade to spread democracy to undemocratic nations. Americans strongly believed that they set an exemplary model. The United States saw itself as the land of opportunity, the "*epitome of democracy... the last hope for the world*"⁴, thus it maintained an attitude of moral supremacy towards Europe and the rest of the world. Each proceeding administration raised the questions of how to accomplish the goal of saving the world. At first the idea was accepted that the United States encourages democracy from afar, that it should be the "*...the model state leading by example*"⁵. Thereby the notion that Americans should avoid entangling alliances surfaced because of the belief that the United States was different from the rest of the world and should therefore not become involved with the rest of the world. American Presidents, specifically President Washington and Jefferson, cautioned and advised their countrymen that America and Europe had different interests the best course for America was to concentrate on keeping these interests separate. Isolationism therefore became the underlying principle of American foreign policy. Pretext after pretext was found to justify America's refusal to enter wars. Americans wanted the European countries to mind their own business and if they persisted in power struggles, to keep them out of the Western Hemisphere.

George Washington's wish that the United States not enter into any political agreements and involve itself in other countries, kept the United States independent and Isolationist for the most part of the 19th century and as early as in 1793 the policy of Neutrality in the ongoing wars between Great Britain and France was proclaimed.⁶

⁴ United States Foreign Policy 1800-1900

⁵ United States Foreign Policy 1800-1900

⁶ United States Foreign Policy 1800-1900

Moreover, in their own opinions, Americans represented principles that were not primarily in the interest of the United States but rather in the interest of the entire world, (these principles were later proclaimed by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points during World War 1)⁷. When President Washington, who was often, called the first Isolationists, left office in 1797, he warned against "*entangling alliances*"⁸. He questioned the real need for the United States to get involved into "*...Europe's habitual and sometimes pointless bloodshed?*"⁹. The great role for the United States in regard to foreign nations was to extend commercial relations and to have "*as little political connection as possible*"¹⁰.

Tension in foreign affairs increased in the early 1800s, as Britain and France adopted restrictive economic measures that injured the neutral commerce especially that of the United States. The United States responded with a number of acts that were designed to deprive Britain and France of American goods and to exclude their products from the United States, the most important of these were the Non-Importation Act of 1806, the Embargo Acts of 1807 and the Non - Intercourse Act of 1809. These Acts however did not change the policies of Britain and France and led to severe financial losses to the United States merchants and ship owners. President Madison hoped to resolve the crisis through diplomacy but there was strong congressional pressure to declare war and thus a Declaration of War was made in 1812. The War of 1812 did not settle any of the issues it was intended to, however, it created a strong national union and pride evident later on in the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This is a statement of policy by President James Monroe that announced the determination of the United States to prevent any further colonization by European nations in either South or North America. It stressed the ideological difference of the American political system to that of Europe whose nations engaged frequently in warfare. The implication was clear; democratic governments equal peace, and aristocratic government means war. (It should be noted that American farmers always needed overseas markets, that is why the War of 1812 was mainly concerned with keeping markets open, this been a component of American foreign policy).

⁷ Lundestad, Geir. "*East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945*", page 15

⁸ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 25

⁹ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 25

¹⁰ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 25

Thereafter, and as a result of the Spanish-American War on April 25, 1898, the United States acquired territorial possessions outside its continental area, namely Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba, giving the nation problems of colonial government and control that compelled it to assume an increasing role in world affairs. This war marked the entrance of the United States into the Pacific.

In the early 1900s, at the outbreak of the War in Europe, (1914) the United States proclaimed a policy of neutrality, opting not to get engaged. Germany tried to keep the United States out while Britain tried to get the United States in. The United States argued that it would remain neutral and attempted to mediate peace amongst the allies and Germany. In 1917, with Germany's continued submarine war against all commerce, both neutral and belligerent, which are included attacks on American shipping, the United States broke diplomatic relations declared war. World War I, as President Wilson emphasized, was not an ordinary war fought for reasons of national power, it was rather an idealistic war, a war fought to "*end all wars*"¹¹. The United States entered the War to "*make the world safe for democracy*"¹². Once the undemocratic forces were defeated, and with the triumph of democracy, the world would be peaceful, stable and open to American trade and political leadership.

With America's entry into the conflict, the Allies were able to contain Germany's spring 1918 offensive, leading to its defeat. After its victory, the United States retreated into its hemispheric shell but only after a failed attempt by President Woodrow Wilson to make the world safe for democracy. In his famous "Fourteen Points" speech President Wilson called for all countries to reduce arms, end colonialism, refrain from secret diplomacy, respect the freedom of the seas and proposed that a League of Nations be established to prevent future wars through a system of "*collective security*"¹³. Under this system, member countries would agree to defend any

¹¹ Roskin, Michael. "IR: An introduction to international relations", page 32

¹² Roskin, Michael. "IR: An introduction to international relations", page 32

¹³ Roskin, Michael. "IR: An introduction to international relations", page 32

nation that had been invaded. Congress never ratified the treaty as it questioned whether the League would undermine the United States sovereignty by forcing the United States to send troops overseas even when its national interests were not threatened.

The United States was later influential in the writing of the Treaty of Versailles, a peace treaty, which formally ended the war in 1919. This Treaty declared Germany guilty of all the economic losses sustained by the Allies and established a Reparations Commission that imposed on Germany reparations amounting to \$33 billion¹⁴. During World War I and shortly afterwards, the United States government had lent a total of about \$10 billion to the Allies. Because the debtor nations were unable to pay the full amount owed, in 1922 Congress created the World War Foreign Debt Commission which negotiated agreements that reduced the debts and provided for annual payments to be distributed over a period of 62 years¹⁵. Most of the debtor nations made their annual payments dependent on the reparation payments made to them by Germany but when Germany defaulted on its reparation payments in 1923, the United States was instrumental in formulating plans in 1924 and 1929 to help Germany pay by reducing German obligations and extending credits to German industry.

As previously mentioned, during the 1920s and the early 1930s the United States was Isolationist, despite having some overseas interests. These interests were never backed by force rather, through the use of law and rhetoric. It carried out diplomatic moves such as in sponsoring in 1921 the Naval Conference, which limited the number of battleships of the major sea power. In 1928, and despite the fact that the United States military power had been decisive in the defeat of Germany, the United States wanted nothing to do with power politics and sought to abolish war, this time through the Kellogg Briand Pact, which outlawed War as an instrument of national policy. These diplomatic efforts however did not hide the fact that the United States did not want and wasn't prepared to do anything overseas. World War I was seen as a failure and unrelated to the United States national interests, it was simply to rescue the Europeans. There was a lapse to

¹⁴ Latane, John Holladay. *"A History of American foreign policy"*

¹⁵ Latane, John Holladay. *"A History of American foreign policy"*

Isolationism because the Europeans were seen as tricky and unreliable. There was thus a feeling of distrust "...we should never come to their rescue again"¹⁶, a return for "normalcy"¹⁷ and indifference to the rest of the world pursued.

In addition, a German victory over the rest of Europe could threaten the United States security. Another reason for its preference of isolation was the economic cost of entering the War. Participation in World War I for the United States was therefore an interlude. Thereafter, the United States preferred to return to pre-war conditions of normalcy where peace would be ensured through disarmament and neutrality. American troops were pulled out and returned home, and the army and navy shrank in size. Also, the onslaught of the Great depression focused America's attention on domestic economic recovery. In the Senate, the Nye Committee blamed the United States involvement in the War on alleged "*merchants of death*"¹⁸ i.e. bankers and makers of munitions who had an economic interest in bringing the United States into conflict. From these hearings resulted the Neutrality Acts of 1935-37, which were designed to keep the United States from getting drawn into similar wars.

I should point out that the United States would not isolate itself from the outside world in a commercial sense. Economic expansion based on foreign trade was a central element of the early American foreign policy. The key was to assure that no political strings would be attached. As George Washington proclaimed in his farewell address "*the great rule of conduct...in regard to foreign Nations, is extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible*".¹⁹

¹⁶ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 33

¹⁷ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 34

¹⁸ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 34

¹⁹ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 16

Chapter 2.

America Engaged.

In the late 1930s, the United States felt fairly secure in the world. The totalitarian political forces of the century; namely Fascism and Communism were not a threat so long as Britain and France continued to stand against Hitler and the Nazis. It saw no pressing need to play any great role in the world preferring to remain Isolationist. American foreign policy was to support the status quo but only through worded engagements²⁰. The use of American troops overseas was out of the question. Americans did not want a German domination of Europe or a Japanese domination of Asia. It spoke out against such occurrences, but was not ready to do much to stop them, especially if it meant going to war. The persistent Isolationist spirit amongst the Americans, and the fear of entering another war, refrained the United States from involving itself with more than words.

When faced with hostility, the United States would take a stand against aggressive nations through boycotts, through more neutrality acts and through quarantine measures, rather than through military means, as it preferred to remain neutral and adhere to the Neutrality Acts. This is clearly evident in the early 1930s when the United States adopted measures to keep itself out of the war that had been threatening to break out in Europe since the coming to power in Germany of the Nazi Party in 1933. Between 1935 and 1937, three neutrality acts prohibited actions by American citizens that might aid a foreign aggressor nation, in particular; an embargo was placed on the export of arms, munitions and implements of war. Moreover, the United States took a stand against the aggressive acts of Japan in Asia and that of Germany and Italy in Europe. And in 1937, President Roosevelt proposed that aggressive nations be quarantined by means of economic boycott.

²⁰ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. " *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* ", page 6

With World War II underway in 1939, Americans were split on how to react. The building of the axis (Germany, Italy and Japan) threatened to create a hostile world where the United States would find itself militarily besieged and economically isolated. Moreover, exerted pressure was placed on the United States to play a more active role, to aid nations resisting fascist aggression. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent President Roosevelt a description of the British situation and emphasized that they were running out of money and therefore the cash-and-carry would no longer suffice.

Isolationist resisted any steps that might lead to aid for the democracies fearing that the United States would become so committed to an allied victory that as in 1917, would be drawn into war against its will, whilst Interventionists wanted to abandon neutrality and give military aid to Britain and France. Many believed that entering World War I had been a mistake; as a result, disarmament and neutrality became dominant factors during the late 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, the attitude of the President; Franklin D. Roosevelt, that of dislike for war, reinforced Isolationism as he often proclaimed his dislike "*I hate war*"²¹.

In addition, the American public was antiwar and Isolationist, "*America should be kept free of foreign entanglements*"²². President Roosevelt was restrained by the persistence of strong Isolationist sentiments among the public whilst willing to aid the Axis of Powers so long as there was no commitment of American troops. The fear of putting troops on the ground existed as President Roosevelt reassured the American public that "*no boys will be going to war*"²³.

President Roosevelt therefore chose to take the middle ground. He declared that his policy was designed to keep the United States out of war and asked for the repeal of the arms embargo and approval of a cash-and-carry system. Hence, the United States would sell arms to the democracies as long as the democracies picked them up and carried them off. The United

²¹ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 2

²² Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 6

²³ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 7

States would thus resist attempts to upset the balance of power in Europe, whilst at the same time not pay a high price to stop Hitler. Congress in 1939 repealed the arms embargo imposed by the neutrality acts. Therefore, France and Britain could purchase war supplies in the United States. The United States would provide Great Britain all aid it could provide short of war. *"The best defense of Great Britain is the best defense of the United States"*²⁴.

Thus in 1940, the United States government transferred 50 old destroyers to the British; in return Britain gave the United States 99-year leases on several naval bases in the Atlantic. The American Administration strongly felt that *"The best way to keep the United States out of the war was to do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis"*²⁵.

The refusal, however, of the United States to commit American troops abroad led to the surrender of France to the Germans in 1940. The defeat of France to the Nazis was a shock because the United States now faced a new situation, no longer could they expect that the British and French would stop the Germans. The balance of power was gone and Hitler had to be stopped in order to restore the balance. In addition, in March 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which empowered the President to transfer, sell, lend, or lease war supplies to any nation of which the defense was vital to the United States national security. President Roosevelt stated the United States' intent to lend or lease to England the supplies it needed. The Lend Lease gave war material to Britain and after the 1941 German attack on Russia, to the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt was so anti-interventionists, he constantly reassured the American public that no troops would be committed to a war *"...your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign war"*²⁶. He strongly felt the mistake of entering World War I, and continuously declared that he had

²⁴ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 7

²⁵ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 7

²⁶ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 7

no intention of sending the troops to war. *"I give you more assurance, I have said this before but I shall say it again and again and again, your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars"*²⁷.

On another note and in the Pacific, Japan was becoming more of an aggressor, involved in a war of conquest with China. The United States had protested this war from the beginning, but without action, again only through worded engagements. Thus, the Japanese ignored the protests. Japan was expanding southward. Only the Soviet Union and the United States were potentially strong enough in the Pacific to interfere. Japan moved politically to minimize these threats, and in 1940 signed a five-year non-aggression pact with the Soviets, an agreement that Stalin, fearing Hitler, was happy to sign. Japan also entered into the Tripartite Pact with the Germans and Italians, a defensive alliance that pledged mutual support if any one of the three signatories were attacked. In 1941 with the invasion of Russia by the Germans, the Japanese debated on whether or not to take advantage of the Russian's weakness or to continue to expand south. The latter seemed more feasible and the first step was the invasion of French Indochina. The United States government did not respond to the invasion, as it wanted time to defeat Hitler and to build a first striking force. This was despite the general public's opinion, which, according to the polls, indicated that 70% of the American public was willing to risk war in the Pacific rather than let Japan continue to expand²⁸. President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States. The effect of the freeze was to create an economic blockade of Japan so as Japan could not buy oil, steel, or other necessities without the President's permission. The embargo made it clear to the Japanese that they either had to pull back from Indochina and China and thereby reach an agreement with the United States that would provide them with access to oil, or to go to war.

Relations with Japan became tenser as Japan ignored the embargo and continued to expand southward. On Sunday December 7, 1941, Japanese planes attacked the United States Pacific Fleet, which lay at anchor in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The next day, the United States declared war on Japan. Three days later, on December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on

²⁷ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 7

²⁸ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 11

the United States. America then declared war on those countries. President Roosevelt was confronted with a great decision; he had to decide where to strike first. To the United States, it seemed more important to see Germany defeated as soon as possible plus the fact that the navy had suffered greatly from Pearl Harbor and could not strike an effective blow against Japan until it recovered.

It is evident that during the 1940s the American foreign policy in Europe had failed to make any significant contribution to stopping or overcoming Hitler because the steps that President Roosevelt and Congress took to protect American interests in Europe were limited. It is also evident that the long held American belief of a mutual harmony of interests between nations which in turn assured a common commitment to peace and thus no need or profit from war which the Americans had held during and after World War I, changed as Americans learned to accept war. After World War I, the United States adopted a policy of unilateral disarmament and neutrality as a way to avoid another war, but after World War II, the United States adopted a policy of massive rearmament and collective security as a way of avoiding another war. The latter involved stationing troops and missiles overseas.

Furthermore, and by 1945, the United States declared that Americans had learned "*we cannot live alone at peace, that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of nations far away...*"²⁹. With that declaration On February 11, 1945, Roosevelt met Churchill and Stalin at Yalta and the three leaders issued the Crimea Declaration which repeated the principles of the Atlantic Charter³⁰ namely; denying territorial ambitions, favoring self-government and liberal international trade arrangements, pledging freedom from want and permanent security against aggression. They introduced their plans for a post war world. President Roosevelt pressed for the creation of a United Nations organization as a mechanism for preserving peace. Here they decided to divide Germany into zones of occupation, to establish the United Nations and to bring the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. The United Nations Charter was drawn up during World War II while a

²⁹ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 7

³⁰ Atlantic Charter made public on August 14, 1941

common enemy cemented the alliance. The United Nations Charter was accepted and signed in 1945. The United States would have greater influence mainly because of its military capacity and its economy.

The United States who had been isolated from power politics was forced to end its isolation in 1945 when Germany's growing strength increased and British power decreased and a German victory became a possibility. As long as Britain was able to fulfill its function, there was less need for the United States to do so, hence to keep the balance of power. Moreover, American preponderance amongst the allies became so great that, if necessary, the Americans could insist upon their judgment, while the British simply had to accept the decision gracefully mainly due to economic reasons. Britain changed dramatically in the years immediately after the war. The British had to retreat on a number of fronts e.g. in India, the colonial system began to collapse and the reduced presence of the British in Greece and Turkey and in Germany. Also, the British contribution to the Anglo-American resources was down to 25% of the whole. American domination of the Alliance in turn reflected a new era in the world history. The United States had replaced Great Britain as the dominant world power. By 1945 American production had reached high levels, producing 45% of the world's arms and nearly 50% of the world's goods³¹. The Gross National Product of the United States increased from 209.4 billion in 1932 to 355.2 billion in 1945³². The economic problems of the United Kingdom were the immediate cause of the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 (described in detail later on). The British could no longer hold back the leftist guerillas in Greece nor support the Turkish government against Soviet pressure thus the Truman Administration had to take over.

³¹ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 27

³² Lundestad, Geir. *"East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945"*, page 2

Chapter 3.

America Expansionist

With the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a powerful industrialized nation and therefore the leader in global, political, and economic system. For the first time, the United States demonstrated its willingness to manage that international system. President Roosevelt repudiated the interwar Isolationism and revived the Wilsonian concept of a United States national interest that extended overseas, so as to promote peace and prosperity. Unfortunately large areas of the world, especially those under Stalin's control, refused to cooperate in this idealistic venture. Moreover, The changes that resulted from World War II, namely by the defeat of Germany and Japan, were so great that there was a huge vacuum. Once Germany's power was eliminated from Europe, the vacuum had to be filled by someone. The United States and the Soviet Union were capable, and thus the two superpowers were drawn in, and conflict was inevitable. As the Soviet Union's power increased, and as it continued to expand and capture Eastern European Countries and integrate them into the Eastern Bloc, the United States was faced with the challenge of maintaining the balance of power and playing a global role. Economically the United States prospered during the war, and militarily it was the strongest, (in fact until 1949, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and later on, it continued to have a technological lead over the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union first satellite in 1957)³³.

Furthermore, and regrettably so, the wartime cooperation, which emerged after World War II quickly disappeared because President Truman, unlike Roosevelt, took a hard-line with the Russians. The United States and the Soviet Union were deeply suspicious of each other. These suspicions resulted from the economic rivalry and ideological differences between them. Also, the pace of scientific and technological change in the postwar period further progressed the rivalry. The era of mutual suspicion grew amongst misunderstanding and this lead to an era of conflict, which is better known as the Cold War. Nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them became the pivot around which much of the Cold War revolved. The fear that its opponents would move

³³ Lundsestad, Geir. "East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945", page 2

ahead especially with their weapons systems, drove each nation to make a huge effort in the arms race. Here the change in the foreign policy is evident when the United States became expansionists and interventionist. It armed itself, sent troops into other countries, fought indirectly (as in Korea which is explained herein below). It acted preemptively, and reactively, and tried to maintain its allies and gain new ones from the camps of the Soviet Union, who was considered as its enemy.

President Truman, like previous presidents, felt strongly that the United States was the chief defender of Western Civilization. It thus had to defend against the expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe, and the establishment of Communist governments there. This era in the world politics was again characterized by involvement and intervention and a retreat to Isolation was not apparent especially since Britain was no longer able to preserve the balance of power. Moreover, the United States policies were now more and more motivated by the need to have National Security. If Eastern Europe was relinquished to the Soviet Union, pressure would then be transmitted to the near countries which would in turn threaten the Western European countries. The fear of Soviet expansion into Western Europe was however, not a direct aggression but the Soviets could have succeeded through political pressure, economic chaos and active local Communist parties. The impression that Western Europe was at threat was exemplified and the constant pressure on the United States to play an active role in the European politics through economic assistance, political and moral support and finally direct military guarantees.

The world became bipolar, divided into two hostile camps. The role of the United Nations here became extraneous. It was impossible to get the United Nations to function as was envisioned by President Roosevelt at its inception. Instead of cooperating to keep the peace, the Soviet Union vetoed any United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the United Nations became a debating society and an area of conflict.

The United States also tried to influence the Soviet Union's policies through economic means. It reduced the Lend-lease aid; it also applied a harsh loan policy. The foreign policy of a country was used as a basis to decide whether or not a loan would be granted. Governments, which were not democratic, could count on support if they opposed the Soviet Union and Communism, hence if they were anticommunists. Here we can observe the double standards in the American foreign policy dealings. The United States faced a dilemma. It questioned whether or not to protect the undemocratic states like Iran, Turkey and Greece, that would help to contain Soviet expansion on one hand but risk the American reputation on the other hand, or to align only with democratic states, which were a few and might make implementing Containment difficult. Assistance, as defined by President Truman, was therefore linked to a general principle that the United States policy would support *"free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"*³⁴. Whenever and wherever an anti-Communist government was threatened by an insurgent, a foreign invasion or diplomatic pressure, the United States would supply the political, economic and military aid necessary. On May 15, 1946, Congress appropriated \$400 million dollars for Greece and Turkey; it was the first time in history that the United States chose to intervene during a period of general peace in the affairs of people outside of North and South America. (Communist guerillas in Greece controlled much of the impoverished country and the Soviet Union strongly pressured Turkey for territories and control of the strategic Turkish straits). The United States would not slouch back into Isolationism but would actively oppose the Soviets worldwide even if it meant aligning with undemocratic countries. This too is observed after September 11 when the United States aligned itself with Pakistan in its fight against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Consequently in 1947, and in an effort to contain the advance of Communism in Europe, President Truman announced the policy known as the Truman Doctrine. A Doctrine of International resistance to Communist aggression by which the United States would provide military and economic aid to countries threatened by aggression and subversion. This became known as the Containment Policy and aimed at blocking Communist expansion anywhere in the world. This Doctrine guaranteed American aid to free nations resisting Communist sabotage.

³⁴ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 82

President Truman further declared that the United States would help any free nation resist Communist aggression.

An addition to the Truman Doctrine was the Marshall Plan, which was proposed in June 1947 by Secretary of State George Marshall. It was officially designated the European Recovery Program. This was a broad program of economic rehabilitation, which proposed that the war-damaged nations of Eastern Europe join in a program of mutual aid for economic recovery, assisted by grants from the United States. Economic aid would be granted to all European nations that would cooperate in plans for their own recovery. The United States believed that a strong and stable Western Europe would hold back the spread of Communism. This Marshall Plan began the concept of foreign aid as a permanent part of United States foreign policy.

Thereafter, the Truman Administration established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, which would provide advise and information to the President on foreign policy matters independent of the State Department and Congress. President Truman came up with the National Security Council Resolution 68 after discovering that the Soviet Union possessed atomic weapons. This Resolution meant a great military effort in time of peace. Its premise was that the United States could spend up to 20% of its GNP on arms. It provided justification for America assuming the role of the world policemen³⁵ and reflected the strategic thinking of the American policymakers during the Cold War. It states that the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build up of strength, which is to support a firm policy directed to induce a change in the nature of the Soviet system.

There were also some domestic conditions, which influenced the United States policy. There was again the strongly held ideological desire to spread the American gospel to other countries, to establish democracy and free trade. The United States felt a responsibility to defend democracy against an expansive Communism. In February and March of 1948 a number of events

³⁵ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 111

contributed to a change of course for the United States, namely the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Finnish-Soviet cooperation pact and the fear of a Communist victory in Italy. These events, as well as the Allies pressure on the United States for a more direct contribution to the defense of Western Europe, led to the American participation in the establishment of the Atlantic Defense system. This mutual defense treaty was created in 1949 and named the North Atlantic Treaty which set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance whose goals was to prevent Soviet expansion and the defense of West Germany. It was the first time that Americans entered into an entangling alliance in peacetime. This alliance committed the United States to close peacetime military collaboration with the armed forces of foreign nations. When it signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States formally abandoned its historic policy of Isolationism with respect to European affairs. By joining NATO, the United States acknowledged that its security was inextricably connected with developments on the European continent.

On another note, in 1945, the control of atomic energy and atomic weapons became a major diplomatic question for the United States. On August 6 and 9, 1945, President Harry Truman made a historic decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan, which led to the Japanese surrender on August 14. This inaugurated again a new era in the world's history and in American foreign policy, for the Americans began to use the bomb as an instrument of diplomacy. The United States would use this threat in its approach towards the Soviet Union and to impose its will on any opposing nation. In return, the United States would retain a powerful position in Europe without having to have a mass army. The United States had rapidly demobilized; the army was cut from 8 million to 1 million men in 1946³⁶. The existence of the atomic bomb would have a moderating effect on the Soviet Union. It would act as a deterrent to Soviet plans for an attack on Western Europe. With no retreat to Isolation as in 1919, there was a popular feeling that America could handle its foreign problems through possession of the atomic bomb.

³⁶ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938", page 76

It is this evident that in the 1940s in lieu of a policy, most political decisions were dictated by military necessity. World politics was characterized by the conflict between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The geographical distance, which had acted as a barrier for the United States for its engagement in the world, disappeared as the United States and the Soviet Union faced each other directly in various parts of the world. Moreover, during this period in time, the United States in its diplomacy based its foreign transactions not only on containment, but so too on deterrence and intervention and later on preemption. The end of the United States atomic monopoly spurred a policy of massive nuclear arms proliferation. Furthermore, Atomic diplomacy was replaced by the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction.

The Truman Administration then became sensitive to Communist expansion in Asia and containing Communism spread to new areas. China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek suited America's plans for the postwar period perfectly because Chiang would support the United States against the Soviet Union in relations between East and West. Also, China represented an important market, which could become more important in the future. Even though Chiang's regime was authoritarian, corrupt and ineffective, the United States supported the national government of Chiang, a portrayal of the double standards in its American foreign policy dealings. China was given a total economic assistance of 1.4 billion during the years 1945-1947³⁷. But American support was limited and halting, mainly because of the "Europe-First"³⁸ focus of the Truman Administration. Efforts to stop the Communists in China had to be subordinate to the policy of containment in Europe. Europe was primary in terms of strategic and economic significance. Also demobilization meant that armed forces were to a bare minimum and there was no desire to induct forces or increase the defense budget in order to procure resources for a more active policy in China. Moreover, the tasks of China were more comprehensive than in Europe where the objective was mainly to deter Soviet expansion and not to support troops in combat. Thus the United States did not want to become involved in another war.

³⁷ Lundestad, Geir. "East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945", page 43

³⁸ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938", page 107

As a result, the nationalist government of Chiang was unable to withstand the advance of Communist forces under Mao Zedong. By the end of 1949 government troops had been defeated, and Chiang led his forces into exile on Taiwan. This development caused great mayhem in the United States when critics charged that the Truman Administration had failed to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists.

The United States placed great emphasis on events in Europe than in Asia, this was evident not only in China but in other parts of Asia too. In June 1950 when South Korea was invaded by the forces of Communist North Korea, President Truman announced that the United States would intervene to assist the South Koreans. The United Nations sponsored the military action. The Soviet delegation was boycotting the Council and missed a chance to veto the decision. Seventeen nations contributed men to the United Nations force and Chinese Communist troops aided the North Koreans. The Korean War was a major turning point in the Cold War because it was the first war in which troops of a world organization fought an aggressor nation. It was the first time that Americans fought a "*hot war*"³⁹ against Communism. The United States changed its policy.

At first, the United States stance was that there would be no direct military response in Korea and that South Korea was beyond its defense perimeter. The political situation in the United States however undermined the original stance of the Truman Administration. Verbal assaults for having "*lost China*"⁴⁰ to the Communist became harsher. It was assumed that Moscow was behind the North Korean attack and analyzed that the Soviet Union would probably try to gain control of new areas. Thus the policy of containment would be practiced in Korea. Moreover, the President at first was not ready to risk military involvement in another costly involvement in Indochina but believed in the domino theory⁴¹. This theory states that if one Southeast Asian nation fell to Communism the others would topple over one after the other. This theory would resurface later on.

³⁹ Lundestad, Geir. "*East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945*", page 56

⁴⁰ Lundestad, Geir. "*East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945*", page 57

⁴¹ Lundestad, Geir. "*East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945*", page 57

During this period in history, the United States was on a constant wartime footing and became more committed to rebuilding Europe. Here the United States became expansionist, as its view was solely to contain Communism and at all costs. This War extended the Containment Policy to the Far East. It also introduced limited warfare to the East-West conflict as a substitute to an all out, and possibly, nuclear war. The United States pushed through a resolution in the Security Council branding the North Koreans as aggressors, demanding a cessation of hostilities and requesting a withdrawal behind the thirty-eighth parallel. An armistice was achieved in 1953, President Eisenhower made peace deciding that the price of victory was too high.

The United States, and after the Korean War, increased its participation in military treaties, and developed mutual defense alliances entering into treaties and making commitments in a number of different regions. Prior to the Korean War, the United States was bound by only one military treaty outside the Western Hemisphere, and that was NATO. The United States made the ANZUS Pact in 1951, an agreement made with Australia and New Zealand, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO and a defense agreement with Japan which gave the United States the right to have bases in Japan.

The United States believed that it had to fight Communism everywhere such as was evident in Korea and later in Vietnam. It feared the fall of countries to Communism, hence its fear was the domino theory that once one country fell others would soon follow. Furthermore, the threat of a nuclear war gave both sides a stake in maintaining a stable balance of terror; a balance, which was, symbolized in a series of arms control agreements. Direct military confrontation between the two superpowers was avoided. Rather, the United States engaged in a long struggle on the periphery of the world. Eventually, the United States and its allies triumphed by containing the Soviet challenge until the Soviet Union collapsed due to its own internal contradictions.

American Administrations have long held the assumption that in the end, every situation was controllable by them, and could be made to come out, as the United States wanted to. This perfect example of the "arrogance of power"⁴² influenced almost all foreign policy decisions in the early Cold War. The United States believed that they were different and better than other countries, especially having a monopoly of the atomic bomb gave them a sense of power. Moreover, their main concern and significance was national security. This is evident in the United States policy towards Eastern Europe. The region in itself was not of particular strategic importance to the United States, however, the question of whether relinquishing Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union would not result in the pressure been transmitted to the next layer of countries, then the strategically important Western Europe would be threatened, arose. Many policy makers during this era accepted this layer-by-layer theory⁴³. Second, Hitler had not been stopped in time; the lesson of World War II was that aggression developed gradually. This mistake could not be made a second time. There was also the strong ideological desire to spread the American gospel to other countries, a responsibility the United States felt to defend democracy against an expansive Communism⁴⁴.

With regard to the containment of Communism, there was considerable continuity from the Truman to the Eisenhower Administration, both in Europe and in Asia. President Eisenhower did not repudiate containment but rather carried it out differently. He believed that the Containment policy was too passive and preferred a more dynamic policy of massive retaliation. He introduced the New Look Policy⁴⁵. This was a political military strategy based on the capability to respond decisively to aggression while leaving the adversary uncertain as to the precise form the response would take. The adversary must expect a range of retaliatory response. The New Look Policy emphasized both the importance of tactical nuclear weapons and the role of strategic air power as a deterrent to aggression. The United States developed smaller atomic weapons that could be used tactically on the battlefield. Communist aggression would be met with massive retaliation.

⁴²Lundestad, Geir. *'East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945'*, page 92

⁴³Lundestad, Geir. *'East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945'*, page 36

⁴⁴Lundestad, Geir. *'East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945'*, page 37

⁴⁵Lundestad, Geir. *'East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945'*, page 130

The United States would strike back "*at places and with means of our own choosing*"⁴⁶. The United States would utilize the policy of brinkmanship as a method to support containment at a reasonable cost and within a limited time span, "*...you have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war...the ability to get to the edge without getting into the war is the necessary art...if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost*"⁴⁷. A best example of this policy was in Korea and later in Vietnam. When President Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the truce talks were stalled on the question of prisoner of war repatriation, the Chinese wanting the return of all their men held by the United Nations command whilst the Americans insisted on voluntary repatriation i.e. those who wanted to return would do so. Talks ensued and determined to cut losses President Eisenhower warned that unless the war ended quickly, the United States might retaliate "*under circumstances of our own choosing*"⁴⁸.

Moreover, conventional military forces were de-emphasized and a greater emphasis was placed on nuclear armaments and delivery systems. The United States forces stationed overseas were reduced and greater reliance on the ground forces of the allies and the development of a mobile reserve base in the United States was emphasized⁴⁹. President Eisenhower would not commit American troops in an armed conflict. He was not immune to engagement. The American strategy was based on the assumption that the United States would not start a major war but if it were attacked, its responses would not be limited to the same kind of level or force. American troops in Europe would constitute only a "*trip wire*"⁵⁰ for an attack on them would set off the United States nuclear retaliation. The troops would symbolize the United States commitment to European security.

President Eisenhower, who was anticommunist, desired a relaxation of tension, a détente. The desire for détente grew stronger mainly due to economic reasons. President Eisenhower advocated a reduction in the defense budget, and he wished to limit the level of

⁴⁶ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 133

⁴⁷ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 133

⁴⁸ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 134

⁴⁹ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 275

⁵⁰ Roskin, Michael. "*IR: An introduction to international relations*", page 275

armaments in the world. With his desire to keep the United States out of major armed conflicts, he contributed to a decreasing the level of tension in the Cold War.

The Middle East formed an important focus of American foreign policy during the Eisenhower Administration. Between 1953 and 1958, the United States moved from the position of a peripheral actor (behind Britain and France) to the role of a leading Western Power in the Middle East. This was evident in the Suez Crisis of 1956 where Britain and France attacked Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal and depose of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. The United States opposed the use of force and President Eisenhower addressed the world stating his discontent with the Allies; Britain, France and Israel's attack on Egypt to regain the international control of the canal. *"There can be no law if we work to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose, and another for our friends⁵¹".* The United States supported the United Nations resolution to oust the invading forces and used economic pressure to get the Britain and French to withdrawal from the Suez. The Middle East therefore became important to the United States. This was also evident through the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, which provided for the use of American military power if there was a direct threat of aggression to any Middle Eastern country. Hence the United States identified the Middle East as vital to its national security, and in July 1958, President Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon to support President Camille Chamoun. The priority that the United States gave to the Middle East crises, illustrated the growing importance of regions outside the North Atlantic area in the United States foreign policy.

In Vietnam, at first the United States adopted a *"hands off"*⁵² position with regard to the fighting. However, with the heightening of the Cold War in the late 1940s, the United States saw the French cause as holding back Communism. Then with the fall of China to the Communists in 1949, the United States decided to back the French. During President Eisenhower's presidency, few men were sent to fight in Vietnam.

⁵¹ Roskin, Michael. *"IR: An introduction to international relations"*, page 270

⁵² Roskin, Michael. *"IR: An introduction to international relations"*, page 53

President Kennedy, who succeeded President Eisenhower in 1961, thought that the United States was the last, and best hope of mankind. He wanted prosperity and happiness in the world and believed that the United States was capable of providing the leadership needed to achieve these goals, yet another example of the arrogance of power. President Kennedy could not accept any limitations on America's role. He felt that his predecessor was not aggressive enough and tended to compromise, he was not satisfied believing that the United States was not doing enough in the Cold War. He wanted the people of the world to start looking to America to what the President of the United States is doing. President Kennedy wanted the United States to take the initiative. *"Without having a nuclear war, we want to permit...the disease of liberty to be caught in areas which are now held by the Communists"*⁵³

With regard to foreign policy, President Kennedy sought to formulate a new approach towards Communism. President Kennedy wanted to stop the spread of Communism in the Third World and would do so with counterinsurgency methods. For President Kennedy, Vietnam was to provide ground for the new techniques of counterinsurgency. If Communism could be stopped there, *"we could scare off the communists from trying it elsewhere"*⁵⁴.

As for the Russians, and according to President Kennedy, the only way to deal with them and their associates was from a position of strength. The Soviets had the ability to enlarge their operational arsenal and the United States would have to insure against a Soviet buildup by dramatically increasing American strength and achieving a first strike capability. Hence, there was a huge military buildup and by 1962; the United States was ahead by a ratio of 7 to 1 in strategic missiles⁵⁵. The defense budget was thus increased, as too the military buildup. President Kennedy substituted the policy of massive retaliation for a policy of flexible response. President Kennedy sought to make a controlled flexible response to the threats that might be posed not directly to the security of the United States but rather to the security of the United States allies

⁵³ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *"Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938"*, page 173

⁵⁴ Roskin, Michael. *"IR: An introduction to international relations"*, page 53

⁵⁵ Roskin, Michael. *"IR: An introduction to international relations"*, page 53

*"...principal military objects should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of its civilian population"*⁵⁶

President Kennedy also created the Peace Corps, on September 22, 1961, which were teams of young Americans sent to poor areas of the world to work with people, share their way of life, and assist in development activities such as road building and improvement of farming methods. Militarily, the Green Berets were organized and trained for counterinsurgency operations.

In Latin America, the United States still guarded against the threat of Communism. In April and May 1965, the United States, at the request of the Dominican Republic, dispatched 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to prevent a Communist take-over during a revolt there. The crisis eased, and the United States troops left.

As for the Vietnam War, it dominated President Johnson's entire foreign policy. President Johnson continued to send military advisers to assist the military forces of South Vietnam. China had already been lost to the Communist and visions of falling dominos haunted the Pentagon and the White House. Moreover, the United States was already committed to stopping Communism in Vietnam. Americans believed that the 17th Parallel dividing North Vietnam (North Vietnamese) from South Vietnam (South Vietnamese) was a frontier between the free world and the Communist world, thus they decided to come to the assistance of the South Vietnamese. Problems were encountered however, namely the Vietnam War was fought from a great geographical distance from the United States where the frontier was accessible to the Soviets. Again the geographical distance proved a barrier. Furthermore, South Vietnam emerged as a new state after the Geneva Conference in 1954 that ended the Indochina war with France, and thus it had not established a political system or a good economy and was easily targeted by Communists. When the North Vietnamese were reported to have attacked the United States vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin,

⁵⁶ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in a speech in June 1962

President Johnson ordered the United States planes to bomb the North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases. He then asked Congress for power to take all the necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the United States forces and to prevent further aggression, which Congress granted, known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Johnson used the Resolution as a legal basis for increased United States involvement in the War. The United States committed more than 500,000 troops to the War⁵⁷.

One may question why the United States got involved in the Vietnam War. The answer to that lies in the fact that Vietnam, for the United States, was seen as a test of its will and it had to meet the test to maintain its frontiers. The United States could not just pull out and abandon an ally. It would be dishonorable. America should not look like it had been defeated. Moreover the Asian balance depended on the United States, for a time, until the non-Communist states of the area had stable political systems and were military and economically sufficient. The Americans could not forgo the defense of the frontier in South Vietnam for the domino effect. Furthermore, China was viewed by Washington as far more militant and dangerous than Moscow and if the noncommunist government was overtaken, Vietnam would be added to China's power. This in turn would lead to an increase in the Sino-Soviet bloc's power and result in a decrease of the credibility of the United States.

In addition, the United States justified its policy in terms of an anti-Communist crusade and aroused the public by promising to stop Communism. The United States involvement however became a long-term commitment. At first, domestically there was support by the public for the anticommunist crusade.

Each president thought that increased involvement in Indochina was less costly than doing nothing. Domestic costs of losing a country to Communism were so high that those in power felt compelled to intervene to avoid losses. The cost of non-intervention; the image of been soft on

⁵⁷ Roskin, Michael. "IR: An introduction to international relations", page 59

Communism, the loss of public support and support from Congress was higher than the cost of diplomatic hardness and overt or covert intervention.

Because it was a test of its will, it did not want the Communists to control the South Vietnamese, it had to defend its frontiers. Again, if the United States had pulled out then the balance of power would be upset in Asia and the South Vietnamese would be added to China's power and thus the Sino-Soviet Bloc's power would increase. The Vietnam War however undermined Containment, the Soviets benefited because they were able to focus their resources on catching up with the United States and on surpassing them in nuclear weapons because the United States had cut down its military spending in 1970s⁵⁸.

In Vietnam, the American Soldiers did not understand the political nature of counter-guerrilla war they were trained for conventional battle, to use maximum firepower to wear down the enemy. The military was confident it could do that because its helicopters were technologically advanced. American foreign policy makers felt strongly confident in their military superiority and their authority. They had sizeable forces and superior mobility and firepower. It was assumed that the guerrillas were an easy task, yet another example of the arrogance of power the United States strongly adhered to.

When President Nixon came into power, he outlined a foreign policy based on a *"low profile"*⁵⁹ and on reductions in the United States role abroad. President Nixon announced that he intend to *"wind down"*⁶⁰ the war through a policy of Vietnamization or replacement of the United States troops by South Vietnamese forces trained and equipped by the United States. Vietnamization resembled what President Roosevelt had previously stated in Europe, *"American boys ought not be fighting in Europe, doing what European boys ought to be doing for*

⁵⁸ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 142

⁵⁹ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 143

⁶⁰ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 143

themselves"⁶¹ Instead; the Americans would supply the tools of war so that others could contain the Axis aggressors⁶². President Nixon devised a strategy to get out of Vietnam without portraying a defeat. More than 350,000 United States troops from the war zone; by the end of 1971 fewer than 175,000 remained.

1. American ground troops were to be withdrawn gradually to reduce the costs of war. Nixon hoped the continued involvement of some United States forces especially in the air, would provide an incentive for Hanoi to negotiate an end to the war.
2. Vietnamization of the war, as American troops were withdrawn South Vietnamese forces would receive better training & modern arms so that they could take over the ground fighting. A winding down or replacement of United States troops by South Vietnamese forces trained and equipped by the United States.

Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Advisor had convinced the President that there was a path to peace with honor in Vietnam and that was through Moscow and Peking. If these two Communist superpowers would only refrain from supplying arms to the North Vietnamese, Hanoi would have to agree to a compromise peace, a ploy that Kissinger called Linkage. In an effort to bring about peace in Vietnam, the United States government worked at bettering its relationship with China. In 1969, Nixon approved the removal of some restrictions on travel by Americans to China. He also encouraged the reopening of trade between China and the United States. The two nations had stopped trading with each other during the Korean War (1950-1953). In 1971, Nixon approved the export of certain goods to China and in February 1972, the President visited China for seven days. Nixon continued his efforts to improve relations between the United States and China. In 1973, the two nations sent representatives to serve in each other's capital and exchanged visits by cultural groups.

⁶¹ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "American Foreign Policy Since World War II", page 259

⁶² Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "American Foreign Policy Since World War II", page 259

President Nixon saw allot of possibilities for the United States in a Sino-Soviet split *"The best way to get China and Russia to cooperate was to keep them guessing about what the actual intentions of the United States were"*⁶³. Nixon's pursue of the policy of détente would make China worry about a possible United States Soviet alliance against China, whilst Nixon's opening to China made Russia's leaders fearful of a United States-China alliance directed against them. *"...we simply cannot afford to leave China outside the family of nations"*⁶⁴.

The United States emerged from the Vietnam War with new doubts about its role in Foreign Affairs. Doubts were raised about using anti-Communism as the basis for the country's foreign policy. Prior to the Vietnam War, the United States could be mobilized to stop Communist aggression, however later on, the nation tried to avoid engaging in any overseas adventure. Anti-Communism was no longer useful as a means of eliciting popular support. Moreover, the nation, after Vietnam had become weary of its foreign policy burdens. This mood was demonstrated by attacks on the imperial presidency and restrains imposed on the White House by a more assertive and watchful Congress.

During the 1970s Presidential power and authority was to be restrained. American power and prestige declined in 1973 as the War Powers Resolution attacked the *"imperial presidency"*⁶⁵ and restricted the Presidents ability to deploy the United States forces abroad by cutting defense budgets and by restricting secret operations by the Central Intelligence Agency and giving Congress more power over the President. Previously the President was mainly responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, but this was to change because most presidents where too anticommunist and therefore involved the country in too many costly battles. Congress now was to be involved in forming foreign policy. It was no longer a cipher; it had ignored its constitutional duties on the grounds that the President had to be free to act immediately against aggressors. Moreover, in the pre-Vietnam era, Congress rarely questioned the President's authority to use armed forces or the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out United States Policy, but after

⁶³ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 150

⁶⁴ Foreign Affairs magazine 1967.

⁶⁵ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 150

Vietnam, America's role as a "*global policeman*"⁶⁶ was criticized widely and emphasis was placed on the nations limited power, a more restricted role in what was regarded as the post Cold War era. Domestic problems now were to take precedent and priority; those were the voices of critics of the war, of the opponents who wanted improvement of quality of life rather than crusading for democracy, the historically held goal of the United States.

This restriction on the President's power was evident in 1973 when Congress forced President Nixon to end the United States bombing in Cambodia. Nixon had argued that the bombing was needed to prevent a Communist take-over of that nation. But Congress refused to provide money for bombing beyond August 15, 1973. This was the first time Congress had ever denied funds for American combat operations in a war. Nixon's justification to enter Cambodia: "*if when the chips are down, the world's most powerful nation acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world*" Again an example of the Brinkmanship policy.

Amongst other foreign policy programs of President Nixon, was a program he termed "new internationalism."⁶⁷ Under this program, other nations would take over from the United States more of the responsibility for preserving world peace and helping developing countries.

From around Pearl Harbor in 1941 to Vietnam in the late 1960s, the United States practiced an interventionist foreign policy. The United States was not reluctant to send troops to contain the Soviet bloc. The United States foreign aid and troops starved off the possibility of Soviet expansion into Western Europe and the United States rolled back a communist attack in Korea, acting like the world's policeman. After Vietnam, the United States shifted to a non-interventionist direction and was slow and reluctant to return to the sweeping interventionism of pre-Vietnam years.

⁶⁶ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 150

⁶⁷ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 84

Chapter 4.

Post Cold War Interlude: Defining the United States role in the world

During the 1980s, a new era of foreign policy set in under President Ronald Reagan who was very anti communist and capable of mobilizing public opinion. Soviet Communism was denounced as the "*focus of evil in the modern world*⁶⁸" and that it was therefore the duty of the United States to "*oppose it with all our might*⁶⁹". As a result, President Reagan pushed to double the defense budget of the United States to match the Soviet nuclear and conventional military buildup of the 1970s. As a consequence, the arms industry became the leading growth industry in the United States. By the early 1980s worldwide military spending was nearly \$550 billion annually⁷⁰. Congress approved the doubling of the defense spending. President Reagan attempted to restore the United States' stature, which was battered with the Vietnam War by reviving the notion that an active United States role in international affairs was essential for world peace.

In the 1980s, the horror of a nuclear war emerged. Public protests increased especially on having a nuclear freeze on the testing and producing and deployment of weapons. President Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) intended to render nuclear missiles impotent and obsolete thus SDI would be a defense using different technologies to destroy approaching missiles during each phase of the ballistic trajectory. Reagan did not like the deterrent strategy that his predecessors were committed to, for it was too costly and accelerated the arms race. Moreover, President Reagan did not favor arms control agreements with the Soviets, he was preoccupied with rearmament.

The policy of the United States would be offensive to rollback Soviet gains during the 1970s especially in the Developing countries where Marxist governments had been established.

⁶⁸ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 203

⁶⁹ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 204

⁷⁰ Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. "*Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*", page 304

Past administration did not hesitate to intervene and save a friendly regime from being attacked from outside or from within the Soviet Union but the official policy of the United States was never to depose of Soviet supported regimes. Containment during the previous administrations was a defensive doctrine; Reagan's doctrine would be offensive. The Reagan Doctrine, was to reverse the Soviet gains.

Thus the focus in the 1980s was an offensive Containment Policy, on the Soviet Union as a Communist expansionist state and on the need to contain expansion even by force if necessary. President Reagan played a crucial role in raising the costs of superpower competition and in forcing the Soviet Union to reform itself. There was a large United States military buildup, which required the Soviet Union to invest in arms at a time when it should have concentrated on domestic policies.

President Reagan adopted his own national liberation strategy against governments that had not come to power by democratic means. He would sponsor anti-communist guerillas that tried to overthrow the pro Soviet regimes. This became known as the Reagan Doctrine. To demonstrate his determination, the United States directly intervened on the Caribbean island of Grenada where a military coup had led to the installation of a Marxist regime in 1983. The mission achieved its objective of eliminating the Marxist regime. The justification by President Reagan was that the United States had to respond to threats especially those close to its borders. If the United States could not respond to a threat near its border, than why should the Europeans or Asians believe that it would be seriously concerned about threats to them.

Democracy and freedom were "*the waves of the future*"⁷¹ proclaimed President Reagan, thus the legitimacy and longevity of Communism as a social and political system in Eastern

⁷¹ Hastedt, Glenn P.: "*American foreign policy: past, present, future*", page 130

Europe no longer existed. The Vietnam Syndrome was a thing of the past. *"America's will to resist Soviet expansion was back"*⁷².

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and the change in the old guard in Moscow, new uncertainties about world politics emerged because the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, which had guided the foreign policy of all countries, dissipated and tensions between the Superpowers was then reduced. In the absence of that rivalry, the old alignments were either no longer necessary or advisable. The question of a new balance of power emerged. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in the absence of a direct threat, the United States embarked on the post Cold War interlude which was a decade of transition defined by uncertainty, as the United States fumbled to determine its role in the International system which was not defined any more by a single existential threat.

During this era in time, American primacy was unprecedented and uncontested. Russia had declined and Europe had consolidated. The most important traditional security concerns of the past, namely the prevention of a major war, dissipated as the United States policy seemed to be guiding important regional disputes such as in the Middle East.

Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union had brought an end to the bipolar order that had persisted since the late 1940s. Western European states retained their previous status and the emergence of a strong European Union as a single entity. During that period of time the task was to integrate the Soviet Union into the Community of nations.

By 1990s and as George Bush proclaimed *"a new world order"*⁷³ had arrived *"we can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order, a*

⁷² Hastedt, Glenn P.: *"American foreign policy: past, present, future"*, page 131

⁷³ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 204

World where the United Nations freed from Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders, a world in which freedom and respect of human rights find a home among all nations"⁷⁴. Yet many questions surfaced as to what American foreign policy would resemble that of 1918 when the United States retreated into its Isolationist mode after World War I? Or that of 1945 when it assumed a strong internationalist posture after World War II. Moreover, without the imminent military threat, what would the resources and the attention devoted to foreign policy be? International realism became the doctrine to be followed. George Bush would deal with the post - Cold war world on a personal level, through personal contacts.

Policymakers concluded that a revival of American Isolationism was out of the question because of the belief by Americans that the United States was an exceptional country, one whose foreign policy must pursue a moral cause even if other nations did not. According to the latter, it was *"America's duty to make the world better for its inhabitants and to shape the new world order so that the gains from the Cold War could be preserved"*⁷⁵. In addition, with the new era that emerged came intensified global economic competition, ecological problems that were growing more severe and Weapons of Mass Destruction, which were falling into unknown hands. Computer technologies were uniting the far reaches of the globe both for good and for evil. The latter was evident with the September 11 attacks. Thus in view of the risk that a rival superpower could again cause havoc if the United States led down its guard, policymakers concluded that a revival of American Isolationism, was out of the question.

The United States would play an active role in world politics, for the best hope for the security of the United States and the global stability was for the United States to prolong its unipolar moment by exploiting its military predominance, by imposing itself in regional power struggles and aggressively containing potential challengers. American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself. Economically it was

⁷⁴ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 223

⁷⁵ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 232

the strongest. In 1991 American firms produced \$5.6 trillion in goods and services (26% of the world's output). Militarily, American preponderance was greater; the United States maintained its global presence with military forces deployed across the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. The United States navy patrolled most of the vital sea lanes and the United States air force maintained uncontested supremacy of the skies. American military spending of 8280 billion in 1991 represented 27% of the worldwide total.

Therefore, and according to Samuel Huntington, only through a "Pax Americana" could the anarchic world be saved from itself, *"a world without the United States primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs"*⁷⁶.

President George Bush's Administration adopted and continued this target of maintaining the primacy of the United States. The strategy was focused on precluding the emergence of any future global competitor. This is a depiction of the arrogance of power that is evident throughout the foreign policy of the United States. Americans have historically believed, and presently continue to believe, that they must protect the world from the chaos and anarchy that exists. President George Bush emphasized the responsibility of the United States to face those that threaten the United States and its allies.

Accordingly, during the mid 1990s the persisting trend in world politics was thus the technological revolution that was rapidly drawing the far reaches of the world closer together. This process of global integration was welcomed because world leaders would increasingly recognize and solve problems that crossed national boundaries. Integration would discourage self-serving and nationalistic behavior. Economic globalization would increase prosperity and the spread of democratic rule would reduce the likelihood of war.

⁷⁶ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *"American Foreign Policy Since World War II"*, page 235

Opposing forces that favored global fragmentation raised doubts about these scenarios because the shift in the global balance of power had produced a volatile and violent international order. Bipolarity had been stable because of its simplicity, watching each other constantly was easy. The superpowers maintained the balance but with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of bipolarity brought instability and encouraged fragmentation because ethnic, religious and nationalistic tensions were revived. Aspirants to regional hegemony felt free to pursue their aggressive designs. No longer could each superpower restrain its clients and prevent local conflicts and expansionist middle powers were now free to fill the void left by the superpowers.

The fragmented world order tested the rigidity of the United States alliances. NATO's mission became unclear as other security arrangements were devised for the European Union. It was feared that NATO would become obsolete and that is why the United States was enthusiastic for its expansion eastward. Furthermore, and with the advancement in technology, the United States now had to concern itself with the behavior of terrorists, drug cartels, organized crime syndicates and black market weapons dealers. The United States would have to guard itself against threats that could take several forms and come from any direction especially with the advancement of technology and communication, which made the world smaller.

The first trouble spot to disrupt the new world order was the Middle East. The West was very dependent on the Middle East oil, which was vulnerable to disruptions of oil flows as had occurred in 1973 and 1978 with the embargoed oil shipments. In the absence of superpower rivalry in the 1990s, a power vacuum was created in the Middle East that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq attempted to fill. The first post Cold War world crisis was thus on August 2, 1990 when President Saddam ordered his Iraqi army to invade Kuwait. The possibility that President Saddam might control 40% of the world's oil reserves and dictate the terms of OPEC production forced an aggressive response. Iraqi assets were frozen by Western powers then an embargo on Iraqi oil and other economic sanctions were enforced by a naval blockade of the Persian Gulf. The United States responded with the largest troop buildup (Operation Desert Shield) whereby 250,000 troops were deployed and the United Nations gave President Saddam a deadline of January 15, 1991 to

withdraw from Kuwait (the United Nations witnessed unanimity within it which portrayed how great power politics had changed with the end of the Cold War, previously the United Nations Council's five permanent members had rarely agreed on anything and the two superpowers had vetoed any call for collective action). Moreover, the Gulf crisis resuscitated the United Nations for the new world order worked through the United Nations. Congress however did not share the United Nations solidarity and they insisted that George Bush gain its assent before he used force (War Powers Resolution). American troop deployment reached 500,000 and Saddam Hussein did not abide by the January 15 deadline. With Iraqi forces still in Kuwait, coalition partners and the United States transformed Operation Desert Shield into Operation Desert Storm and attacked Iraq. After weeks of air and missile bombardment, the land battle routed Iraq's army. Despite the military and diplomatic success, President Bush was not reelected because of the strong discontent at home from the faltering economy and the continued high deficit spending⁷⁷.

By 1992, the American Public wanted a change of priorities, because foreign policy was less important than the economy and domestic issues. President Bush's successor, President Bill Clinton, was to concentrate on domestic problems. The primary goal of the country would be to achieve a strong economic growth, to give attention to the problems neglected during the Cold War such as ecological decay, rapid population growth and political repression. He would follow a policy of "*assertive multilateralism*" and "*liberal internationalism*"⁷⁸ whereby international institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank would play a meaningful role in achieving the goals of the nation. Furthermore, the United States would no longer lapse into Isolationism but would exploit and extend the advantages that derived from its privileged position in the unipolar world.

A major focus of the foreign policy of President Clinton was the bettering of the United States Economy. The United States had become dependent on export for employment and economic growth. President Clinton laid out a program of domestic reform and emphasized that without a strong and growing economy accompanied by declining budget and trade deficits, the

⁷⁷ President George W. Bush, The White House

⁷⁸ Spainer, John and Steben W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 271

United States could not afford to play an influential role in world politics. The decline of the United States economy during the Cold War was inevitable. The overwhelming strength of the United States economy just after World War II when it accounted for half of the global production stemmed from the wreckage of the Western European and Pacific economies. That strength however lasted only until these economies recovered by the early 1990s thus the United States share of global production was just about the same as before World War I. After World War II, American leaders hardly ever raised the issue of affordability when responding to a foreign threat or regional crisis that was vital to the interest of the United States.

Moreover, the prosperous economy of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s did not continue during the 1970s because of the Vietnam War, which bore an enormous expense. Economic stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s raised the question of whether the United States economy could still support a foreign policy that maintained 300,000 United States soldiers in Western Europe, defended Japan and South Korea, policed the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and kept the traditional sphere of influence it had in Latin America. Therefore, and in order for the United States to compete effectively with the outside world whilst at the same time supporting domestic program at home, the government would have to reinvest in its domestic base i.e. take a more active role in reforming the national health care system, improving the quality of life, decreasing the unemployment rates etc...

Under the Administration of President Clinton the National Economic Council was created to coordinate economic relations and to serve as a counterpart to the National Security Council. The policy would be to expand the United States role in regional trading blocs by removing barriers to trade and investment within the by encouraging the movement of workers and service across national borders and by unifying health and safety regulations. In 1993 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was created aimed at reducing and/or eliminating tariffs that had limited trade among the United States, Canada and Mexico. In 1994 the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade was ratified and a reduction on tariffs on most products sold overseas followed.

The United States had long sought to promote the expansion of democratic rule overseas, from Thomas Jefferson's "Empire of liberty" to the Woodrow Wilson's pledge to make the United States role in World War I a mission for *"democracy for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government"*⁷⁹. In 1992 President Clinton declared this renewal of democratic crusade *"I believe it is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated Communism"*⁸⁰. He was an advocate for spreading democracy, adhering to principles. Here focus was placed on humanitarian interventions, which began to gain more acceptance. President Clinton brought liberal views into the foreign political strategy. International order would be preserved by the United Nations force, the Peace Corps. Morality became rationale for peacemaking and for humanitarian intervention and for conducting an ethical foreign policy.

By the time of Clinton's term in office, more countries had adopted representative governments and allowed the formation of multiple political parties, established the rule of law and allowed for basic political and civil rights. In 1994 for example South Africa dismantled Apartheid and permitted free elections. The Clinton Administration sought to make the promotion of democracy the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake in 1993 stated that the United States would *".. seek to isolate non-democratic states diplomatically, militarily, economically and technologically"*. President Clinton's administration then identified rogue states including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea among others, which it felt threatened the foundations of democratic rule and then sought to punish them through economic sanctions, diplomatic exclusion and occasional military coercion. But President Clinton faced a battle as people questioned whether the effort was actually vital to the security of the United States and to its economic interest. American governments have for a long time equated democracy overseas with American Security at home. Enlargement of democratic rule was a pillar of the United States security strategy⁸¹.

⁷⁹⁸⁰⁸¹ US Government Printing Office. *"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement"*

This era of American Foreign affairs however brought to the surface the double standards depicted in the American foreign policy dealings such as violations of human rights by the Chinese government, which were subordinated to the primary goal of expanded economic ties. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were ruled by repressive governments and Turkey was engaged in a crackdown of Kurdish minority yet continued to receive generous allotments of military aid from the United States and full partnership in NATO.

As for the Gulf, Saddam Hussein continued to demonstrate his ability to cause havoc when he wanted to, and the United States responded on numerous occasions. In December 1988, Clinton ordered a four-day aerial bombardment of Iraqi military headquarters, intelligence agencies and weapons plants. The attacks were denounced by Russia, China and France as well as Clintons decision to act without the approval of the United Nations Security Council and further bombing in 1999 far from forcing Iraqi compliance, the attacks added to the "sanctions fatigue" among United Nations members and provoked sympathy for Saddam.

Clinton also embraced the global effort to promote sustainable development in developing countries such as political reforms; environmental protection, population control and market based economic growth. Chronic problems could no longer be ignored by industrialized nations as they posed to threaten the global security. Moreover, in the United Nations, these developing countries united with other developing countries to form a majority in the General Assembly, which served as a forum to express their grievances against the United States and other industrialized nations. During the Cold War, many of these nations became the battleground for the superpower conflict. The end of the Cold War was thus welcomed by most impoverished nations.

In many of the developed areas, the post-Cold War era witnessed the emergence of the "failed state"⁸² unable of sustaining itself as a member of the International Community because of its poor economy. Those states descended into violence and anarchy. Somalia is an example of such a country. During the Cold War, the Soviets had supported the governments of Somalia

⁸² Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "American Foreign Policy Since World War II"; page 305

because Ethiopia, its neighbor to the North, was aligned with the United States but when a pro Soviet military regime came into power in Ethiopia, Somalia's ruler switched sides and became a loyal client of the United States but when the Cold War ended Somalia became embroiled in a war of succession among rival factions. The government ceased to function and chaos prevailed.

The era of technological advancement and communication as well as the enormous media attention compelled a Western response through the United Nations. This era in time was also characterized by intervention for humanitarian purposes/relief and to aid struggling nations. More than 27,000 troops were dispatched in 1992 to provide order and food and after they had accomplished the mission of Operation Restore Hope, the United States forces were to be withdrawn and replaced by temporary contingent United Nations forces. Fighting persisted however, as the humanitarian relief did not suffice. There was a need to rebuild Somalia's political and economic structures and therefore resistance to the enlarged United Nations mission, which called for the removal of Mohammed Fara Aidid (who controlled Somalia's capital Mogadishu) persisted and peacekeepers were killed. Strong demands to withdraw the United States troops ensued. President Clinton accelerated their departure and the United Nations suspended the mission in 1995. Why it went wrong was basically because the peacekeepers that were initially dispatched for the humanitarian purpose ignored the political situation that had created the hunger in the first place. It should have been clear that resolving the anarchic political situation was a prerequisite to resolving the humanitarian crisis.

Focus was thus placed on the issue of humanitarian intervention to the top of the foreign policy agenda. Foreign engagement became a matter of discretion, of choice and not necessity. With the demise of the Soviet Union came the privileged security. Even in the face of growing transnational threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, infectious diseases and environmental degradation, the United States felt fairly secure in its homeland. What became of utmost importance was the national security of the United States and in order to achieve that, great focus was placed on building the economy.

Thereafter, President Clinton in 1994 signed, and because of imposed limitations on the President's foreign policy powers by the Congress (if the United States is not at war or faced with a military crisis), a presidential directive that places strict conditions on the United States support for a United Nations peacekeeping, these conditions included a clear threat to United States security, substantial public support for intervention, participation by other countries under United Nations supervision and an assurance that long term nation building would not be necessary.

The limits of the United States military power resurfaced, the failed military interventions reminded American leaders that they must pay attention to the interests at stake in any conflict as well as the cost, the level of public support, the likelihood of success and existence of a coherent exit strategy. Moreover, America's vast military arsenal was of little or no use in most trouble spots because long-term constructive solutions were required. In most cases, there were civil wars and not disputes between states thus the point that home grown solutions, rather than those imposed by other states, were needed. This aspect challenged the long held American view that once the United States committed its military forces to battle, their overwhelming strength would hold back any opponent.

As for Europe, after the Cold War, the United States kept its presence on the European Continent both to prevent the emergence of new fault lines and to exploit the gains that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Americans have always viewed a stable Europe as essential to their security and a balance among European nations was needed to prevent one country from falling into Communist controlled hands. In the early 1990s, specifically in 1992, the Europeans sought to become more independent and self sufficient through the European Union, created by the Maastricht Treaty.

Furthermore, the integration of Western Europe into a more cohesive European Union brought those states closer together and provided them with a forum, to resolve their political differences. However, this move towards confederation was both welcomed and troubling by American leaders. It was welcoming for the United States had long encouraged regional integration as a way to defuse the bitter rivalries among European powers e.g. the Truman administration explicitly made regional cooperation a condition for Marshall Plan funding and military aid. It was troubling because a revitalized Europe could seek to detach itself from the United States and chart an independent course.

Also, NATO's role was questioned for it had accomplished its stated mission of protecting the Western European states from a possible Soviet aggression; many thus felt that the alliance should be disbanded. Both roles of NATO however, that of a collective defense of Western Europe against foreign attack and for the regions collective security against its own self-destructive tendencies, remained valid after the Cold War. A rationale to keep and not dismantle the alliance was evident through the desire of the former Soviet states to become a part of the West, thus the question became not whether the alliance should disband but whether it should expand. Enlargement seemed right given the new power vacuum in Eastern Europe created by the abolition of the Warsaw Pact. Unless NATO stepped in to fill these vacuum countries like Poland, Hungary would have to build independent military forces and might be tempted to create another regional bloc. However, expanding NATO and adding the Eastern European states to NATO threatened to inflame Russian nationalism and isolate moderators. Therefore, President Clinton and NATO leaders arrived at a compromise in October 1993, a Partnership for Peace whereby the former Warsaw Pact members and the soviet republic were invited to become junior partners of NATO. In this capacity, they would participate in some NATO deliberations and training exercises but would not receive security guarantees of full members; if the partnership proved successful they would then be considered for full membership.

President Clinton worked for major changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, overseeing its historic expansion to three former communist nations in central Europe, namely the

Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in the spring of 1999. President Clinton emphasized the importance of international intervention when human rights abuses on the scale of ethnic cleansing are committed⁸³. As the alliance was expanding, he led NATO's largest military campaign of air strikes that led to the ouster of Serbian forces from Kosovo, the end of the ethnic cleansing of Albanians and the return of thousands of refugees. He allowed the domestic policies to influence the United States' conduct abroad; this was evident in the Kosovo crisis where he did not allow for deployment of ground forces in Kosovo because the polls had shown concern among Americans for casualties. *"Foreign policy was never a priority for this administration, so it should not surprise that political concerns often came first."*⁸⁴

By 1992, Americans were troubled mainly by fears about their country's economy. The unemployment rate had climbed to the highest level that was reached in 1984, mainly 7.8%⁸⁵. The Federal Government Policy of deficit spending or borrowing to finance expenditures had resulted in a large national debt, which was also a major concern for the Americans.

As for Weapons of Mass Destruction, President Clinton failed to move beyond the Cold War policies on reducing nuclear inventories and on establishing a new nuclear weapons policy. He asked for increased controls on nuclear weapons after India and Pakistan tested such weapons. In 1993, 125 countries signed a UN sponsored treaty banning the manufacture, use, transfer and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the treaty took effect in 1997. In 1996, the UN approved the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was designed to end the testing of nuclear weapons. To officially go into effect, the pact must be ratified by the legislatures of all countries that have nuclear reactors.

Critics of the conduct of American foreign policy during President Bill Clinton's Administration state that Clinton mostly took an adhoc crisis management approach to international

⁸³ McMahon, Robert. "US: Experts see Clinton's foreign policy legacy as mixed" September 20, 2002

⁸⁴ McMahon, Robert. "US: Experts see Clinton's foreign policy legacy as mixed" September 20, 2002

⁸⁵ "Unemployment Rate" US Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics

relations⁸⁶. Clinton's foreign policy has mostly amounted to a series of piece-meal approaches to major issues the best example is that of Iraq where Clinton's policy was marked by short term reactions. In September 1996, Iraqi forces attacked Kurds in Northern Iraq in violation of the restrictions; in response President Clinton ordered the United States military to launch missiles against military targets in Iraq. When the United States decided to take forceful measures in response to Iraqi violations of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, Haass says the U.S. actions lacked any lasting purpose. The Clinton administration dropped bombs on Iraq for four days during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and then stopped. In December 1998, Clinton ordered United States forces to launch air and cruise missile against military and industrial sites in Iraq because Iraq had failed to cooperate with the United Nations inspection of suspected weapons facilities.

American Foreign Policy has, as is indicated herein above, historically undergone periodic changes from Isolation to intervention to expansion, which has led to its establishment as a Superpower. During the 1990s terrorism became a principle foreign policy challenge for the United States when attacks on American interests were engineered without effective United States responses. Such attacks include the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States embassies in Nairobi, and Dar El Salaam in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2001 culminating in the September 11 2001 attacks.

Moreover, and during the 1990s, the United States was indecisive in asserting its power and gave the world the impression that it could be chased out of a country by anyone who managed to kill a few Americans. The best example is Somalia whereby President Bill Clinton cut the help after the deaths of 18 American soldiers, as did Ronald Reagan by pulling out of Lebanon after the 1983 bombing of the United States Marine barracks. Moreover, after the fear of putting troops on the ground persisted as was seen with President Clinton whom after the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, sent cruise missiles--not soldiers--to strike a

⁸⁶ Richard Haass, Director of foreign policy studies at Brookings Institution, & member of the National Security Council of Former Republican President George Bush

symbolic blow against Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. Those attacks rather than symbolizing the United States determination, symbolized its passivity in the face of terrorism. This impression was also reinforced by the failure to retaliate for the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.

Chapter 5

September 11: The Apparent Change in foreign policy dealings.

September 11, 2001, a day that went down in history, the day the symbols of capitalism and military strength of the United States were struck. 8:46 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 crashes into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. 9:03 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. 9:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. 10:10 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93 crashes in a wooded area in Pennsylvania. Approximately 3380 people were dead. Wall Street trading was stopped, all flights were halted by the Federal Aviation at all the United States airports for the first time in the history of the United States. The United States military was placed on high alert. That historic day was the beginning of a new era that paved the way for a radical change in American Foreign Policy.

What follows is a description of how the events of September 11 ended the long held complacency of the United States and forced the Americans to see clearly that foreign policy was important and it could not afford to stand aside nor take a unilateralist approach. September 11 further portrayed to the United States how small the world has become with the technological advances and the means of communications, which aided the September 11 terrorist to achieve their operation. Hence how globalization raised the stakes of transnational threats. Moreover, it portrayed that the United States can never be Isolationist again because it would be engaged in the world.

Terrorism here became a number one foreign policy priority by the Bush Administration and the fight against Terrorism became a pertinent goal to be achieved. September 11, further emphasized the diverse security challenges the world faces. President George W. Bush introduced a Doctrine of Preemption, which offers, in his point of view, strategic clarity (this is elaborated upon here within). This Chapter will portray how the Bush Administration, through its War on Terrorism and its Doctrine of Preemption, has undergone changes in the foreign policy

relations namely disregarding the International Organization, the United Nations. The best example here is the Iraq war in which the United States disregarded the sovereignty of Iraq and fought to remove the President, Saddam Hussein, at all costs because he posed as a potential future threat.

Moreover, September 11 changed the outlook of the United States on the world and the United States government's relationship with other major powers, the creation of the coalition to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan and the evolving relationship with countries the United States rarely dealt with like Pakistan for example. Here President Musharraf made a strategic choice to reorient his country's foreign policy and stand with the United States and the rest of the international community against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

During the first months in office, President George W. Bush's foreign policy was neglect for multilateralism and a unilateral "*going at it alone*"⁸⁷ approach. President Bush spoke of a possible United States opposition to, and withdrawal from a number at multilateral treaties. This included the United States' refusal to sign, support or pursue ratification of a large number of international agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Military Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Protocol Verification mechanism and others. President George W. Bush's foreign policy showed a preference for unilateralism, resting on the belief that in a dangerous world, the way to ensure America's security was to portray the limitations imposed by friends, allies and international institutions and that America, limitless, should use its strength to change the status quo in the world. This doesn't necessarily mean that America needs to always act alone, when unilateral action seems unwise President Bush will seek allies, but not to make decisions that would require their approval, rather, to seek an adhoc "*coalitions of the willing*"⁸⁸.

This arrogance of power and the intent of a unilaterally going at it alone approach is as a result of the sole superpower status that the United States achieved after the collapse of the Soviet

⁸⁷ Gordan, Philip. "September 11 and American foreign policy". November 2001

⁸⁸ Gordan, Philip. "September 11 and American foreign policy". November 2001

Union. It felt that it could unilaterally do what it considered to be in its national interests over and beyond the national interests of other nations. Thus in the early months of the Administration, President George W. Bush's conduct of foreign policy was under this self-image of unilateralism. In major security, environmental and economic areas, the United States went alone, against European objections often modifying and sometimes even nullifying collective obligations. However, unilateralism did not take the new administration very far. When the Bush Administration proposed a missile defense treaty, it ran into opposition from NATO allies. The way the American leaders saw the United States international position was very different from the way others saw the new Administration. Thus the gap between the Bush Administration's perception of itself and others perception of it was growing. This unilateralism increasingly led to Isolation of the Bush Administration.

The bloodshed of September 11 however, led the Bush Administration to reassess its policies especially in the Middle East and its *"hands off" policy*⁸⁹(especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). The United States' view of the world, and the notion, which it had based its foreign policy upon during the 1990s, changed. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon awakened the Bush Administration to the fact that the United States cannot fight terrorism alone and needs the support and cooperation from the rest of the world. The attacks made terrorism the number one security threat, and the war against terrorism became the priority of the United States foreign policy and also brought home the issue that American primacy does not mean American invulnerability.

Amongst the initial responses by the United States to the attacks was a declaration by President George W. Bush of a policy of zero tolerance toward governments that continue to harbor terrorists or terrorist organizations, and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. Attention was focused primarily on Afghanistan where Bin Laden's operatives maintained an open presence under the protection of the ruling Taliban. The United States was met with an unprecedented degree of cooperation especially with the coalition campaign against Terrorism and in investigating

⁸⁹ Jones, Curtis F. "The American Burden of Hegemony in the Middle East".

Al Qaeda. Leaders from across the continent declared their determination to stand "*shoulder to shoulder*"⁹⁰ with the United States and to provide, according to Gerhard Schroder (German Chancellor) "*unlimited solidarity*"⁹¹. The United States began as early as September 12 seeking United Nations Resolutions. On September 24, an Executive Order, 13224, threatened sanctions against states or financial institutions that carried out business with 27 groups and individuals tied to Osama Bin Laden. On September 12, 2001 the Security Council Resolution 1368, which grants the United States the right to take military action against the terrorist in Afghanistan passed unanimously. And on September 28, 2001 the United Nations Security Council invoked Resolution 1373, which is binding on all states under international law. It obliges all member states to deny financing, support, and safe havens for terrorist. It called upon all nations to freeze any funds deposited within their borders that are used to finance terrorist activities and to deny financing support and safe havens to terrorists⁹². The Executive Order was later amended to include 39 additional names of persons and organizations known to conduct or financially support terrorists. The Resolution unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks and called on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the "*perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors*"⁹³ of the attacks. It was the first time in the history of NATO's alliance that Article 5 of the Treaty was invoked, "*an armed attack against one or more of them...shall be considered an attack against them all*".⁹⁴ The unanimous invoking of Article 5, 24 hours after the attack was an important statement of solidarity and political commitment. This invocation portrays political legitimacy to the claim by the United States to be acting in self defense and strongly implies that the United States will be able to count on Allied military help.

The result of September 11 was thus a reinvigoration of engagement. This invocation hence, Europe's willingness to back military retaliation, however was not unlimited. Europeans made it clear that they wanted any retaliation to focus as narrowly as possible on the perpetrators of the September 11 atrocities and that they expected to be consulted⁹⁵. President Jacques Chirac

⁹⁰ Gordan, Philip. "*September 11 and American foreign policy*". November 2001

⁹¹ Gordan, Philip. "*September 11 and American foreign policy*". November 2001

⁹² Bush, George W. "*The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*", December 2001

⁹³ Bush, George W. "*The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*", December 2001

⁹⁴ Gordan, Philip. "*September 11 and American foreign policy*". November 2001

⁹⁵ Gordan, Philip. "*September 11 and American foreign policy*". November 2001

stated after his September 18, meeting with President George W. Bush that *"we can naturally envisage military cooperation so long as we are consulted beforehand on the objectives and the modalities of an action whose goal is the elimination of terrorism"*⁹⁶ thus September 11 attacks have created both a great opportunity and a great risk for transatlantic relations because if the United States chooses to strike militarily and assume righteousness of its actions, it will risk losing the support of those in Europe who are have historically take its side.

Later, the United States reaction to the terror attacks was a declaration of *"War on Terrorism"*, followed by the formation of an International Coalition to stop additional terrorist attacks. The United States government met with leaders from over 40 foreign countries to organize a common effort to *"rid the world of terrorism"*⁹⁷. President George W. Bush adamantly and on numerous occasions repeated the statement, *"if you are not with us, you are against us"*⁹⁸ a kind of warning to those countries that would not join in the effort to fight the war on terrorism.

For President George W. Bush however, the War on Terrorism went beyond the war on terrorist but rather a war against the regimes that support and employ terrorism. In an article by Robert Kagan and William Kristol on October 1, 2001 in the Weekly Standard, President George W. Bush states that though America's War on Terrorism starts with Al Qaeda it does not end there because the War will require *"that every terrorist group of global reach be found, stopped and defeated"*⁹⁹. President Bush further states that the enemies of the United States will include *"every government that supports them"*¹⁰⁰. The President thus reiterated the will of the United States to hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorist. *"The allies of terror are the enemies of civilizations...in the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action"*¹⁰¹.

⁹⁶ Gordan, Philip. *"September 11 and American foreign policy"*. November 2001

⁹⁷ Emery, Noemie. *"Present at the Re-creation: The newest world order takes shape"*. September 30, 2002

⁹⁸ Glazov, Jamie. *"The Bush Doctrine"*, October 7, 2002

⁹⁹ *"Bush Sends new National Security to Congress"*. September 20, 2002

¹⁰⁰ *"Bush Sends new National Security to Congress"*. September 20, 2002

¹⁰¹ *"Bush Sends new National Security to Congress"*. September 20, 2002

What is clear is that the primary change in American foreign policy allegedly sought by the terrorist; hence an American withdrawal from its global involvement, particularly in the Middle East, is not likely. Just as Pearl Harbor effectively eliminated the Isolationist movement and created a population determined to fight and win World War II, September 11 attacks have resulted in an impressive show of national resolve to fight for the preservation of American values both at home and abroad.

The foreign policy against International Terrorism of President George W. Bush was to put the world on notice that any nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded as a hostile regime. Once the coalition against terrorism was built, the seizure of terrorist financial assets and disruption of their fundraising pipelines followed. Then the military campaign in Afghanistan, which was named Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October 7, 2001. The United States along with the international anti-terrorism coalition began to destroy Al Qaeda's control and to disrupt its finances. This worldwide coalition was built through a diplomatic initiative, which included 136 countries offering a diverse range of military support. An interim government was formed to establish control of the country. One of the major successes in the War was the financial community's move to starve the terrorist of their financial support. According to a report that outlines the coalition successes in destroying Al Qaeda, 196 countries support the financial portion of the war, while 142 countries acted to freeze the terrorist assets¹⁰². During this period of time the United States relied on countries it rarely dealt with like Pakistan, or former enemies including Russia and former Soviet countries in Central Asia. However, in many cases the United States downplayed human rights violations of certain countries "...all to increase the odds of winning the war"¹⁰³ thereby portraying the Double Standards in its foreign policy dealings.

The War in Afghanistan ended with the United Nations Resolution 1378. America won the War militarily but did not catch their prime suspect, Osama Bin Laden, whose whereabouts to date

¹⁰² Bush, George W. "The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days", December 2001

¹⁰³ Bush, George W. "The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days", December 2001

is unknown. Six months after the attacks, the United States put a network of forward bases "stretching from the Middle East and across Asia"¹⁰⁴ so as to provide platforms which can launch attacks on any group that the United States perceives to be a danger. These bases were and are been built in or near any country that President Bush considers to be a "clear and present danger"¹⁰⁵ The historic fear by the United States of not putting troops on the ground no longer prevailed. Also, and after the War in Afghanistan, the second phase of the "War On Terror" materialized whereby the United States began to train some countries like Indonesia, Philippines, Yemen, etc...to fight against terrorism and gave aid to countries like Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where American bases exist.¹⁰⁶

Domestically speaking and immediately after the attacks President George W. Bush took steps to help protect America against further terrorist attacks by providing \$20 billion for homeland security, strengthening intelligence efforts, creating the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council; implementing tough new airline security measures, creating the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to prevent terrorists from entering the US arresting and indicting known terrorist, increasing the global sharing of law enforcement information. The Department of Justice created a new Most Wanted Terrorist list, the Department of State strengthened its "Rewards for Justice Program" which authorizes the Secretary of State to offer rewards of more than \$5 million for information that prevents acts of international terrorism against the United States. As for International Terrorism, President George W. Bush sent four separate bills to support a more systematic and strengthened effort to combat international terrorism. These included:

1. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking,
2. Aircraft Sabotage Act.
3. Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts
4. Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984,

¹⁰⁴ Woodward, Bob. "Bush at War"

¹⁰⁵ Woodward, Bob. "Bush at War"

¹⁰⁶ Woodward, Bob. "Bush at War"

Immediately after September 11, the question was asked why do they hate us. Referring mainly to the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. According to President Bush Americans are hated because *"...they hate what they see right...a democratically elected government, their leaders are self-appointed, they hate our freedoms..."*¹⁰⁷. President George W. Bush however failed to recognize and acknowledge that in many parts of the world, the United States is disliked because it is not associated with freedom and democracy but rather with suppressive and autocratic regimes. The United States is often seen as the power behind military regimes and brutal dictators because it has backed self appointed leaders providing them with financial and military support as well as security. Such an example was with Iran. The United States Central Intelligence Agency was directly involved in engineering the coup that removed the democratically elected government of Mohammed Musadeq and installed the Shah regime in Iran in 1954, despite the abuse of civil liberties of his people and his extensive use of the state security forces to suppress critics and opposition forces, the Shah continued to receive the "blessing" of the American leaders. As for Saddam Hussein, the United States took an active part in arming him in order to help in bringing down the revolutionary government in Tehran. To ensure the cooperation of the Iraqi military government, the Reagan Administration kept silent when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iranians as well as against the Kurdish opposition in Northern Iraq it was only when Saddam turned his military strength against the oil rich countries that he was declared a renegade. The United States was widely perceived abroad as *"intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist hegemonic and hypocritical....with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic politics"*.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, to answer the question of why the United States is hated would lead to a review of the American foreign policy especially towards the Middle East, (where anti-American sentiment is high) which may then lead to criticizing and blaming the policy for September 11. So the focus shifted to the government response *"America Strikes Back"*¹⁰⁹. The politics of the Cold War, and in particular in the Middle East, and the absence of checks and balances in various government departments and agencies have led to the adoption of a reckless and biased American foreign

¹⁰⁷ Ford, Peter. *"Why do they hate us?"*; September 27, 2001

¹⁰⁸ Samuel Huntington: *"The Lonely Superpower"* foreign Affairs, march-April 1999 page 46

¹⁰⁹ Jones, Curtis F. *"The American Burden of Hegemony in the Middle East"*.

policy. Also, America supports democracy to some degree in the Middle East, but not at the expense of important strategic interests such as oil, regional stability and the Arab-Israeli Peace. Its support for corrupt autocrats is a leading cause of anti-Americanism in the Arab World. Such practices in the United States foreign Policy over a long period of time have fueled a wave of hatred among the world towards America and Americans. This foreign policy, which has supported tyrants and dictators, is informed by the nationalist political culture of the 19th Century Europe. This political realist approach to International politics states that national leaders have one obligation, to advance the national interests of their nations. This is justified by stating that in the absence of international law that can be enforced by a central authority, nations are justified in enforcing their own interests and way of life. Hence a pursuit of self-defined national interest is justifiable¹¹⁰.

President George W. Bush spoke about the "*Western Sanctuary that is under attack*"¹¹¹. If one reviews the American foreign policy dealings and especially in the Middle East where the anti-American sentiment is most high and which was the focus, along with Al Qaeda, of the Administration after September 11, it is evident that America failed to act honorably. Its promiscuous sale of missiles, its appointment of pro United States leaders and its blind support for Israel, whose security is so crucial that it uniformly receives the personal attention of the President; all are related to the attacks of September 11. What is labeled as the "*US-Israeli marriage*"¹¹² is the core of the problem that has tarnished the image of the United States in the Arab and Islamic Worlds. According to Robert Fisk, (independent Middle East Correspondent) America's name is literally stamped onto the missiles fired by Israel to Palestinian buildings in Gaza and the West Bank. Robert Fisk identified one of them as AGM 114-D air to ground rocket made by Boeing and Lockheed Martin in Florida (the state where the hijackers got their license for the September 11 attacks)¹¹³. "*It is incongruent to think that the world's leading exporter of the tools of death and destruction would not someday be visited with an evil in*

¹¹⁰ Mazouri, Eamad. "*The US foreign policy of the Post September 11th Terrorist Attack*". November 1, 2001

¹¹¹ Fisk, Robert. "*Bush is walking into a Trap*". September 16, 2001

¹¹² Jones, Curtis F. "*The American Burden of Hegemony in the Middle East*".

¹¹³ Fisk, Robert. "*Bush is walking into a Trap*". September 16, 2001

previously sold to the Afghanis so that no weapons would remain with them, however not all arms were sold back, this was evident in the recent war against Afghanistan whereby the Taliban fought against the United States with its own weapons)¹¹⁸. The Americans relied on the Saudi's who advised them on working with an Engineer named Bin Laden, who was a well known Muslim in the confrontations against the Soviets, this rich man was well established who *"came from castles to make war and not for playing"*¹¹⁹. This *"American Hero"*¹²⁰ was so disappointed at the US policy in August 1990 after realizing the aid that King Fahd had given to the US to establish bases in Saudi Arabia during especially against Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War.

It is not surprising that the United States who has the world's mightiest army, had its Pentagon bombed and despite been the richest nation its symbol of capitalism no longer stood. *"On the scale of evil, the New York Bombings are sadly not so extraordinary and our governments have been responsible for many that are probably worse"*¹²¹. September was thus an attack on the American foreign policy, an *"example of the strategies of the weak, against the overwhelmingly powerful"*¹²². The people of New York were, according to Professor Thomas Lacquer of Berkley University, *"collateral damage"*¹²³ of American foreign policy.

It is evident thus so far that the terrorist attacks of September 11 immediately transformed the Policy of President George W. Bush in several ways. First, the United States foreign policy now had the focus that had been lacking since the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War because of the unprovoked attack against its civilians and on its soil by an active and aggressive enemy. The Cold War strategy had been based on the principles of containment and deterrence, but what was confronting the United States now was not terrorists associated with a particular territory nor synonymous with a nation state, therefore containment was irrelevant. The terrorist also could not be deterred from further attacks by the threat of massive retaliation because

¹¹⁸ Reuters, 25 May 2002

¹¹⁹ Yost, Casimir A. *"Assessing the Bush Administration's foreign policy"*. May 2003

¹²⁰ Yost, Casimir A. *"Assessing the Bush Administration's foreign policy"*. May 2003

¹²¹ Judt, Tony. *"America and the War"*. November 15, 2001.

¹²² Charlmers Johnson, *"What Goes Around, Comes Around"*.

¹²³ Charlmers Johnson, *"What Goes Around, Comes Around"*.

return¹¹⁴". *"America claims to be the champion and protector of Human Rights, Democracy and Liberties while at the same time forcing on Muslims oppressive and corrupt political regimes"*.¹¹⁵

In addition, in its foreign dealings, the United States is often arrogant, asserting a preemptive right to be where it chooses, to do as it sees fit, with little attention to the consequences of others. The September 11 attacks were suggested to be a payback for American imperialism. The United States also plays a double standard in its foreign policy dealings. It shifts in its treatment with wild swings from engagement to indifference; *"today we are at war with Rogue states (those that allow terrorist to raise cash and buy guns on their soil) tomorrow we are not"*¹¹⁶. It defines terrorists, and rogue states according to its needs. Was Iraq a rogue state when the United States backed it against Iran? Was Al Qaeda a terrorist organization when they joined the United States financed war in Afghanistan?

The Americans created certain characters and utilized them to their interests and in the process, lost control of these "puppets" that eventually turned against the United States. Bin Laden is a prime example as is Saddam Hussein. The Americans created Bin Laden during the Cold War and this is a *"textbook example of dialectical reversal... we devised the world's problems of imperialism, exploitation, globalization, so we shouldn't be surprised at the backlash"*¹¹⁷. The once hero against the Russians became the prime suspect and enemy of the United States. (in 1986 the Central Intelligence Agency gave the Afghani resistance arms to stop the Russian air power and when the war was over, the Americans re-bought the arms it

¹¹⁴ Safi, Louay M. *"Global Justice, Not Global Revenge"* October 8, 2001

¹¹⁵ Safi, Louay M. *"Global Justice, Not Global Revenge"* October 8, 2001

¹¹⁶ Safi, Louay M. *"Global Justice, Not Global Revenge"* October 8, 2001

¹¹⁷ Judt, Tony. *"America and the War"*. November 15, 2001

of the dispersed nature of the organization which made massive retaliation impossible. The nature of the enemy had changed. Historically, the enemy needed great armies to endanger *"the attacks of September 11 required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than the cost of a single tank."*¹²⁴ Accordingly, President George W. Bush stated, *"the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology posed the gravest danger to freedom"*¹²⁵ thus deterrence and containment were no longer feasible against the new kind of enemy that was emerging. *"Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizen to defend...Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies"*¹²⁶. This policy favors the taking on of hostile states before they can strike¹²⁷, a strike first philosophy.

Second, there was an increase in the influence of the ideological hardliners in the Administration, who had warned the President from the beginning that the International arena was not as benign as it had appeared to be, thus the United States was now engaged in a defensive war against the enemy. Traditionally, terrorist movements that affected the United States Security interests were politically motivated. Today they are more religiously motivated. Violent militant Islamic elements, often with the help of the state sponsors, now operate worldwide and have global reach. They have ready access to information and information technologies coupled with the ability to communicate globally via the Internet, fax and other media. Terrorists are nowadays provided with new tools for targeting fundraising such as dissemination (broadcasting) and operational communication.

It is also evident that the events of September 11 also increased the power of the President in the making of foreign policy. During peacetime, when the United States has no clear

¹²⁴ George W. Bush. Military Academy Graduation speech. Washington Post.com June 2, 2002

¹²⁵ "Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress", September 20, 2002

¹²⁶ Allen, Mike. "Preemptive Strikes Part of US Strategic Doctrine"

¹²⁷ Allen, Mike. "Preemptive Strikes Part of US Strategic Doctrine"

enemy, it was very difficult for the President to take aggressive or innovative steps in the making of foreign policy as domestic concerns took precedence over foreign policy concerns also, the ability of the President to ask domestic groups to sacrifice their self interest for the greater good or for a more important goal was limited. However, once the United States was attacked, President George W. Bush was able to do that, as Congress became more cooperative with the Executive Branch gaining power over the Legislative Branch of government and foreign policy moving to the forefront of the agenda of George W. Bush's Administration.

The fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the United States however, became more apparent a year after September 11 when President George W. Bush introduced a new National Security Strategy released, on September 20, 2002. This strategy focuses on forward reaching preemptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist. It does not focus on deterrence, which President George W. Bush argues as meaningless against *"...a shadowy terrorist network"*¹²⁸, Preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. In the new National Security Strategy however, President George W. Bush's Administration is broadening the meaning to encompass preventive war as well, where force can be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not gather or grow over time. This National Security Strategy policy allows the United States to identify and destroy any terrorist threat before it reaches the United States¹²⁹. Furthermore, the strategy document emphasizes the United States position to act alone, *"the United States will not hesitate to act alone if necessary to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorist to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country"*¹³⁰ should the need arise, *"America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal"*¹³¹.

¹²⁸ "Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress", September 20,2002

¹²⁹ Haskins, Todd. "Preemptive Doctrine" September 20, 2002

¹³⁰ "Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress", September 20,2002

¹³¹ "Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress", September 20,2002

The United States would now undertake unilateral, preemptive military action for the War Against Terror *"...will not be won on the defensive...we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action, and this nation will act."*¹³² This aspect of the new United States Security Doctrine was further elaborated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. At a NATO meeting on June 6, 2002 the Secretary asserted that NATO would no longer wait until it had *"absolute proof"*¹³³ before taking action against terrorist groups or hostile, threatening countries that possessed biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. This comment foreshadowed the ensuing national and international debates regarding the bypassing of the international organizations, NATO and the United Nations, in the international arena and depicting the United States intention to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (henceforth found within this Thesis).

The attacks of September 11 changed America and according to President George W. Bush, *"in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment."*¹³⁴ President Bush declared war against terror and has made victory in the war on terrorism and the advance of human freedom the priorities of his Administration. The Bush Doctrine of Preemption represents a major departure in the American foreign policy. Moreover, it should be noted that preemptive or preventive wars could encourage smaller nations to protect themselves from an American attack by acquiring their own weapons of mass destruction. The first case of this doctrine of preemption is with Iraq. The attack against a sovereign state, aimed explicitly at removing its globally recognized government, without specific authorization from the United Nations Security Council and not in response to a prior act of aggression and carried out not by a multilateral organization but by the world's greatest power, acting with the backing of only of a few loyal allies led to an increasing debate about the legal authority under which such an attack would be carried out as this would mark a departure from accepted international practice. French President Jacques Chirac said on July 30 that an attack *"could only be justified if it were decided on by the Security Council"*¹³⁵, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder said there would be no support in Germany

¹³² Haskins, Todd. *"Preemptive Doctrine"* September 20, 2002

¹³³ *"Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress"*, September 20, 2002

¹³⁴ *"Bush sends new national security strategy to Congress"*, September 20, 2002

¹³⁵ *"Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense"* August 20 2002

for a strike "*without approval of the United Nations*¹³⁶". President George W. Bush and his Administration justified the attack stating that such an attack against Iraq would be an act of self-defense. Because the United States faces new threats, self-defense should extend now to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting them off before they are able to launch strikes against the United States. President Bush states three purposes for the United States led attack on Iraq. First the United States needs to protect itself from the "*menace of terrorism*"¹³⁷ hence this war was carried out in self-defense. Second, the United Nations Security Council no longer functioned adequately and so the United States would have to shoulder the responsibility for guaranteeing global security instead. Third, regime change in Iraq, bringing democracy to Iraq and liberating it from the dictator. The United States was unable to build a United Nations supported coalition against President Saddam Hussein because of strong opinion by the world of the misuse of the American power rather than about the dictator Saddam Hussein. However, the United States bypassed the United Nations and attacked Iraq.

It should be noted here that had the United States demonstrated ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda, then the war, which was sanctioned as an act of self-defense, would suffice. But because it could not, the United States sought United Nations resolutions to authorize war. During the Cold War, the United Nations failed to effectively solve political friction. Certain countries could use their vetoes to further their own interests at the expense of the organization. But with the case of Iraq, the United Nations was inclined to continue the weapons inspections it was the United States who opposed.

Nowadays there is a fundamental geographic reorientation of American foreign policy from Europe to the Middle East and South Asia. This reorientation has accelerated dramatically with the United States military buildup in the Middle East region after September 11. Also, President George W. Bush's Administration views wartime coalitions different. The mission defines the coalition and not the reverse. The Administration does not want to be restrained by coalition partners but rather wants to put together, as stated earlier on, a "*coalitions of the willing*" to

¹³⁶ "*Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense*" August 20 2002

¹³⁷ "The Bush Doctrine. What it means". October 4, 2002

accomplish specific goals. In Turkey for example, in 2000, 52 percent of Turks had a favorable view of the United States but by 2002 this had fallen to 30 percent and, before the Iraq War, had dropped to 12 percent or lower. This precipitous decline in Turkish popular support for the United States could have had terrible consequences for the United States goals in Iraq had the United States needed the 4th Infantry Division that was supposed to have entered Northern Iraq through Turkey (but had to be re-routed because of the negative vote in the Turkish parliament).

Chapter 6.

Persistent Changes

There has been a historic pattern in the United States foreign policy dealings. The United States pursued various courses at different times swinging, it seems, like a pendulum from engagement to disengagement almost at generational intervals.

Historically, the United States detached itself politically and militarily from the European powers. Its national style was modeled by its domestic experiences and cultural traditions. The United States was able to detach itself from great power politics not only because of its geographical distance but also because of the nature of democracy. The United States, as I have indicated throughout this thesis, saw itself as the world's first constitutional democracy. Americans professed a strong belief in what they considered to be their destiny; to spread, by example, freedom and social justice and lead humankind away from wicked ways.

A clear-cut distinction was drawn between war and peace in the approach to foreign policy. Peace was characterized by a state of harmony among nations; conflict was considered abnormal and war, a crime. In peacetime, one needed to pay little attention to foreign problems, to do so would divert people from their individual concerns and professional aspirations. Americans turned their attention toward the outside world with reluctance and usually only when provoked, i.e. when a foreign menace became too much to put up with, that it could no longer be ignored. The United States rarely initiated foreign policy, the stimulus that dictated America's response generally came from beyond its borders.

The defense of the United States has always involved more than physical security. The German threat during World War I was not one of an immediate invasion, nor was an invasion the main threat even after the defeat of France early in World War II. However, the United States

intervened on both counts. Why did the United States forsake its isolation for foreign entanglements? It did so to prevent a threat. The possibility that American security would be threatened by any undemocratic state that would attain control of Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa and then convert those resources into military power and someday be able to attack North America was a probable cause for its engagement in both World Wars.

After World War I, the United States slouched into Isolationism swearing never to get involved again. The American thinking was driven by geopolitics. The foreign policy was thus narrow and cautious refusing to be bound by any agreement, which would entail an involvement. Moreover, pacifism existed amongst the American people.

The United States began to play a political role again only when the balance of power in Europe was upset once more by the eruption of World War II in 1939 and the defeat of France in 1940. The rationale for United States intervention, was that the security of a democratic America was inextricably interwoven with the survival of other democracies, especially France and Britain. "America could not survive as a lone democratic island surrounded by totalitarian seas". Hence, democracy in America could not flourish unless democratic values prospered in other societies.

In its practice of Containment the United States foreign policy was expansionists as it engaged itself in the world. It continued to do so until Vietnam, which caused the American administrations to be more cautious and the mood became neo-isolationists. The dominant foreign policy was thus reactive and defined mainly by the Cold War and the need to contain the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States passed through an interval period where it questioned its role in the world, and which course it would follow, engagement or disengagement. As it emerged as the sole superpower after the Cold War the United States power, militarily and economically expanded.

It should be noted that the fear of Soviet expansion into Western Europe was, not a direct aggression but the Soviets could have succeeded through political pressure, economic chaos and active local Communist parties. This can be assimilated to Iraq, which was not a direct aggression against the United States.

The Containment strategy of the Cold War, had given some clarity to America's role. In the 1990s such clarity was not to be found. Reflecting the nation's detachment from foreign affairs and preference for addressing domestic issues, crime, education, and health care. President Clinton converted foreign policy into an extension of his domestic agenda based primarily on promoting the nations economy. Most favored a cautious and limited response to problems overseas that did not directly affect the United States.

Furthermore, the United States acted at times preemptively, and without international support, hence the United Nations Security Council, approval or support. This is evident with Yugoslavia whereby the United States acted through NATO and without the consent of the United Nations in 1999. America in the 21st century was the world's preeminent power with American military forces maintaining an unmatched global presence, and an unprecedented freedom of action in international affairs¹³⁸. Despite this, the United States was less secure in early 1990s. In addition, the American political system served as a model for many other governments and this factor gave the United States an "*unprecedented freedom of action in International Affairs*" ¹³⁹.

An unending sequence of regional crises in the 1990s rekindled old debates about America's role in the world. Some believed these crises should run their course others called for the United States to take the lead in ending regional conflicts, preserving democratic reforms and tackling global problems such as environmental decay. Others insisted that American primacy be

¹³⁸ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. "*American Foreign Policy Since World War II*", page 2

¹³⁹ Lake, David A. "*Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century*".

upheld as a principal foreign policy goal. Another group favored pragmatic policy of selective engagement. It is clearly evident that the United States pursued all these courses at various times after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Several regional crises in the 1990s shattered the new world order that was anticipated after the Cold War e.g. Iraq invading Kuwait and threatening the Persian Gulf's oil. Yugoslavia broke apart as the dominant Serbs unleashed a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Muslims. The United States in the 1990s became widely perceived as intrusive, interventionists, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, with a foreign policy driven overwhelmingly by domestic policies.

Historically world politics was determined by the interplay among states. Nowadays, world politics is shaped by two contending phenomena. One is the predominance of the United States hence primacy which gives the United States the unsurpassed ability to get its way in international affairs. The other is globalization, which enriches the American economy and spreads the American values. Great power and great wealth however do not necessarily produce greater respect of greater security. This is true also because the geographical distances nowadays are minimal and the United States physical security is now endangered with the United States vulnerable to attacks from abroad.

In this day and age, the United States is confronting a new international environment, one without a peer competitor but that, which presents serious threats to American security. The current practice of foreign policy is not new; the United previously carried out diplomatic relations with the foreign policy of preemption, what is new now is that such policies have widened to include a preemptive strike against any nation perceived to be a threat. What is evident is that September 11 changed the battleground, hence, prior to September 11, wars were fought everywhere but the United States. The war now is one with a blurred distinction between combatants and non-combatants. And the battle is no longer based on ideological differences but rather on Terrorism and on combating the spread of diseases, ecological and environmental problems amongst others.

As for the crusade to spread democracy, this has resolutely existed in the United States with the Americans believing that it is their moral duty to spread their values to all countries, to bring democracy to countries that lack such a system. This is evident too with the current Administration's will to not only fight terrorism globally but to attack those countries or states that pose as terrorists threats, namely the undemocratic countries. In addition, its practice of integration is not all that new, as was evident during the Cold War when it expanded to include other countries in its fight against Communism. Now too it is integrating countries in its fight against terrorism. What is evident in change is how the international community has evolved and how it views sovereignty, hence that it does not grant governments a blank check to do whatever it likes within its borders, rather, the principle that sovereignty carries responsibilities is gaining force. What is also new is the changed aspects of international confrontations; those against the United States were categorized alongside the terrorists.

As a self proclaimed, morally and political superior country, the United States could remain that way only by abstaining from involvement in a corrupt world. If the world would not leave it alone, the United States would destroy the source of evil through the application of maximum force and total war. This is true with the present America Administration whom at first followed a unilateral approach in its foreign policy dealings and maintained a hands-off policy. This approach only lasted until September 11 in which the United States, whom the world engaged, would apply preventive measures and act preemptively with maximum force to rid itself, and the international community, of what it identified as terrorist and terrorism. As evident, there might be no physical threat to the United States, but the aim of American foreign policy had never been just the physical security of the United States, rather, it had always sought to defend the security of a democratic America, which required that democratic values flourish internationally.

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