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Arab Spring:
Islamization of Democracy or
Democratization of Islamism

By

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Arab Spring: Islamization of Democracy or Democratization of Islamism

Salma Daabous

Abstract

Events that followed the Arab Spring have demonstrated a contentious and often irreconcilable relationship between the secular and Islamist's conceptualizations of Arab democracy. The type and form of the new regime have only infuriated new divisive politics pitting groups in an unwavering struggle, often reversing democratic prospects. This thesis compares and contrasts the different Islamists' paths followed by Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt in order to reveal aspects of contentions and reconciliations between democracy and Islamism. Whether Post-Arab Spring states will witness the democratization of Islam or Islamization of democracy is what this thesis attempt to reveal.

Keywords: Islam, Islamism, Democracy, Democratization, Islamization, Arab-Spring, Islamists, Sharia Law, Ennahda, Muslim Brotherhood.

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

EIU: Economic Intelligence Unit

EU: European Union

FJP: Freedom and Justice Party

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NU: Nahdatul Ulama

PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)

PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)

PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
(Democratic Party of Struggle)

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)

PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party)

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)

SBY: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

UN: United Nations

US: United States

Chapter One

Introduction

After the revolution against autocracy erupted in Tunis, during December 2010, and witnessed the toppling-down of its president Zine-el-Abidine Bin Ali, the election to the new National Assembly brought to victory the Islamist “Ennahda Islamic party”. In a very similar scenario, the post revolution elections in Egypt resulted with striking victory of the Islamist, “Muslim Brotherhood” represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), in both, the People’s assembly and the Presidency.

Demands for democracy and liberty in autocratic Arab regimes, especially in Tunis, Egypt and Libya, inspired the “Arab Spring” movement. Optimism, however, began to fade away after waves of Islamist electoral victory in Arab spring states triggered doubt regarding the democratic path of these states. International disputes and power struggle stripped many of these revolutions from their original domestic reform intentions. Yet, the rise of Islamists throughout the region has constituted the single most daunting task facing these states’ transition toward democracy. The ambiguous relationship between Islamists and democratic rule is not promising, as historic experiences provided vivid evidences of Islamists capturing power to repress opposition and deny democratic process. The puzzling question that continues to demand explanation is how can Islamist be related to democracy and liberty and to what extent can they apply the norms that were demanded in the Arab Spring demonstrations?

1.1 Introduction to the Thesis

While the previous revolutions of Tunis and Egypt received a support of all the parties and factions of their society, Syria's revolution seemed to suffer a rift among its domestic sectarian groups. Thus, despite their full awareness of the brutal character of the regime, during the first years of the Syrian uprisings, Christians of Syria as well as its Alawites tended to support the regime against the protestors, afraid of being dominated by the Sunni majority rule. The question of sectarian minorities and fear of Islamists' tyrant majority is, thus, a major aspect that needs to be addressed in any transitional views.

The controversy between the application of democracy and Islam was definitely analyzed by many political scientists. Many written documents, books, and papers have treated the issue of democracy's impact on Islam, as well as the impact of Islam on democracy. They either explained the historical success of Islamic countries like Turkey and Indonesia in implementing democracy or analyzed the interpretation of Quran in favoring people's representations, but none was able to speak broadly about the contents of the political programs of Islamist Parties, or the way they can promote themselves in countries thirsty for liberty.

Therefore, the thesis presents in short, the reasons behind the success of Islamists, and the previously analyzed correlation between Islam itself and democracy in the application of al-Quran, and further addresses the ability of Islamist parties to cope with democracy and liberty as well as their ability to set an agenda that represents claimed Islamic values within a democratic rule. It examines democracy-promoting Islamist parties in the Arab world, the main two parties re-emerging after the Arab Spring in Tunis and Egypt. This thesis focuses the analysis on the experience of two

Islamist parties in their rapprochement to democratic rules as case study: Ennahda in Tunis and Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. Based on the cases examined and analyzed, it evaluates the extent to which Islamists can preserve the “Springish” outlook of the Arab Revolution. Ultimately, the aim is to reveal evidences that support or refute the propositions associating contemporary Islamists and democratization.

1.2 Political Islam

When we speak about Islamist parties, there is a certain must to go deep into the religious aspect of these political organizations and to the roots of their beginnings. The emergence of Islamic religion into politics dates back to the first four successors of Prophet Muhammad, the Rashidun Caliphs , followed by the great Islamic dynasties, Umayyad and Abbasid, until the rise of what Peter Mandaville calls, in his book *Global Political Islam*, the Muslim Political Society, including the Ulama, Sufis, Shariah, and the state (Mandeville, 2007).

In order to highlight the meaning of Islamism, Daniel Pipes wrote a study in 1998 in which he distinguished Islam from Islamism (Pipes, 1998, June 30). Pipes explained that Islamism is the complete adherence required from a Muslim to the sacred law of Islam, offering ways to control the state and the society. In the pre-Islamic Arab society, an unorganized rule with no judicial system to set the basics of governance reigned. However, with the rise of Islam with Prophet Muhammad, a new trend of rule began to appear in line with laws set in the Qoran, with a command of a just arbitration. Yet, the application of this rule and the arbitrations through the Qoranic jurisdiction were still a subject of controversy among Islam, as well as observers who analyzed the applicability of the latter.

Islam goes beyond its religious and spiritual meanings. It is a “whole civilization”, as explained by Bernard Lewis in his article, *Islam and Liberal Democracy* (Bernard, 1996). Islam emerged as the ideal and only law that regulates an Islamic society along with the emergence of Jurisprudence Science since the Umayyad period, in 661, through the literal words of God, as written in “Quran”, the “Sunna”, taking the life of Prophet Muhammad as the living model, the “Ijma” meaning consensus of the relied Muslim scholars who possess the ability of setting grounds for righteous legal deliberations, and finally the “Qiyas”, using the analogical deduction whenever Quran and Sunna are ambiguous (Mandeville, 2007, p. 35).

Following the two great dynasties, the Ottoman empire came in 1517 with their Sultans claiming themselves the Caliph, and within time it became known as the “preeminent political authority of the Muslim world” (Mandeville, 2007, p. 42). Later, as a result to the growth of the imperialist powers in Europe, and their ambitious seek after the area with Islamic concentration, revivalist Islamic power grew as the Salafi founded by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab trying to return to the Islam practiced during Prophet Muhammad and which, until today, has a strong influence on the Muslims and Islamists. Another reformist power contrasting Ibn Abul Wahab’s was then founded by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, followed by Islamist activists and intellectuals. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, brought messages of anti-colonialism and refute of Western influence, while Sayyid Abu’l-A’la’ Mawdudi created, in Pakistan, another movement bringing modern Islamism ideas, the Jamaat Islami, always rejecting the colonialist movements and called for the reintegration of “True Islam”.

The correlation of Islamists with Democracy has originated many analyses. Some writers sought to highlight the reasons behind the failure of Islamism to cope with

democracy, like Bernard Lewis believed that the problem lied in the inherited Tribal attitude of Islam, which resulted in creating a difficulty to apply democratic rule. Lewis also added another external reason to the inadequate rule in Muslim countries, the imperialist powers which drove the Islam to end its tyranny with “whatever means possible” (Lewis, 1996), to which also Gurdun Kramer agreed, stating that the political programs of Islam in the post-colonial era was mainly concerned in keeping the Islamic predominance and actions in the society rather than trying to seek “technical procedures” able to constitute a successful rule of an Islamic state. In contrast, Mohammed Elhachimi Hamdi, in his article Islam and Liberal Democracy, went back till before the Western domination in order to explain the Islamic failed governance, believing that “Islam may have been misused and may continue to be misused by corrupt and tyrannical rulers’ intent on legitimizing their policies by giving them what appears to be religious sanction” (E. Hachimi, 1996). As for the contemporary Islamists, the current global interactive world poses new challenges. Like everyone else, Muslims are now opened to other cultures from different backgrounds and they are faced with new traditions crossing their Muslim heritage boundaries. Therefore, their people’s freedom is more accessible than ever before, and the inheritance of Western practices is no longer difficult, which urged many of Islamist parties, either to manipulate the interpretation of Qoran in a total rejection of external habits, or to follow an adaptive strategy, trying to cope with Western and international culture, keeping the Islamic practices as the main reference to Muslim’s behavior.

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1.2.1 Islam and Democracy

Under the title of Islam and Democracy, many Political Scientists and scholars wrote about the correlation and applicability of one with the other. Some of them treated the topic in its wide scope by discussing the potential link between Islam and Democracy in general, like Brian Handwerk in his article, *Can Islam and Democracy Coexist?*, (Handwerk B, 2003) and John Esposito and John Voll (Esposito & O. Voll, 1996) in their paper, *Islam and Democracy*. Other scholars discussed the link by focusing on a certain country where democracy existed along with a majority of Islam. Sharon Otterman studied the Middle east in her article, *Middle East: Islam and Democracy*, (Otterman S., 2003), and others like, Respini B. and Shahrasad H. (Respini & Sahrasad, 2010), Michael Buehler (Buehler, 2009), Dirk Trondle, and Bernard Lewis discussed the factual relation between Islam and democracy in Turkey and Indonesia.

The norms of Islam are defined and read in the Quran. It is only the interpretation that differs from a person or group of people, to others, which had led to the emergence of many sects under the Islam itself, Wahbi, Hanafi, Salafi, etc... Therefore, how Islam understands the Sharia explains how much they are able to accept the adaptation of the latter with democratic norms. Brian Handwerk (Handwerk, 2003) believed that Islam does not reject democracy; "I think that Islam as a set of norms and ideals that emphasizes the equality of people, the accountability of leaders to community, and the

respect of diversity and other faiths, is fully compatible with democracy. I don't see how it could be compatible with a government that would take away those values". He added that through history, the "self-governance" had some roots in Islam. Sharon Otterman (Otterman, 2003) affirmed the theory that Islam and democracy can coexist by explaining the factors that can make the latter a model for democracy. Otterman explained these factors by referring to the Quran that contains religious ideals supporting people's representation and defined these factors by mainly two: factors existing in Islam as the Shura, and the consultative decision making and the principal of Ijmaa, the consensus. The problem according to Otterman is the legal aspects of the mentioned terms, and to what extent they represent a binding effect on Islamists. She also added another factor related to the Muslim's acceptance of others and minorities, the constitution of Medina, quoting Muqtedar Khan, the director of international studies at Adrian College in Michigan, "The document sets down the rules of the community of Medina, as agreed to by Muslims and Jews of the city and grants equal rights to Jews and Muslims who follow its laws".

The link between Islam and democracy seems to enjoy a wide range of scholars supporting it, as John L. Esposito and John O. Voll (Esposito & O. Voll, 1996) who also found no reason for Islam to be non-democratic. They believed that if the norms of democracy are liberal governance, free elections, alternation of power, respect for freedoms and human rights, then any practicing Muslim will accept the mentioned norms within his religious obligations, and where any Muslim leading any kind of political affairs, should follow consultation, as mentioned in the Quran, an explanation that was contradicted by Huntington in his book, *Clash of Civilization*

The position against Islam was seen in the debates about banning Sharia Law in in different states, criticizing Islam, defining it as the religion that could not accept the

other and unable to reach equality among its own people, calling it male-dominated ideology. This claim came to meet Huntington's analysis in *Clash of Civilization*, (Huntington, 1996) where in his analysis of Islam civilization, rejected the ability of Islam's culture to receive liberal ideals, individualism and democracy.

In addition, a more moderate attempt was set to explain the inability of application of democracy in a Muslim majority world. Otterman had a detailed study of the matter, and she related the reason to external factors, outside the scope of Islam (Otterman, 2003). According to the writer, the problem lies in the regional situation of the countries where Islam is powerful, like political manipulation of the Arab Israel conflict, and where democracy became associated to the west and against the aspiration of the Muslims. Others reasons were related to the community of these nations which has a long standing policy of Anti-US policy, and not to forget, the support of the west to the autocratic regimes in these countries. As for the religious ideals of Islam that stand against democracy, Otterman explained the power granted by Islam to women and the resulting imbalance of weight between them and men.

Writings about Islam and democracy are abundant. Analysis of the possibility of correlation also exists. Some writers like Brian Handwerk, (Handwerk Brian, 2003) considered Turkey as a model, adding to them Indonesia, as one of the nation struggling to apply democracy after an authoritarian regime. Sharon Otterman considered other nations like Mali, Malaysia, Nigeria, ruling with a non-fully functional democracy.

The democratic countries with Muslim majority have also been analyzed in order to elaborate the reasons behind the success of democracy in the latter. Some analysis explained the reason through the election law, and the fragmentation of Islamic

authority in civil society. Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad, (Respini & Sahrasad, 2010) in “Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: a Perspective” considered Indonesia as a worthy example of a democracy produced by Islam. The reason behind the success was through the reform led after the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998. The reform was mainly concerning the institutions as well as the fragmentation of Islamist party, where the latter can only become legal “if it is registered with the justice ministry, includes women in at least 30% of central leadership posts, establishes nationwide leadership rosters, and has chapters in at least 60% of the country’s provinces, at least 50% of the regencies in the aforementioned provinces, and at least 25% of the sub-regencies in the aforementioned regencies, according to the Indonesian Law on Political Parties No. 2/2008”.

Turkey on the other hand was analyzed by Bernard Lewis (Lewis, 1994) paper. While Lewis believed that Turkey is the only democracy among countries with Islam predominance, he explained the reasons starting from the historical Ottoman Empire and its impact on the society, until the shift in the policy of Turks in dealing with the West. This application of democracy in conformation with Western norms was founded in the society within a cultural and economic change. Still, the respect of Islamic norms was always applied, but interpreted in what it serves the democracy in the country, “the ruler does not derive his authority from descent, and even God is the ultimate but not the immediate source of authority”. Another writer, Dirk Tröndle (Tröndle, 2007) treated Turkey’s democracy in his paper, *The Islamization of Politics versus the Politicization of Islam*. Tröndle related the reason of survival of democracy in Turkey to the separation of religious and secular matter, analyzing the whole historical process behind this ability to separate.

1.3 Thesis Question

These writings and analysis treating the liaison between Islam and democracy showed that there is a strong possibility of co-existence. Through a proper interpretation of Islamic norms, a suitable control of Islamic party growth, and a wise association of Islam to rule within a right separation of Islam and secularism, democracy can be applied and Islamic countries can enjoy a large extent of freedom and self-representation.

As for the Islamist Parties in Arab countries, recent analysis treating the correlation between the Post Arab Spring Islamist Parties and the democracy has been led concerning the new constitutional programs and amendment that were happening after the emergence of new governments following Arab Spring. Charles Kurzman in his article, *Votes versus Rights*, compares the amendment and the provisions favoring Islamic factions over non-Muslims with other provisions around democratic countries (Kurzman, 2012). In this scope, he explains that despite the non-democratic character of the new provisional constitution in Tunisia, banning non-Muslim from serving as president, the restriction has been adopted democratically; “Egyptians make laws for Egyptians, Tunisians make laws for Tunisians, and outsiders have no vote” (Kurzman, 2012). Other relevant studies spoke about the same topic, treating not only the relation between Islam and democracy, but also the relation between the so-called democratic practices of the Muslim factions and the democracy around the world. Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Navqi pose the question of whether Islamic party would support democracy “even if it means sacrificing some civil rights? Or do you support rights, even if it means stifling democracy?” (Kurzman & Navqi, 2010)

Still, among the mentioned articles and analysis, there was no detailed study of the survival of democracy within a rule of Islamist party in Arab countries. The Study that is treated in this thesis concerns the Islamist parties and their ability to cope with democratic requirements, as well and to adapt their constitutions with the demands of those who made the Arab Spring. Despite the abundance of works, papers, and researches done in the Islamic field and its correlation with democracy, a study of the new Islamist parties programs is not well elaborated, especially in finding the applicability of democracy within their Islamic context. This study does not decide definitively the relation between Islamist parties in the Arab World, especially Tunis and Egypt, but it instead, highlights the Islamists' attitude and practices with regard to democracy in the MENA countries.

1.4 Methodology

In order to answer the question whether Islamist can respond to democratic demands and tailor their political performance in line with democracy, maintaining their Islamic ideology, this thesis addresses the questions on two different approaches. First, practices and manifestos of Ennahda and FJP are analyzed and measured against a set of democratic values, Index of Democracy. The second approach draws a comparison between Egypt and Ennahda's ruling Islamists and successful Islamist in other country.

The study focuses on the Islamist parties and Islamism more than Islam as a faith and principle, analyzing the winning Islamist parties in Tunis and Egypt. It first, throughout the second chapter, explains the historical formation of Ennahda party in Tunis as well as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, highlighting the development of political role and explaining the main assumed reasons behind their victories after

“Arab Spring” and relative failures. It also addresses the constitutional text and principals of both parties in order to set a reference for their practices and the compatibility of their manifestos and declarations with their fundamentals. Chapter three follows a triangulation methodological approach in order to analyze the relationship between winning Islamists and democratization. This includes conducting a content analysis of electoral programs, speeches, and parties’ practices in Egypt and Tunisia. The purpose is to reveal aspects of Islamists’ harmony and contentions with liberal democratic tradition and principles, focusing on a thorough explanation of the choice of democratic indexes. Chapter four addresses another comparative approach. Indonesia, considered a model of successful democracy is set as a scale to which the experience of Islamist in Egypt and Tunis are assessed, and through which, it can be predicted to what extent the practices of FJP and Ennahda intersect with the Islamist in Indonesia highlight the possibility of maintaining a strong political role and capability of governing.

1.4.1 Democratic Norms

This comparison is based on two pillars. First, it identifies a set of democratic indexes, as a non-variant factor, based on which, FJP and Ennahda practices and manifestos will be assessed. Democracy constitutes the most discussed theme of all time, stemming from Greek origins meaning “the rule by the people”. Through its linkage with rulers, governance, freedom, and liberty many criteria were set to determine it, and each of them is, alone, subject to controversy. Michael Clarke published a study in which he described democracy as a contested concept (Clarke, 2008). Clarke argued that democracy, throughout the history has witnessed an increase in constitutionalization process, due to which democratic norms became fundamental, but remained subject to contrasting interpretations. While international organizations

like the United Nations and European Union set democratic standards to be acknowledged around the world, many other scholars oppose this generalization of definition, and believe that democracy is variable and its definition depends on the society in which it is studied, quoting Hyland, “there is a deeply problematic paradox of the unquestionable value and unique legitimacy of democracy. Everyone supports to be in favor of democracy, but there is little agreement over what democracy is” (Hyland, 1995: 36). In the same context, David Chandler related democratic norms to social constructivism, arguing that democratic criteria do not only depend on societies and civilizations, but its promotion also depends on the period where the latter is being discussed. Accordingly, he defined three chronological stages, the early 1990’s where democracy’s promotion is linked to cold war victory or liberal ideals, the mid 1990’s where democratic norms are seen as “elite self-interests” product, and the after 2000 stage where democratic promotion requires an external involvement in shifting societies (Chandler, 2011).

Despite the controversial status of democratic norms, it was important in this thesis to set a static and non-variable reference of Democratic Index. Through searching for the internationally acknowledged democratic norms, there was accordance to a great extent, between Freedom House, United Nations and Economic Intelligence Unit on democratic norms. The only contrast that could be recognized in the methodologies used by these organizations to measure democracy; House of Freedom uses a dichotomous concept, that a state might either be democratic or not, depending on four main criteria, competitive and multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage, regularly contested elections, and public access to media, whereas EIU democracy index is based on five categories, electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.

1.4.2 Comparison to the Indonesian Islamists

This comparison is aimed at highlighting two main characteristics of the Islamists' governance. First, based on the practices of FJP and Ennahda compared with that of the Islamist in Indonesia, the study will identify the possibility of the survival and success of the Arab Islamists. Second, it identifies, based on the differences between the parties in question, i.e. FJP and Ennahda with Indonesia's Islamist, the reason behind the potential failure of these parties and the way to overcome it. Indonesia presents itself as a scale country to Egypt and Indonesia based on various similarities among the countries, the status of the Islamists during the autocratic regimes, the principles of the Islamists in each of the countries, and the nature of society, Muslim predominance. The fourth chapter elaborates the resemblance of the three countries on the level of the society's struggle for democracy, rule under Islamists, and the reaction of the society to the latter. It highlights the path of Islamist parties in Indonesia from 1998, with the fall of Suharto, until today, depicting their influence in the country's politics and explaining the reasons behind it.

The result of this study brings to light, in an assumptive approach, the future of FJP and Ennahda in Egypt and Tunisia, and draws a broader image of the ability of Islamists to contribute to democratic rule.

Chapter Two

Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda, History that would Shape a Future

Before any attempt of studying the ruling Islamist parties in Tunis and Egypt, Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood (MB), there is definitely a need to go back in history explaining their formation, their fundamental beliefs and practices which have allowed them, not only to perpetuate the political life of their countries, but also to win the elections following strict demands toward democracy and liberty. This chapter examines the history of both parties, since their foundation and until date, in order to reach a clear visualization of possible credibility in their claim for democracy while reaching the rule, following the Arab Spring. The history is followed by a thorough reading of articles and analysis written after the emergence of Islamist parties in both countries, Tunis and Egypt, enabling a better understanding of their set goals, and highlighting contradictions between their fundamental credos and pre-elections manifestos. This chapter constitutes the base of the study followed in the next chapter, especially while trying to correlate the statements and behavior of the ruling parties to the application of a democratic rule.

2.1 Muslim Brotherhood

Egypt's political life is very active. Although it had been for many years under oppressive rules, its geopolitical situation transformed its people into political actors, struggling to re-define the ruling heritage of their country. Egypt is not only an Arab country, it was the one that witnessed the emergence of Arab nationalism with Nasser,

while it neighbored the everlasting Palestinian-Israeli conflict, playing many roles in the matter, mainly through 1967 war and Camp David Accord with Israel.

Out of over forty active parties and movements, including secular, leftist, socialist, and religious parties, the main concern revolves around the Muslim Brotherhood which constitutes the energizer of Egypt's new political life after Arab Spring through its re-emergence under FJP. MB had played a key role in Egypt's politics, either through acting directly in political life, when running for elections for People's Assembly, or by affecting political changes in the country through their participation or accused participation in assassinations that had shaped Egypt's history.

2.1.1 History of Muslim Brotherhood

Founded in 1928 by the Egyptian Activist and School Teacher Hassan el Banna, Muslim Brotherhood became the largest Sunni Entity and "Influential Organization" in the world, creating interconnecting branches, by mean of Social Media or representatives.

This Islamist socio-political organization was no longer restricted in its activity to its birth country, it rather had become widespread in all continents, varying in its practices from a country to another, holding all together the same credo.

Muslim Brotherhood, since its birth and until date, was always active and had always been a key factor for rulers' decisions in Egypt, taking different behaviors in shaping its work. During 1930's MB kept an undercover attitude exercising its activity through infiltrating the Egyptian society. In 1944, this Islamist organization grew to reach more than two million followers, and played its first role in the Palestinian struggle, during 1948, along with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Muslim Brotherhood maintained an organized character practicing politics in Egypt, despite many security incidents including assassinations and attempts of assassination, accusing or involving

the latter. Still, whether in public, or undercover, this Islamist organization was par excellence adding to Egypt its political complexity, until the latest developments of Arab Spring, emerging itself as the leader, and representing itself not only in the People's Assembly, but also in the presidency, through launching a civic political party, the Freedom and Justice Party.

An interesting turning of event for MB is read in their history, the assassination of Egypt's Prime Minister on December 28, 1948 by the latter's member. This incident led to an apparent retaliation by which Al-Banna himself was assassinated. Furthermore, after the takeover of the presidency by Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1952, MB witnessed a split between two ideological orientations. Hassan al-Hudaibi tended to work with Gamal Abdel Nasser in his seizure for a secular government, while Sayyid Qutb had a radical ideology advocating armed revolution against corrupt, including non-believers (non-Islam) in Western Nations. This attitude and the attempted assassination of Abdel Nasser in 1954 led to the abolishment of MB, when accused of perpetrators of Egypt's security apparatus. More than thousands of MB members were imprisoned and punished, including Sayyid Qutb.

Sayyid Qutb, MB's most influential thinker after Banna was later executed following, again, an accusation of an attempted overthrow of Abdel Nasser regime, while his thoughts remained fundamental to MB.

Following the loss of Sayyid Qutb, the re-emergence of Muslim Brotherhood came only after Sadat in 1970. This political role was granted to them by the President, only in order to fight the popularity of communist and socialist opposition parties. Still, despite the fact that Sadat was promoting a controlled public activity of MB in Egypt, being a signatory of Egypt-Israel peace treaty following Camp David Accord in September 1978 triggered the national feelings of Egyptian people, including MB,

standing always on the side of Palestinians. Sadat was assassinated in October 1981, and MB was the main suspect behind the plans to assassinate Egypt's president. Following this act that exposed again a militant character, Muslim Brotherhood decided to start investing their power into political involvement. As a result, MB grew into one of the largest opposition group, where again, Mubarak exercised a strong grip over their participation, limiting the implementation of MB's agenda in Egypt, through targeting the latter's finance and imprisoning active members. In 2000, MB was able to win fifteen seats in the Egyptian Parliament, and then during 2005, they participated in the pro-democracy demonstrations led by "Kifaya Movement", in a first attempt against the corruptive autocratic regime. A while later, MB reached a strong victory scoring 88 parliamentary seats in the People's Assembly despite the campaign used against the latter, using the western concern against any growing Islamic power, relating it to Al-Qaeda. This anti-terrorism strategy urged MB candidates to rally independently, under the slogan "Islam is the Solution". Following this huge success, 1,000 MB activists were detained in prisons leading to a growing tension between MB members and Mubarak government, suffering pressure and limitation, until January 2011, with the eruption of massive uprisings.

De Kerckhove explained, in his policy update paper, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring, that MB did not directly join the demonstrations, and tried hard not to be misinterpreted in leading an Islamic Revolution, until later when its members played a direct role; "yet, MB members had a major role in fighting off Mubarak's goons on Tahrir Square on February 2, when the Brothers took to the front lines and suffered the majority of injuries". (deKerckhove, 2012). As a result, not long time after the topple down of Mubarak's regime, Muslim Brotherhood emerged under the Freedom and Justice Party, as the strongest organized political group in

Egypt, not only winning in the People's Assembly elections, but also representing itself through presidency.

2.1.2 Principles of Muslim Brotherhood

Hassan el-Banna, founded Muslim Brotherhood on the main proclamation that "Islam should be given hegemony over all matters of life as mentioned in the latter's website, under a militant credo: "God is our objective, the Koran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle (Jihad) is our way, and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations".

A rule that is based on Quran and a state proclamation, founded on an Islam religious view, is what Muslim Brotherhood have been aiming for. In an interview with Deputy Chairman of MB Mr. Mohammad Ma'mun al-Hudaibi, Harvard International Review magazine was able to elaborate, to an important extent, the MB members' point of view on how to apply Islam in their state. In his interview, al-Hudaibi explained MB's two key pillars, the introduction of Shariah as the basis that controls the state's affairs and society, and the work aiming to accomplish unification among Islamic countries and states, in order to liberate them from the imperialistic influence. According to al-Hudaibi, applying MB's model in Egypt wasn't a hard task based on the fact that the majority of Egypt's population is Islam who would comply with their practices to Islamic values and abide by default to its Shariah. As for the fight against external imperialist influence in Egypt, al-Hudaibi considered that MB was able to play an important role through history, starting with the liberation against the British occupation, not only in Egypt but also around the Arab world and Islamic countries. Despite this aspiration of having Shariah rule in Islamic countries, this would not affect the accountability of rulers, explained al-Hudaibi, where he saw a strong incorporation

of democratic values in this rule like justice, fairness, social and economic equality and protection of human rights, as expressed in MB's fifteen principles. The first two principles highlight the value of representation and accountability, stating that the power is inaccessible unless by the consent of the people, always maintaining respect toward the power exchange through "free election". As for the rights of minority and freedom of opinion, they were all explained through the five principles that followed, allowing the establishment of parties, the right for demonstrations and confirming "the freedom of opinion and the right to publicize it", always respecting the "freedom of personal conviction". In addition, the separation of power and judicial institution were widely detailed in both, the twelfth and thirteenth principle, while the ninth until the eleventh spoke about the equality of citizens and the right of everyone to "become a member of parliament through elections". Concerning the protection of the country's internal and external security, principle fourteen and fifteen explained the independence of army from political influence "and that it should not be used, neither directly nor indirectly, by the governing authority in enforcing its wishes and control, or in prohibiting the people's rights", as it should be also applicable on the police and security services.

2.1.3 Freedom and Justice Party, Post Arab Spring MB

Despite the fact that the participation of MB at the beginning of the protests against Hosni Mubarak was shy, Egypt's election came to validate their existence by receiving the majority of votes in both, People's Assembly and Presidency.

During the election, MB represented itself through a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, winning in all the three rounds of Parliamentary elections, and taking the majority of the seats. The Democratic Alliance, which FJP was a part of, won 225 seats including 216 seats only for FJP. Other alliances including Islamist Alliance, with

three Islamist groups, the Egyptian Bloc with three parties, and twelve other parties and independents only received 55% of the Egyptian votes. Consequently, on December 2012, New York Times magazine published an article stating in which the victory of MB by calling the latter, Egypt's "anti-colonialist movement".

Many scholars and political analysts tried hard to seek after the reasons that granted FJP this huge victory. Some believed the reason was the oppression exercised by Mubarak over the latter, especially using the boogeyman label that was given by the American, during their fight against Terrorism and al-Qaeda. Some others believed that MB was very much organized that it was able to penetrate Egypt's society in each neighborhood and by then, mobilize a great majority of Egyptian's on their side. As for de Kerckhove, he elaborated four reasons behind the rise of MB power, considering that the main reason lies in the inadequate military pressure used during Mubarak to counter the rise of Islamists in his country. Military, he wrote, had an inability in restoring security, and later, had an "overbearing control over an ineffective transitional civilian government". Another long term reason was based on a legal aspect and constitutional amendments, putting to a referendum the Supreme Command of Armed Forces, and giving the MB the opportunity to call a "yes" vote for Religious Duty. De Kreckhove also added that MB itself was able, through its Freedom and Justice party, to promote its righteous behavior, by promising the Egyptian of not running for presidency, highlighting its "power sharing" slogan.

On the contrary, FJP did not comply with its alleged promises. It did not only run for the presidency, but it also won the seat with a strong grip, that was later criticized by the Egyptian, comparing it to the previous autocracy with a non-secular agenda. As a result, FJP candidate Morsi became the president of Egypt, and his presidency came along with a price. The ruling attitude of FJP's winning candidate lead to violent

situation, during which some of protestors held a banner saying: “Mubarak, come back, we were joking”.

Despite the fact that Morsi was the president of Egypt after “Arab Spring”, he was not FJP’s first choice. It was Khairat el-Shater, a non-member of FJP, whose candidacy would have not affected the party’s pledge of running for presidency. Yet, el-Shater wasn’t able to run for presidency due to his legal status after being jailed during Mubarak from 2007 until 2011. This disqualification of el-Shater was cleverly used by FJP who chose Morsi, the Chairman of the Party, to continue the presidency battle. Still, the repetitive promises of FJP to apply democracy, never made secularists more assured, nor made them feel less threatened. FJP’s manifestos at the beginning of the presidency have been repeatedly contradicted in the streets of Egypt through indirect statements released by MB followers and supporters, declaring the victory of Islam and the “dream of Islamic Caliphate that was coming true”. These behaviors led the fear escalating on an international level, especially when the president himself was tackled through videos with offending comments about Jews and Christians upsetting Western sentiments. Following this incident, Morsi did not reject the videos, but tried to defend himself, saying that his speech was mainly against Israeli policies toward Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Morsi also played at a later stage the biggest role that transformed Egypt’s seculars and oppositions’ fear from nightmare into reality. It was on the 22nd of November 2012, when Morsi issued a constitutional amendment that would have place him above judicial oversight. His decree provoked Egyptians who went again to the streets, resulting in six dead people among protestors. Autocracy was again put in highlight; opponents of Morsi claimed that they had been captured and tortured by Islamists supporters on 5 December, 2012. The situation also got worsened when

Morsi's constitutional amendment was ratified with 64 percent of the votes, triggering the sentiments of opposition who vowed to use peaceful means to reject the latter.

On the 25th of January 2013, the Egyptian crisis took a different shape. After celebrating the second anniversary of January uprising that had led to their Arab Spring, Morsi and MB's opponents claimed that the latter have used the presidential power and betrayed their revolution through passing the constitutional amendment. The protests were escalated, especially after sentencing 21 local people to death following their role in the previous February's incident that led to a loss of seventy persons, caused by a fight that had erupted over a football match between al-Ahly and al-Masry. Connected or not, the protests increased all over the country urging Morsi to announce a "State Emergency" along Suez Canal area, placing MB in a very critical situation, under the accusation of betrayal. Consequently, the short lived presidency of Morsi ended up through renewal mass protests in the streets demanding the end of his tenure which met the support of the Army. The military through its head General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi provisionally suspended the country's constitution and declared the end of Morsi's presidency. Since that date, MB's supporters remained in a struggle against the new government under elected President Al-Sisi, facing by mass, different allegations and political trials.

Their principles claimed democracy, but their historical attitude opposed it in many events, which caused a difficulty in correlating their popularity to the rights claimed during Arab Spring uprisings. As a result of the toppling of Morsi, MB has become banned in Egypt, suffering a continuous oppression and clashes with the government's apparatus.

2.2 Ennahda

Within a similar scenario of that of Egypt, Tunis was the first country to set the departure line of an Arab Spring. This country also possesses a complicated political life, and an ongoing dilemma among different political actor, of which, “Ennahda Party” which has re-emerged after the topple down of Bin Ali, winning the election of Constituent Assembly with a striking majority, ninety seats out of 217. Like FJP, questions about what Ennahda is, and why it was able to overwhelm the Tunisian elections became a topic of analysis for many political scholars, trying to solve this Islamic alienation of the Arab Spring’s people.

2.2.1 Overview of Ennahda

Ennahda is the most recent name that was adopted only after 1989 to an Islamic Movement in Tunis, known as Islamic Action which later took a party shape under “Movement of the Islamic Tendency”.

This party was inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, had suffered the same oppression of its country ruler, and with a small difference of turn of events, the fate of Ennahda could be said the same of that of MB after Tunisian’s Arab Spring. Although it has its roots founded on Sayid Qutb’s ideology, Ennahda was also able to emerge itself under a more moderate Islam advocating democracy and recognizing not only pluralism in Tunis society, but also adopting more tolerance with the West.

Like MB’s Sayid Qutb, Ennahda could be also characterized in a man, an intellectual who founded the latter in 1981, Rachid Ghannouchi, and who like many others, suffered from the oppressive attitude of Tunis’ regime under Bin Ali. This oppression was always using the same and most prominent slogan, “war against Terror”, while Ennahda – Islamic Tendency at that time – was the most threatening opposition force

in Tunis. This strong influence of Ennahda in Tunis pushed its ruler, Bin Ali, to take radical actions, through which, he jailed more than 25,000 activists and banned the party from participating in the elections in 1989. At the same time, Ennahda founder, Ghannouchi was exiled, and never turned back to Tunis, until the Tunisian revolution that led to the ousting of its president.

After Arab Spring, and with the return of Ghannouchi on 11 January, 2011, Ennahda tried hard to promote itself as a moderate Islam, distancing itself from Salafis and extremists in Tunis. In order to reinforce their commitment in accommodating themselves with New Tunis after Bin Ali, Ennahda signed with the other opposition groups in the country a “shared statement of principles”. Their victory in Constituent Assembly also drove many analysts to rely on the single cause behind their victory; it was due a compassionate feeling of the society toward a party who had suffered a lot during the autocratic rule. Noah Feldman correlated the Win of Tunisian Ennahda to democracy who despite the fact that he compared the victory of Islamist to “puzzling disappointment for the forces of democracy”, he proved that this victory was predicted to a great extent. The reason was not only due to the inability of organizing the opposition before the election, the way Islamist and Ennahda were organized, nor the relatively short time between the beginning of democratic process and elections, Feldman analyzed a deeper reason, the one of disparity between vanguard and revolutionary masses, where he explained that “many Tunisians see Islam as a defining feature of their personal and political identities” (Feldman 2011).

Despite the controversial existence of Ennahda victory along with continuous criticism of secularists in Tunis, Ghanouchi, in many occasions tried to assure to his society that his party would never follow Saudi Arabia model of Islam, nor that of Taliban, but,

they would rather try to adapt a more successful Islamic models, as the one in Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia, a model that could highlight a modern character of Islam.

2.2.2 Ennahda and Elections

Elections in Tunis for Constituent Assembly was held on 24 October, 2011, after the Arab Spring uprising. Like Ennahda, many other parties were rallying for elections including secularists, and Islamists. All these political groups were also participating in the oppositions against Bin Ali, and were definitely an engine for the latest demonstrations. Besides Ennahda, there was the Free Patriotic Union launched after the Tunisian uprisings by a 39-year old businessman, the Tunisian Workers Communist Party, a party that was founded since 1986, well organized and popular among student's populations, in addition to Democratic Modernist Coalition, legalized only after 1993, after ending its support to communisms, and many others, reaching an approximate number of eighty.

After re-gaining its legal status and becoming able to compete in Tunis' Constituents Assembly elections, Ennahda worked hard on promoting itself to the Tunisian as a potent alternative to Bin Ali's regime following Arab Spring uprisings. In a prior attempt to distinguish itself from Radical Islam, its party's officials referred to the latter by Islamic and not Islamist. Still, despite all, some of the followers and members refer to themselves as Islamists and call their party, "God's Party" (Lewis, 2011).

Also, in an attempt to show openness to the west, members and high officials of Ennahda met with American figures, like when General Secretary Hamadi Jebali met with US Senators McCain and Joe Lieberman, adding to which statements stressing their commitment in fighting theocracy and applying democratic rule based on people's liberty. Therefore, with a long term organization and hard work in a relatively

short pre-election period, the results of the elections held on 24 October 2011 were fruitful for Ennahda, winning 90 seats out of 217, an equivalent to 41 percent of the registered votes on that day.

Other practices were also noticeably encouraging for democracy. Ennahda represented a female candidate who did not wear veil, offering a strong symbol of tolerance. Moreover, Ghannouchi in an interview with BBC, during his stay in his exile in London, highlighted his beliefs in a peaceful coexistence between Islam and modernity. His statement showed that his views were not related to a momentary grasp of the opportunity represented by Arab Spring, but had rather been declared since 1981, "... we have declared that we accept democracy without any restrictions and we accept the decision of the people whether they come with us or against us". (Lewis A., 2011)

The post-election period was as hard as the pre-election on Ennahda party. Again, Ennahda suffered the critics of secularist, but this time, the critics were not only assumptive, but also based on some facts and practices that were viewed by some Tunisians, non-democratic.

2.2.3 After Election

On 21 September, 2012, a critical article was released on "Green Left" web based newspaper, in which Patrick Harrison detailed some failing points of Ennahda, writing that this party was losing the confidence of those who rose against Bin Ali. Harrison in his article mainly spoke about the wrong steps made by Ennahda, like the appointment of Lofti Touatti as the director of Dar Assabah state-newspaper, without consulting with civil society leaders as it was promised. This act urged two hundred journalists to rally against the appointment on the 22nd of August 2012. In addition,

some reported the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 26th of August, 2012, saying that Ennahda had a goal to clean up the media, which, if true, could be against the alleged democracy. Not only statements were criticized, but also the behavior of the government was under scope of activists, where some saw that Ennahda hasn't been doing noticeable difference in implementing its rule than Ben Ali's, and where some others went to criticize its economic attitude, disagreeing with the declared attempts for taking loans from World Bank.

Fears in Tunis against Ennahda seemed to be continuous; despite the promises renewed by Ghannouchi and the party's members, Tunisians, and especially secularist are always doubtful of Ennahda practices, and their tolerance vis a vis Salfis and other Islamists who are always claiming an Islamic state.

2.3 Conclusion

Whether Muslim Brotherhood or Ennahda, two Islamist parties reached their rule after an uprising, ousting two autocratic figures like Mubarak and Bin Ali. These two parties, similar in their origins, brought a similarity to the reaction of the street, especially the seculars, against them. Their credibility is always tested, and their statements are always doubted, making the analysis of their attempts for democratic application harder and harder.

Studying Egypt democracy will remain more difficult, especially with the rapidity of the events that occurred after the constitutional amendments. The third chapter explains more closely the amendments of the constitution, as much as detailing every statement, in order to test a potential credibility of Ennahda and FJP in applying democracy.

Chapter Three

Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda's Approach to Democracy

This chapter constitutes the core of the study. It highlights the actions that have been taken by the ruling parties of Egypt and Tunisia, their manifestos and agendas, in order to compare them with democratic values and behavior acknowledged internationally. Therefore, this comparative study requires a set of democratic indexes, against which FJP and Ennahda practices are measured. The information related to the FJP and Ennahda behaviors and declarations are mainly retrieved and collected from various web based newspapers, researches targeting the two parties, in addition to their websites.

3.1 Democracy

Democracy, as described in the first chapter, is a controversial term by itself. The approach followed in this chapter relies on qualifying a practice or a statement of either FJP or Ennahda and compare it against a set of norms, in order to measure their compliance to the latter. Regardless the constructivist theory and the subjective perception of democracy arguing that democratic norms are constructive and depends on the society in which they are applied, as it was explained by David Chandler in his paper, Promoting democratic norms? Social constructivism and the 'subjective' limits to liberalism, and supported by Michael Clarke, in his paper The Contested Meaning of the International Norm of Democracy. This chapter sets and follows the norms of a democratic rule as described and mentioned in the internationally acknowledged definitions within the International Law, International Convention on Civil and

Political Rights, declarations of regional unions, Human Rights organizations, and by the United Nations General Assembly, who since 1988, have adopted an average of one resolution per year related to democracy and its application, proclaiming the fifteenth of September the International Day of Democracy.

3.2 Democracy Index:

In order to define democracy indexes, there was a need to revisit the democratic values in their legal scope, as defined by international organizations, binding declarations, and ratified agreements. In the United Nations web based page concerning Global Issues, it was highlighted that despite the fact that the UN Charter did not mention the Democracy explicitly, still, the opening words, “We the People”, reflects the fundamental principle of Democracy, the will of the people. Moreover, always within the binding principles of democracy, the International Covenant of Social and Political Rights, in 1966, ratified until date by 167 countries, highlights under its articles 19, 21, 22, and 25, the fundamental principles of the freedom of expression, right of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and right to elect and be elected.

3.2.1 Free Fair and Regular Elections

Under Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it was declared that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. Within this context, it should be also highlighted that democracy is not limited to one electoral or governing system, it rather is related to fair representation of people’s will, regardless the implemented machinery for this purpose. The implementation of the above principle is therefore applied through just electoral systems as well as free, fair and regular elections. This entails equal opportunities for parties and candidates, a balanced access to media, set

ceilings for the campaign expenditures, as well as free and equal access for voters. In addition, the secrecy of ballot, as declared by the Humans Rights Commission in 2002, in its resolution 2000/47, is one of the main pillars of democratic practice within election, in which the free will of people is exercised without any constraints or threats. The importance of election in the democratic process is highlighted by number of international organization besides the United Nations, which are working, individually or collaboratively to implement Democracy, citing of which, African Union, the European Union, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance¹, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Southern African Development Community. (United Nations, [UN])

3.2.2 Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law

This limit is only applicable through implementing a just rule of law, unable to be overruled by any person who is in power. The democracy web defines it as “the rule of law, not men” which restrict the absolute power of the state and suggests no amendments of constitution, under which no ruler can imply wars, or extend ruling terms, unless under the consent of its sovereign people.

3.2.3 Minority Rights

Under the rule of majority, through democratic votes, the minority rights should always be preserved. This requires genuine guaranty of the will of those who are not represented in the government. Those people represent a faction of the society, and their opinion should be respected and preserved by the majority’s representatives. Minority Rights was adopted by the General Assembly, on 18 December 1992, through

¹ See www.UNDP.org

the declaration on The Rights of Persons Belonging to a National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, through which the United Nations was able to set and promote standards to ensure equality and participation of group of people enjoying same ethnic, linguistic, or religious beliefs within a particular society.

3.2.4 Accountability and transparency

This principle of good governance, advocated by the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights, and referred to by the Freedom House as Democratic Governance, claims transparency and accountability of the ruling government, through which, people can act against corruption and assess the legitimate rule which had to represent their demands when elected. This entails that the separation of power, legislative, executive and legal institutions must act independently, without any dominance of one over the other.

3.2.5 Multiparty System

Within the framework of democratic governance, people should possess the will to define themselves in the political realm. They are eligible to have a political and ideological identity and to act collectively with individuals who shares similar and same platforms. The competition among parties in democratic governance can differ from a state to another, depending on the electoral systems implemented in the latter.

3.2.6 Freedom of Expression

There are many speculations related to the freedom of expression. Some analysts defends the right of individuals to possess unconditional freedom for speech and expression, while others believe that this freedom should be controlled, or domesticated in order to maintain a certain order in the state or the country and avoid any threats towards the national security. It certainly is a controversial right of

democracy, but, whether a country wish to exercise any sort of control or protection of their nationals from uncontrolled speeches or expression that would influence the national order, it should be done within limits, in order to avoid any oppression or misappropriation of control. Freedom of expression, as incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stated that each individual should have the liberty of expressing opinion, as well as to seek information. This freedom of expression allows individuals to access to all sort of media, press, and social, without the manipulation of governments who tend to exercise censorships over distribution of information, as well as harassing journalists and bloggers.

3.2.7 Economic Freedom

In the Democracy Web, Economic Freedom was described broadly as one essential factor for democracy to flourish. Under the same subject, it was also highlighted that there are no international covenants that would guarantee this economic freedom as a condition for the establishment of democracy. Many empirical studies concentrated on the correlation between democracy and economic freedom; in his article, Ian Vasquez, the director of the Projects on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute, advocated that economic freedom is the main factor that counterbalances the political power and contributes to a pluralistic society. He also contradicted the claims of Civil Society actors who believe that economic freedom acts against Human Rights and political pluralism. Vasquez explained that the stronger is the economic freedom the wider is the space created for organization and civil society to grow and be independently funded. Although, while observing Singapore and Hong Kong, the high level of economic freedom did not induce any higher level of democracy.

3.2.8 Freedom of Association

Freedom of association is the pioneer that lies behind the establishment of democracy. In order to acquire majority, and to express thoughts and beliefs within organization, or parties, or even small based gathering, the freedom to associate and to struggle for your right, to ask for your freedom when it's withdrawn, and to rise against state's tyranny should be sacred in democratic systems.

3.3 FJP and Ennahda Practices

Before any analysis of both parties, Ennahda and FJP, and before falling into the predictions related to the future of Ennahda based on the failed attempt of Muslim Brotherhood to rule Egypt under FJP, there is a need to re-visit the practices of these two parties and try to conclude their relevance to democracy, to the demands of the Tunisian and Egyptian people during the uprisings of Arab Spring. The study also enables us, in the following chapter, through carrying a comparison with Indonesia's emergence into democracy, to visualize the genuine reasons behind the fall of Morsi, and the ability of Tunisia to survive, until today, the opposition's attempts to topple it.

3.3.1 Freedom and Justice Party

Following the first democratic election after the topple of Mubarak's regime in Egypt, came the Muslim Brotherhood, under their FJP party, with striking results, to achieve a majority representation in the Constitution Assembly, and elect the president, Mohammad Morsi.

This short-lived presidency posed a controversial debate in Egypt, which lasted until today. Currently, Egypt is divided among many factions. There are those who criticize Morsi's tenure in presidency and blame his undemocratic approaches, those who believe that the coup d'état against Morsi is a military conspiracy and cannot do better

than the latter, and those who, despite their opinion rejecting Morsi's tyranny, see that the events that have occurred in Egypt could not be avoided and may be considered as normal course of events.

3.3.1.1 FJP Democratic features

Being a party based on Islam and Sharia, possessing a history filled with contradictions and being oppressed and attacked several times by presidents who sought secular rules in Egypt, the position of FJP and its representatives became doubtful to Egyptians.

Still, Morsi and other counterparts of the FJP tried on different attempts, through televised appearances, newspapers, social media, election program, and lastly the constitution, to assert to all Egyptians that their agenda was genuine and that, despite the fact that they aspire a law based on the Islamic Sharia, the latter would never contradict the democratic values and the freedom the Egyptian appealed for, during the Arab Spring uprising.

On the economic level, FJP did not evoke any declaration related to banning alcohol² and its consumption, which could have contributed, to a certain extent, in the destabilization of the touristic sectors in the country. Despite this questionable tolerance to a non-Muslim practice, the president Morsi, at that moment, became the spotlight related to his guidance towards irresponsible drinking habits. FJP representatives reassured Egyptian investors and promised that the government was seeking participation. Osama Gado, a founding member of FJP, explained that his party is targeting a more regulated market in order to end monopolies, and would not change any of the State's subsidies' aiming at feeding the poor.

²See David Britain: The New Islamists: Pluralism and Minorities?

Analyzing FJP approaches and practices in Egypt, Nathan J. Brown reported that the FJP leaders were always invoking in their speeches “participation, not domination”. This approach was being challenged by the FJP’s Muslim rivals in the Egyptian political arena, where it became difficult for the party to decide whether to compete with the Salafis for the Islamists popular base by highlighting their Islamic tendency or to reassure the secular and the western world.

In order to show their respect for minority, Morsi appointed twelve Christians³ out of ninety members in the Upper House of Parliament, and tended to show FJP’s tolerance for equality by including eight women. Morsi also appointed Mahmoud Mekki, a senior judge known for his fight to implement judicial independence as his vice president. He also, during a speech on the 14th of June, 2012, assured to the Egyptian that he would preserve all national and international agreements, protecting the rights of women and children, as well as Muslims and Christians.

With regards to the freedom of speech, Morsi’s reaction to Muslims’ outrage against the video “Innocence of Muslims” was criticized. Still, this reaction was not strictly controversial to the Muslim Brotherhood. All around the world, freedom of speech became debatable whether attacks against religious figures should be tolerated or not. Morsi, in order to highlight his tolerance, and in a very concrete corrective measure to the violence that had erupted in Egypt, addressed all Egyptians and asked them to protect the western diplomatic representatives in Egypt, while offering his condolences to the American ambassador killed in Libya, in an outrageous reaction to the same movie. Also, in their election program, FJP promised the Egyptians that it would “safeguard for every Egyptian, fundamental rights and freedoms” (Ikhwan web). This

³See Leila Fadel: Morsi Wins and Losses after Egypt passes draft constitution

entailed the freedom to form and join political parties, as well as to be organized in unions and syndicates. It also covered the freedom of belief and the liberty to practice it. The FJP program also included a paragraph detailing the importance of woman in the society, “wives, mothers, and makers of men” encouraging their education, support, and provision of a just social right.

According to many Egyptians, these democratic practices and themes came to be contradicted by the aspiration of FJP to found the Egyptian constitution on Sharia Law. Based on an article retrieved from Ikhwan web, FJP tried to defend their inclination to Sharia law by describing it as the “most important component of the Egyptian personality”. The article highlighted that the Sharia is a determinant of the Egyptians, identity, and even for non-Muslims, it doesn’t not contradict with any democratic aspect, since it is a culture and requires equal citizenship, quoting al Quran 49:13⁴; “made you into nations and tribes, so you may get to know one another”. According to the same source, the Ikhwan web, the defense of Sharia came to define it as an improved law system than the man-made, and that it would safeguard the rights and rites of non-Muslims. Nathan J. Brown, in his paper, *When Victory Becomes an Option*, highlighted the FJP’s tendency to opt a less robust Islam-based language, and explained that the expression stipulating that Sharia’s principles are the main source of legislation could not be self-enforcing, and that its implementation will be strictly linked to the Parliament and the executives, and not to religious scholars.

⁴ See: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30353>

3.3.1.2 Undemocratic aspects of FJP governance

Despite FJP's repetitive attempts, on different occasions, to highlight their tendency to a democratic Egypt, they were not able to alienate themselves completely from their party's foundation, the Islamic Sharia. It was very obvious that this foundation is not only the basis of FJP's members to join, but it rather is an incorporated belief that cannot be simply abandoned. This belief, and the obvious differences among the FJP's members, weakened the credibility of Morsi, and affirmed many secular's fears.

Yasmine Saleh, a Reuters reporter posted in Cairo, explained that FJP have always been unclear about their policies, reporting Said Nabil Abdel Fattah, a researcher in Al Ahram Center for political and Strategic Studies. A Christian website, On Coptic Nationalism, published an article analyzing the brotherhood's election program. In their article, they highlighted a hidden Islamic agenda that would contradict all claimed democratic approaches. The article started with accusing the FJP of subterfuge and later continued with criticizing the translation of the document into English, explaining that the outcome came delineating from the original Arabic text, concealing their true undemocratic tendencies. As an elaborative example of the contradictions, the women's right as described by FJP in their program opposed strictly the women's duties in society. In a tricky exercise of democracy, as reported by haaretz newspaper, many Muslim parties, amongst which the FJP, tried to introduce female candidates in their electoral lists, only relegating them to low places on the lists. Also on the same electoral program, Brown explained that the aspiration of FJP to build an economical system compliant with Sharia was less clear. Another Coptic attempt to highlight the

undemocratic practices of FJP was through a published article under Coptic literature⁵ where it analyzed the contradiction arising from FJP claiming equality between men and women and later linked its application to the Sharia. The comment came to criticize the article stipulating the insurance of women's access to all their rights consistent with the values of Islamic law and maintaining the balance between their duties and rights, by highlighting that it is "abundantly clear that the Muslim Brotherhood do not see women rights as natural and inalienable. Their rights must be restricted by Sharia and their duties in society; duties which are in themselves dictated by Sharia". The opinions against FJP were not only expressed by the Christian community in Egypt, but rather were expressed by seculars and Muslims who saw that the introduction of Sharia in its legal aspect as a binding law contradicts democracy. In addition to the interpretations of Morsi's hidden agenda and the analytical approach of theoretically delinking democracy to Sharia Law, the Speeches, programs and declarations showed, to a large extent, that FJP was unable to comply with democratic values. Despite the attempts of some FJP members to defend the position by basing it on the assumption of Egyptians opinion by not wanting a minority to rule them went in vain. On an international account, Morsi had made a mistake criticizing the Zionist and making no difference between them and the Jews by calling them bloodsuckers and descendant of apes and pigs during his speech addressing the Palestinian cause. During his presidency and after the liquidation of the video related to this declaration, Morsi tried to explain that this statement was addressed to Zionist and not the Jews, noting that the MB's position on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was becoming more tolerable despite the fact that Hamas perceives MB as the mother movement, as

⁵ See: <http://copticliterature.wordpress.com/2011/12/15/the-position-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-on-women-and-children-analysis-and-critique-of-the-fjps-parilamentary-election-programe-2011/>

described by Brown in a Congressional Testimony by the “emotional attachment” (Brown, 2011).

The list of practices made by the FJP in general and Morsi in particular, able to revive the Egyptian sentiments of oppression and autocracy, kept on rolling. New York Times in a published article on January 29th 2013 discussed the complaints of some Egyptian against Morsi’s attempts to dominate the politics of the country through selecting five ministers from FJP and excluding the cabinet members from major political parties. The practices of FJP came in many times less assertive to the Egyptian as was described, and was concluded by the constitution draft that Morsi attempted to pass, and which later became the epic of the Egyptian political crises, turning the page to a new political period underlining more debatable aspects on whether Egypt could ever gain its democracy, now, under military. State-run media reported that Morsi’s constitution had passed a 64 percent preliminary vote. This poll, regardless how democratic it might have seemed, despite some critics that emerged from legal analysts, was very soon contradicted by the Morsi presidential amendment which granted him a status above the law, a status that would throw all democratic aspiration, from autocratic Mubarak, to an MB autocracy. Mervat Ahmed, an Egyptian activist reported by the Guardian newspaper, described the constitution as a coup on the state institution. The newspaper also reported Samir Morcos, a Christian presidential aid blaming Morsi’s reluctance to pass the charter without consulting his aid, and defined the move as undemocratic. Those constitutional amendments erupted demonstrations against Morsi and the FJP, despite the attempts of the latter to rectify or modify some of the clauses. Morsi appealed for unity and demanded in a televised speech to respect the one-third of the voters who voted against the charter. He went to describe that the differences of opinion vis-à-vis the constitution are a “healthy phenomenon” for

democracy. It all ended up by the end of his tenure, a short lived rule that concluded many hope for Egyptians in particular and others who believed FJP would constitute a model for Islam's democracy.

As the table below shows, FJP presented partial compliance in three democratic indexes, the Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law, Minority Rights, and Multiparty system, while failed to ensure the application of six other democratic indexes; the table sums up the main events occurring during the MB's governance.

Table 1: FJP compliance with Democratic indexes, retrieved from News articles.

Democratic Index	Democratic	Non-Democratic
Free Fair and Regular Elections		New constitution was rushed through parliamentary approval and a referendum
Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law		President announced a state of Emergency in three cities along the Suez Canal: Port Said, Ismailia and Port Suez. He ordered a night-time curfew to stay in place for 30 days. Morsi, issued a new constitutional declaration ruling that all laws, decrees and constitutional declarations issued by the president since he came into office on June 30 are final and unchallengeable by anybody.(Xinhua net)
Minority Rights	Morsi vowed to "protect the rights of women and children," as well as Christians and Muslims alike. (CNN News)	The election law allows a parliamentary candidate to run as an independent, or on a particular party's list, and then join still another party after the election votes are tallied. (Haaretz)
Accountability and transparency	In June 2012, after an election that international monitors called credible, Mr. Morsi was declared the winner of the race. (NY Times)	
Multiparty System	Dr. Mohamed Morsi, Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), stated that: The majority in the upcoming parliament will form the government, which will be a coalition government.(Ikhwanweb)	Morsi calls the Jews "bloodsuckers" and "descendants of apes and pigs." (American Thinker)
Freedom of Expression	Morsi was against the outrage against the Movie Innocence of Muslims	Fierce clashes erupted between Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members and its opponents outside its office in the Nile Delta city of Damanhour. (Xinhua)

Economic Freedom	Morsi did ban alcohol: David Britain: The New Islamists: Pluralism and Minorities?	In Egypt where tourism plays an important role in the country's economy alcohol consumption, bikinis and mixed bathing at beaches are being reassessed. (blogs.lse.ac.uk)
Freedom of Association		Egyptian protesters clash with police after Morsi decree. (Guardian)
Women rights		The new law, which was authorized by the Shura council (this body functions as a parliament), holds that lists of parties vying in the parliamentary elections do not need to have female candidates in their top spots. HAARETZ. The constitutional committee in Egypt included no women. blogs.lse.ac.uk

3.3.2 Ennahda

Being rooted and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda's political path after the Arab Spring took a similar turn to that of the latter. The two Islamist based parties came with a striking victory following the toppling of two autocratic regimes, though, after taking over the rule, it witnessed different destinies. While the FJP is attacked in Egypt, its president is going under trials, and many of its supporters are detained, Ennahda still resists all attempts made by the opposition to withdraw the rule from their grip. The reasons behind the survival of Ennahda can be debatable, some of its members explain that it lies mainly in the practices of Ennahda to demonstrate to the Tunisian their tolerance for democracy, others believe that the MB's fate in Egypt was a lesson learned, and others believe that Ennahda uses a smart tactic, in every time it produces an undemocratic statement or practice, it directly counteracts with a democratic practice aiming at masking its mistakes.

3.3.2.1 Ennahda Democratic Features

Like the FJP in Egypt, Ennahda was subject to the attacks of the seculars in Tunisia who also predicted that Ennahda would not differ from other Islamists and would certainly try to implement an Islamic law in an attempt to create an Islamic nation.

Despite these claims and accusations, Ennahda's practices came more aligning to their manifestos and declarations. This behavior stemmed from the established internal organization of the party, which did not demonstrate many contradictions among its members, especially towards their lien with the Salafists in Tunis; philosopher Jameleddine Ben Abdeljelil said that the party has developed internally enabling itself to work a constructive role in a pluralistic and democratic system. In addition Abdeljelil, reported by the web based journal, Quantara.de, explained that Ennahda's ability to cope with democracy relies on their belief that the political Islam is not static and on their consideration that the higher aims of the Sharia takes into account historic changes. The Salafims in the country poses its heavy burden on Ennahda, with their aspiration to establish the Muslim Nation and introduce Sharia Law in the Tunisian constitution. Unlike MB who fell in this trap, Tunis Ennahda did not want to be caught in the same controversy of defending Sharia. Instead, Ennahda declared on repetitive attempts that it was not willing to introduce Islamic Sharia in the constitution, on which 53 senior officials of the party agreed. Ghannouchi, the co-founder of Ennahda movement states that despite the fact that Tunisian want democracy, they obviously don't aspire a western democracy, claiming that the French model of democracy is the main reason on which critics are based against Ennahda practices.

In its attempt to show its respect for diversity, Ennahda tried to establish a broad-based unity coalition and avoided the FJP mistake by appointing an Ennahda president despite their victory in the Constituent Assembly. Said Ferjani a leader within Ennahda was reported by Fawaz Gerges, a professor at the London School Economics and Political Sciences, saying that "history will judge his generation of Islamists not on its ability to gain power but rather on what it did with that power". As for the respect towards women and its equality in the Tunisian society, Rachid Ghannouchi stated in

an interview held in 2011 that the FJP were prisoners of the regressive dogmas on woman, based on their selective spiritual interpretation of Islam. Also the members of Ennahda always pledged to promote the equal opportunities in the employment and education of women, and their free will to either accept or reject the Islamic dress. Rory Maccarthy, in his article published on “Open Democracy” web page, reported Ennahda’s announcement of enshrining the Personal Status Code related to the protection of women’s rights from polygamy and ensuring their equality as a fundamental law. This practice, as much as it seems democratic, came after long debates on the level of the streets and among the political actors, especially that female members of Ennahda were the first ones to tackle the laws protecting women. Amal Al-Hilali wrote in Al-Arabiya news that Ennahda statements related to women’s laws were conflicting. While Souad Abdul Rahim, a constituent assembly candidate “who topped the list of Ennahda” during the first parliamentary election, attacked the law protecting women who have children outside marriage, Ali el Areed, a member of the same party’s executive office “stressed that there was no reason for worry”.

Another democratic practice could also be perceived, the resignation of Tunis’ Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, Ennahda member, following the assassination of the opposition politician Chokri Belaid. Although, the decision to resign did not enjoy the approval of other Ennahda members especially that the plan of the PM was to form a technocrat cabinet, Hamadi Jebali declared his resignation⁶ after the public rage against Ennahda, and was consequently replaced by Ali Larayedh. Despite the turmoil arising from the assassination, Ennahda leader did not respond to the request of the demonstrating people, neither to its member Jebali, and instead, declared that the incident did not involve Ennahda. Still, the other killings of two seculars in Tunis

⁶See: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21508498>

during Larayedh's tenure urged Ennahda to compromise with the main opposition in Tunis, relinquish its power, and contribute in the formation of a government formed by technocrats, led by Mehdi Jomaa. This attempt of participation especially in the drafting of the Tunisian constitution could be considered a positive practice towards democracy, regardless whether Ennahda only exercised it in order to avoid a destiny similar to the FJP in Egypt, or because it felt weak and wanted to grab the chance to remain in power. The resulting draft constitution, which came to light after two years and three months following the elections, was welcomed by the Tunisians especially that its drafting process was under watchful eyes, as reported by al-monitor website. This constitution appears to be responding to the aspiration of Tunisians, especially that in its preamble, it states that it takes pride in the struggle of the people to gain the independence and commits itself to eliminate autocracy and achieve free will. The mention of Islam in the preamble came as a reference to its heritage of principals and not as a binding nature, highlighting the human values of Islam along with the principles of universal human rights. This constitution also guaranteed major changes and ensured women equality, especially with the adoption of clauses that ensure women equal representation and protect them against violence, despite all the debates arising from Ennahda's first inclinations to propose offering housewives pension, stop the support for single mothers and re-introduce polygamy, making Tunisia the first Arab country to adopt such jurisdiction. In this regard, it should be noted that Ennahda's female lawmakers count 41 out of 90, as reported by Nassima Kottoor, from BBC news.

Despite the success of the constitution draft, many Articles were at heart of debates, especially Article 6 stipulating the state's protection of religion and prohibiting charges of apostasy, Article 33 related to the parity in representation of women in

elected assemblies, and Article 38 related to the constitutionalization of the arabization of education, as reported by al-monitor web based newspaper. Many analyses discussed the new born constitution in its juristic framework, and Article 6 came to be the most controversial. Amna Guellali, director of the Human Rights Watch office for Tunisia, wrote in her article, the problem with Tunisia's constitution, that Article 6 suffers inconsistency which interpretations might result in "grave consequences" undermining human rights. Guellali stated that the contradictions arising from the state's commitment to protect the sacred places and its rejection of appeals against apostasy can be interpreted differently and can also be used a tool by the authorities to impose "moral order" and undermine liberties, especially that Ennahda has ever introduced the bill related to a draft law criminalizing the offenses against the sacred value in the National Constituent Assembly on the 1st August 2012, which erupted great concerns for the Tunisians, expressed in their published article: Tunisia: Prison, Fines for Offending "Sacred Values".

Despite their claims for democracy and their generous contribution to cooperate with other political activists of the Tunisian society to the drafted constitution, many activists in Tunis are still following Ennahda's steps and waiting for it to slip, just like FJP did. According to these activists, Ennahda's beliefs are hindered by their decorated democratic practices and that their rejection to the killings of Choukri Belaid and others are not completely genuine using the Salafism as a cover to their Islamism and Islamic aspirations. Although it faces the same controversy of FJP, the practices of Ennahda showed more ability to cope with democracy, as shown in the below table 2 and which was translated in their ability to survive until date despite the unrests in the country.

3.3.2.2 Undemocratic aspects of Ennahda governance

The critics against Ennahda practices targeted different aspects of their rule, starting from the economic situation of the country, to some declarations against women's rights, until the accusations of the killings, either directly or indirectly by blaming the party's presence in the rule to be the ignition of such assassinations.

Nils Naumann a writer in the Arab World reported the so called "political limbo" of Tunisia's spring. In his article, Naumann explained the economic burden lived by the Tunisian after the revolution who believed that the politicians got their jobs, and left the people with the tragedy. He also reported the sentiment of the Tunisians, especially the seculars who blamed Ennahda's presence in the government for the killings of the leftist oppositions, concluded by the assassination of Mohammed Brahimi at the end of July 2013. Rachel Shabi, in her published article in the "Guardian" reported people's sentiments with regards to the assassination of Chokri Belaid; Jalila Hedhli-Peugnet, a president of Think Ahead for Tunisia, in an attempt to highlight the failure of Ennahda's rule, said that Belaid was not assassinated during Ben Ali's tyranny, but was rather killed during post-revolution era, under the "democracy of Ennahda".

On another account, and within the same turmoil arising from the assassination of Belaid, Ennahda's nomination for Larayedh stimulated agonizing sentiments of the Tunisian, since Larayedh was heading the Ministry of Interior, which according to the opposition, was responsible for the killing and the violence in the country.

Tunisian opposition tackled Ennahda on many other levels of failure to apply democracy. Some of these claims were backed by Human Rights Watch organization, and some others were supported by statements from Ennahda members. It though has to be mentioned that some of the statement cannot be used to accuse the rule of

Ennahda of being undemocratic; like every party or political movement, members tend to possess different opinions, especially on controversial topics that intrigues the question of beliefs. Souad Abderrahim, a female member of Ennahda challenged the law protecting the women who have children outside the marriage, and Ali Larayedh, the previous Prime Minister of Tunis stated that his party was not willing to change existing laws based on Islam, like the polygamy and inheritance, claiming that this law is not against democracy, it rather stemmed from the nature of society in which the law is applied. All these statements were not fully adopted by Ennahda, and the drafted constitution came to oppose them.

Table 2: Ennahda compliance with Democratic indexes, retrieved from News articles.

Democratic Index	Democratic	Non-Democratic
Free Fair and Regular Elections	the first round of the presidential election would be held on Nov. 23 and a second round, if necessary in the event no-one gets at least 50 percent of the vote, at the end of December. (REUTERS)	
Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law	53 senior Ennahda officials voted in favor of the motion to keep sharia out of the constitution (arab news) Oppose naming Islamic law, or Sharia, in the new constitution, (Jordan Times)	
Minority Rights	Unclear Position	Unclear Position
Accountability and transparency	Prime minister resigns after the assassination of the leftist politician Chokri Belaïd (Guardian)	Ennahda was accused of coddling ultraconservatives, known as Salafis, some of whom have been tied to a string of violent episodes. (NY Times)
Multiparty System	coalition government	
Freedom of Expression		Escalating political violence (The Guardian)

Economic Freedom	Ennahda promised to create 590,000 jobs within five years, increase investment, cut inflation and push annual economic growth up to seven percent from 0.2 percent estimated growth for 2011.(Open Democracy)	
Freedom of Association		
Women rights	The document also pledges to protect the freedom of women against any imposed dress code.(AFP) Ennahda has pledged to uphold civil and women's rights. (The Guardian)	

3.4 Conclusion

It is obvious that Ennahda and FJP embraced democracy on different levels (table 3). And it is also obvious that the failure in the application of democracy in Egypt was based on the FJP's aspiration to build a society founded on Islam's Sharia and to introduce a new form of autocracy through the introduction of the constitutional amendment through its President member. Still, the experience of Ennahda, despite its Islamic tendency and its similarity to FJP, was able to overcome the challenges against its governance. Their practices were performed alongside with their statements, unlike FJP, and their attempts to broaden their cooperation with the opposition in drafting the constitution increased their chances of survival.

Table 3: FJP and Ennahda comparative compliance with Democratic indexes

Democratic Index	Ennahda	FJP
Free Fair and Regular Elections	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance
Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance
Minority Rights	Unclear Position	Unclear Position
Accountability and transparency	Unclear Position	Relative compliance

Multiparty System	Relative Compliance	Unclear Position
Freedom of Expression	Non compliance	Non Compliance
Economic Freedom	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance
Freedom of Association	Unclear position	Non Compliance
Women rights	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance

At this stage, the opposition's claims against Ennahda remain theoretical but doesn't mean false. The strategy followed by Ennahda is still misleading. Their compromise to form a technocrat government through coalition can be considered as a genuine exercise for democracy and response to people's will, but also can be an attempt from Ennahda to look moderate and the godfather of pluralistic rule, until the right time come to catch the rule with a firm grip.

Chapter Four

Indonesia, an Islamic Model of Democracy?

The controversial potential marriage between democracy and Islam dates long in the past and was studied and analyzed in different nations with Muslim majority. The main two countries that dominated the analytical arena were Indonesia and Turkey, who enjoyed to a great extent the praise of many western and eastern commentators who saw in their experience an example for the emerging Islamic democracies to follow. In this chapter, I chose Indonesia as a case study in order to highlight the differences and the resemblance of the latter with Egypt and Tunis. The three countries intersect in many occasions with their history and struggle to overcome an authoritarian regime that suppressed the liberties of the people. The history and experience after the emergence of post authoritarian rule differs from one to another, which also enables us to highlight the potential reasons behind the success of democracy and its implementation in Indonesia, whether through Islam or through secular parties and to define the shortfalls in the Muslim Brotherhood's governance, and the survival of Ennahda.

4.1 Why Indonesia

4.1.1 History

Like every country rising against authoritarian rule, its emergence into a democratic state is not an easy process. In many cases, the newly elected governments following the fall of authoritarian regimes failed to contain the people and respond to their demands, and in many others fell into the trap of insurgents who shifted the

process and worsened the situation of the country. The fate of these countries is related to many factors, internal, on both levels people and government, and external influenced by the geopolitical interest of other states. Therefore, a country like Indonesia poses itself as an important case study representing countries shifting into democracy, especially that it possesses the largest Muslim population, which makes it more interesting to study the existing relation between democracy and Islam, as well as political Islam.

The democracy web described Indonesia as the country that spent most of its history being under monarchial or colonial, military or authoritarian rules. Indeed, Indonesian had throughout their history different sorts of oppression, the Dutch colonialism, the Japanese invasion, and the “New Order” ruled by the Indonesian president Suharto who was accused of authoritarianism that ended by his resignation in 1998 following the Asian financial crisis and its impact on the Indonesian economy. Like Egypt and Tunisia, the eruption of protests was initiated on a small scale and was later enlarged to contain many parties. The movements towards democracy started in 1996, through protests outside the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held in Jakarta, initiated as a result of a split in the ruling parties, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) led by Megawati, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno. After the resignation of Suharto, his deputy, the interim president Habibie headed the country until the first parliament election in 1999 that brought Abdurrahman Wahid who only ruled until 2001 following corruption allegations. Wahid was then succeeded by PDI-P Chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri who ruled Indonesia until 2004. Although Megawati had dealt with important issues, especially the “landmark agreement

defusing Aceh rebellion”, 2004 election brought Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, known as SBY who had the longest tenure, for two ruling period, until 2014.

4.1.2 Link to Egypt and Tunisia

Choosing Indonesia as a case study to compare the democratic struggle in each of Egypt and Tunisia was not random. The chapter is not only dealing with the success of democratic emergence after an authoritarian rule, but also the success of Islam and political Islam to merge and integrate itself in the new governmental equation of democracy, and be capable to cope with the change and adapt their political language, preserving a presence and role in the political arena. During Suharto’s governance most of democratic practices were violated by the regime through the state’s apparatus, where the criticisms against the government’s policy were prohibited. David Adam Scott in his article “Election Threatens Democracy in Indonesia” elaborated Suharto’s regime practices within the election campaigns whereby all candidates were screened before election and half of the members of the National Parliament were appointed by the president. In addition, democracy web in their published article “Ranking in Freedom in the World 2010” spoke of the brutality of Suharto’s regime similar to what was witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia during Mubarak and Ben Ali respectively. Also, like in Egypt and Tunis, Suharto used the Islamists to destroy political forces threatening his governance, the left and Communist Parties, and later turned against these Islamic actors after the 1970s. As reported by many political authors, Suharto gave no chance for Islamists to act and talk about political Islam and sought a weakening strategy through gathering the four major Islamic parties under one party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). This practice was not only strict to Islamist, but also five major secular parties were gathered in one party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), and only

Golkar party was granted engagement in politics to suppress politics, as described by John Riady in his article “Fifteen Years after Suharto, Indonesia Has Made Great Steps Forward”, published by the Center of Strategic and International Studies. On the same account, Joe Cochrane explained in his new York Times article, “In a Nation of Muslims, Political Islam is Struggling to Win Votes”, that the steps undertaken by Suharto to merge leading political parties had weakened the latter even after its oust, due to the difference of priorities and sometimes agendas.

The end of the New Order regime opened the floor for Muslim activists to start their political race, and five of the Islamic parties won seats in the parliament, reaching an overall of 33 percent of the representation. The first parliament election in 1999 after the resignation of Suharto and the short governance of his vice Habibi, Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of the largest Muslim organization at that time, Nahdatul Ulama came as a president, a scenario that can also be considered similar to that of Egypt and Tunis. Although, unlike Egypt, Wahid contributed in the implementation of reform measures in Indonesia, his presidency was also short lived due to corruption and was later succeeded by his vice president Megawati in 2001. Following this impeach, Muslims were never again represented in the presidency in Indonesia, though they kept a certain influence on regional basis, as well as on a central basis through coalition with other secular parties.

Another political aspect of Indonesia’s politics that resembled Egypt and Tunisia was the relative success of an Islamist party, the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). PKS’ founders had inspired their roots from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and always campaigned for the implementation of Sharia law by democratic means, and only shifted its policy and language after the third election following Suharto’s resignation.

4.2 Indonesia's Shift to Democracy

4.2.1 Democratic Features of Post Suharto

In most of the read articles, analyses, and papers, authors agreed that Indonesia's shift to democracy is to be credited. Democracy web wrote that democratic roots has developed in Indonesia where the presidential elections after Suharto's era were deemed free and fair, which is also endorsed by Freedom House who categorized Indonesia as a democratic country.

There are many reasons behind this success, some based it on the nature of presidents who governed the country after Suharto, especially the former military, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), as described by each of Paul Wolfowitz in his article "Indonesia is a Model of Democracy" writing that Mr. Yudhoyono's leadership deserved a great deal of credit in bringing democratic success to "such a complex country, and David Adam Scott in his article, "Election Threatens Democracy in Indonesia", who related Yudhoyono's legitimacy to his practices and accomplishments during his first governance period in fighting corruption, and success in the economic arena, through which Indonesia surpassed its neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Australia in some exporting materials. Another more elaborative reason was the correlation between the success of democracy and the societal nature of Indonesia. Joe Cochrane in his article described the reason behind the success of democracy to the secular nature of the country. He explained that this secularism did not only emerge in the post New Order era, it rather was another re-emergence from the first independence. Cochrane elaborated his argument by a historical event during the first constitution draft following the Independence from the Dutch colonial rule, where the Islamist demanded the inclusion of Sharia Law in the constitution and the declaration of Indonesia as an Islamic state. The request made by

the Islamists was not welcomed by the other factions of the country, those who were from different religion as well as seculars.

Although it is agreed by many that Indonesia has become an iconic state for the existing harmony between Islam and democracy, many other published writings criticizing the governance, like Malik Miah who argued that Indonesia still retained some anti-democratic aspects with regards to civil liberties rights, human development, fight against corruption, and rule of law. As a result of this politics and large Islamic base in the society, comes the question of the role of Islamist political actors in Indonesia of how much they contributed in its democracy, where do they stand, and where they will bring the future of Indonesia with their progress on societal and regional level.

4.3 Political Islam in Indonesia

Reported by Yenni Kwok in her article “15 years after the Fall of Suharto, a mixed Picture of Indonesia’s Minorities”, SBY declared in a speech in April 2013 in Singapore that his country has proven that democracy, Islam and modernity could go well together, and he went further to state that Indonesia could set guidance to the Arab Spring countries to follow.

Jan Woischnik and Philipp Müller in their paper “Islamic Parties and Democracy in Indonesia, Insights from the World’s Largest Muslim Country” explained that political Islam in Indonesia only existed after Indonesia’s independence from the Netherlands. At a later stage, during President Sukarno and Suharto’s tenures, the political movement of Islam was suppressed, keeping their activity on a pure religious basis. This smart approach differentiated Indonesia from other Muslim countries, where the Islam was not declared as the “arch enemy of the reigning secular political elite”.

4.3.1 Islamist Parties in Indonesia

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Indonesia's political Islam base is more wide and exotic; there are those who adopt the Pancasila⁷, the five foundational principal of the Indonesian State, those who tend to a more national secular ideology, keeping their religious identity, and those who retained a more conservative agenda for the implementation of Sharia Law and establishment of Islamic State. Some of these parties modified their stiff religious tendencies and adopted a more democratic agenda like the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and the Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB).

Based on the study made by Mada Sukmajati, PAN is the most moderate religious party in Indonesia, established recently during 1998 and unofficially linked to Muhammadiyah. This party has even supported non-Muslim candidates and bases itself on the Pancasila principle; although modernist, PAN has been facing declines in the number of seats in the last three elections. Another moderate Islamic party in Indonesia is the PKB which, founded recently by during 1998 by five NU (Nahdatul Ulama) leader, it kept link to the latter. PKB contradicts with NU in its adaptation to the current Indonesia, adopting like PAN a national and secular ideology, advocated by the ex-President Wahid. Due to major disagreement that had emerged within the party's members regarding their view of Islam, the elections' results recorded a decrease in their representation in the House of Parliament, until 2014 elections where the party won 47 seats, an increase with 19 seats from the previous election.

A major Islamic political player in Indonesia is the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan and Sejahtera, PKS). This party is not as moderate as the previous two, although, in the past sixteen years, it has recorded an increase in winning seats in the

⁷ Five principles Philosophy of Human Rights, see:
http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/human_right-2.htm

House of Representatives, while maintaining a balanced position between conservative Islam and urban Muslims. As a result of their latest support for the implementation of Sharia law, and despite their developed organization in the event of elections and preparation of their candidates, the party only won 17 seats, after registering 57 seats during 2009. Moreover, the United Development Party (PPP) which was the main Islamic party during Suharto's era, under which major Islamist were forcibly merged, has followed a more conservative Islamic politics and replaced the Pancasila with Islamic ideology after 1998. This party is adopting a more conservative language with times, refusing the acceptance of other Islamic and religious partners in the country. It should be noted that the practices of the latter was not well received by the Indonesian people who expressed their concern during the elections. From 2004 until 2014, their representation in the House of Representative decreased with 19 seats, winning 39 seats during the latest polls.

The more conservative the ideology of the Islamic party is, the less its representation in the parliament is, as the Crescent Star Party (PBB) which has centralized its campaign on the implementation of Sharia Law and until date, it was never able to register any representation.

4.3.2 Role of Political Islam

As a result of three historical and contemporary factors, the Islam's predominance in Indonesia, the relative political oppression of political Islam during the Suharto's New Order, and the success of secular parties to develop the country's economy and democracy without hindering the religious freedom, Islamist of Indonesia tended to adapt their politics to a more open and flexible ideology, and increased more their focus on social and humanitarian activities.

Regardless the fact that Islamists in Indonesia could succeed in promoting their tolerance and despite their different attempts on several occasions to promote their openness and acceptance of democracy within their religious affiliation, as well as their capability of mobilizing people of Indonesia by playing the common beliefs card, the result in the elections did not reflect the aspired success.

Some analysts interpreted the failure of the Islamists to win majority of seats in the House of Representative to the better ability of secular nationalist parties to compete with the Muslims in Indonesia on the economic level, political level, and even the societal level, where the language of the seculars, especially during 2004 election, included the acknowledgment of their affiliation to their spiritual belonging, the Islam, without introducing it in the political arena. Indonesia's Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) did not only describe itself as national, but also added "religious" during its election campaign (Woischnik and Müller; 2014). Therefore, the tendency of the seculars not to alienate themselves from Islam made them potential rivals of the Islamist parties in the parliamentary election as well as the presidency. Also, the interpreter website published an article explaining the reason due to which seculars were able to win over the Islamist. According to this article, the seculars in Indonesia almost holds principles that resembles the Islamic ideology, only with more tolerance to accept others, through founding their parties on the Pancasila which states their belief in God, as well as through possessing religious wing, like the Baitul Muslimin (House of Muslims) of the PDI-P.

Another major factor that contributed in the failure of Islamists in Indonesia lies in their historical merge under Suharto rule. The Merging of the Islamic groups during the New Order weakened the latter after the fall of Suharto, due to the absence of common ground and the contradictions arising of their different priorities. This

problem was not only observed within the PPP, but also within different other parties like the Nahdatul Ulama organization.

Moreover, on a social and religious level, many Islamists lost the confidence of the Indonesian electors. After being seen as “clean and uncorrupt”, following the fall of Suharto, Islamists of Indonesia won the sympathy and trust of the electors in 1999. Their fall into scandals and corruption allegations strongly impacted the choice of the Indonesian people which was translated in the elections of 2004 and 2009 registering a decrease in the representation of Islamic parties. Jeff Lee, in the Southeast Asia journal published his article “Failure of Political Islam in Indonesia: A Historical Narrative”, explained that the Islamists in Indonesia do not have the green card to rally for election. He wrote that despite the support of the population to Islam, economic concerns, poverty and unemployment reign on the Indonesians and which would affect their choice for their Representatives and President. Therefore, if the Islamic groups in Indonesia were not able to define a clear agenda and a promising future to the Indonesian, their chances for success would remain low.

The said above does not deny the fact that the Islamists in Indonesia are considered potential political actors, and their low profile does not mean that their existence would not influence, to a great extent, the political equation. Islamists in Indonesia have become major societal actors and their influence on the people has been increasing after the fall of Suharto. They were able to realize that their pure religious language would not serve their existence in Indonesia, and they were smart enough to carry corrective measures on an early stage in order to maintain their presence, even if it were more on a society level rather than political. Due to the election system in Indonesia, coalition among parties is highly important in order to secure survival of any candidate in the second rounds and compete for presidency. SBY’s recent government included

four Islamic parties out of the six-party coalition, and the recent presidential competition between Joko Widodo and Prabowo highlighted the strong role of Islamic parties. Widodo, after being officially the runner for Indonesia presidency paid visit to the two biggest Muslim organizations, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. With a popular base of 30 million for Muhammadiyah and 40 million for NU, Islam could strongly affect the outcome of the elections. Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa, Coordinating Economic Minister, have proceeded with their competition in a six-party coalition of which four Islamic parties are represented, PAN, PKS, PPP and PBB, although it shows that there is no common ideological ground.

4.3.3 Difference with the Egyptian and Tunisian Experience

If one observes the big picture and make a comparison between the three experiences towards the emergence into democracy, it could be realized that there are major factors that contributed in diverting the process from one to another. Some of the reasons are of historical nature, others are social, domestic and regional factors that implied certain circumstances on each of Egypt and Tunisia.

Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda under authoritarian regimes were strongly oppressed. For political reasons, and in order to ensure protection and undermine potential Islamist threat, Mubarak gave the Muslim Brotherhood particularly a political role over which he kept a firm grip. This action, although carried out by the Indonesian regime during Suharto, had different impact on both, the Islamists and the Muslims. It weakened the potential coalition of Muslims against his rule but fostered their social and humanitarian role, an outcome that was not observed in each of Tunis and Egypt. This role was described by Jan Woischnik and Philipp Müller as Islamization of the society and not the politics. Consequently, this process contributed in reducing the marginalization of the society and its rigid division between Islamists'

supporters and Secular supporters, due to which Islamists had to increase their tolerance and national identity over their religious'. In a poll conducted on March 2013 and written by John Riady, less than one percent of the interviewed Indonesian favored a party or a political faction based on their religious affiliation (Riady; 2013). On the same account, Hefner, reported by Malik Miah, argued that civil Islam is dependent on the existence of "civil state with transparent laws, including the place of religion, which are accepted by its citizens" (Miah, 2001). Malik Miah adds that the colonialism led by the Dutch has also contributed in the rise of secular Islam through the suppression of political Islam.

In addition, the political system in Indonesia requires coalition among parties in order to ensure competitiveness during the elections. The contradictions arising among the different Islamic parties became an obstacle against their coalition and urged the latter to build other coalitions with secular parties, shifting by which their religious language. The coalition among the political actors in Egypt was not clear and did not, in anyway, soften the language of the MB, unlike Ennahda in Tunis, who despite the absence of a clear coalition before the election, the latter was urged, due to political circumstances and outraged opposition, to call for dialogue and start negotiations with other Tunisian politicians. Michael Buehler in his article Islam and Democracy in Indonesia added that the institutional modification carried by the state and the set election regulations influenced the relationship between democracy and Islam; i.e. "a party could only become a legal entity if it registered with the justice ministry, included woman in at least 30% of central leadership posts and others, making difficult on the Islamist the task to establish and organize a structure that would allow them to participate in politics.

An additional reason differing the Indonesian experience from the Egyptian and Tunisian has been explained by a published article on Fukrwa Fann web based page. In this article, the adds to the previously stated factors that the reason behind the success of Indonesia Islamists to become democratic is accomplished by the role of Muslim intellectuals changing the mindset of Muslims. Of those passionate intellectuals, as described, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's ex-President and NU Chairman, Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Nurcholis Majid who also headed organization and acted more on a social level before political, collecting respectively forty, thirty and ten millions followers; the difference with Egypt is that the contribution for changing Islamists' mindset was done on an individual level, also described as solitary, like Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, etc.

Table 4: Indonesia Islamists' compliance with Democratic indexes, Comparison with Ennahda and FJP

Democratic Index	Ennahda	FJP	Indonesia Islamist
Free Fair and Regular Elections	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance	Compliance: Since the fall of Soeharto, elections in Indonesia are done with participation of Islamists and compliance to its rules
Constitutional Limits on Government and Rule of Law	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance	Relative compliance of Islamists to rule of law in Indonesia, noting the exception of hardliners mentioned in Harsono article (Harsono, 2012)
Minority Rights	Unclear Position	Unclear Position	Relative compliance. (Harsono, 2012)
Accountability and transparency	Unclear Position	Relative compliance	Relative Compliance; Islamists practices, when criticized and highlighted, were reflected in the people's choice.
Multiparty System	Relative Compliance	Unclear Position	Full compliance with integration of various factions in the country and obvious coalitions.
Freedom of Expression	Non compliance	Non Compliance	Relative Compliance

Economic Freedom	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance	Indonesia economic freedom ranking 58.8 (Index of economic freedom, 2014) ; steady economic growth
Freedom of Association	Unclear position	Non Compliance	Relative non-compliance; Ormas law considered as a setback on freedom of association (CIVICUS, 2014) although not promulgated by Islamists
Women rights	Relative Compliance	Non Compliance	Unclear; no law has been promulgated by Islamists against women. Women are active in social related activities of Islamist Parties.

4.4 Conclusion

A country that counts more than 250 million people with an average of 80 percent Muslims, known with its emblem Unity in Diversity, Indonesia has posed itself as one of the most controversial countries in applying democracy and presenting a prominent aspiration for newly emerging countries into democracy. The democracy of this country has been subject of analysis to many scholars, writers, receiving the praise of Nations advocating liberty and free will and defining a new equation linking Islam to democracy.

Despite the fact that many saw the application of democracy possible with the Islamists, others still refused it and wrote, on several occasions, about the failure of some post New Order governments to protect Indonesia's minorities, like Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi in his article "The Limits of Islamic Democracy" citing in which the violations against liberty and civil rights, Siyafi Anwar in his article "The Paradox of Indonesia's Democracy and Religious Freedom" regarding the increase influence of militant Islamists and anti-pluralist ideology, as well as the famous article criticizing Indonesia's Reform era (Reformasi) written by Andreas Harsono in which he highlighted the inability of the Indonesian Government headed by SBY to control the extremists and protect the minorities. Other writers, though agreeing on the current

democratic status of Indonesia and although seeing that some violations are natural and might be applicable in any old democracy, analyzed the status of Islamists and believe that the latter are not completely democratic, yet waiting for the right moment to have a firmer grip over the politics in Indonesia and act towards the establishment of Islamic State. These expectations remain inadequate to the study since it foresees a future that is currently unable to be based on an established base supporting it. Despite the coalition with PAN and other large based Islamic parties that was formed by Prabowo during the Presidential elections 2014, and regardless the controversy that is currently arising of the poll's calculation, Joko Widodo, was declared winner on 22 July 2014. New York Times through Cochrane described the win of Mr. Joko Widodo best known as Jokowi as striking. He wrote that the man raised in a riverside slum will be Indonesia's seventh President, being the first "not to have emerged from the country's political elite. This result shows clearly that the population in Indonesia is not widely mobilized by the religion to choose their ruler, they rather are more inclined to choose based on social base which would make it harder on the Islamists to divert their path from social concerns and focus more on religious agendas.

Chapter Five

Conclusion: Islamization of Democracy or Democratization of Islam

This thesis was set to answer the question about the Post-Arab Spring Islamists who ruled Egypt and Tunis. It aimed at identifying whether these ruling Islamists were influenced by democracy and capable to cope with it, or had influenced the democratic process in the Arab countries and created a democracy based on Islamic values. Three major Republics with politically active Islamists were studied, through which their attempts to rule also varied from a complete failure in Egypt, a partial success and struggle for survival in Tunisia, to a potential success in existence and influence in Indonesia. Throughout the comparison based on the democratic index, this thesis highlights the nature of governance of the Islamists in Egypt and Tunis stressing out their ability to cope with democratic value. Whereas the comparison to the Indonesian experience, reflects the gaps in Ennahda and FJP's governance and their ability to cope with the modern society in their countries. It should be noted, that in the three cases, the approach for the implementation of Sharia was a threatening factor for popularity, not because of its religious representation, but due to its interpretation that might be used by the rulers to establish another autocracy under religion, but was not exclusively the only factor for the failure of Islamists to rule.

5.1 Failure of Islamists (FJP)

As discussed in the previous chapters, many factors have contributed in the fall of Morsi or what some writers call the military coup d'état against the MB governance in Egypt. It is also certain that what triggered the sentiments of the Egyptians was not based on the person of President Morsi, despite the many sarcastic critics that attacked the latter, but rather based on the whole process of governance with all its components, the Muslim Brotherhood principals and organization, its members and representatives in addition to social factors that affected FJP's governance and contributed to its fall.

5.1.1 FJP Performance

After the end of Morsi's rule, many articles discussed the reasons behind this short lived presidency with a majority stressing on the inability of FJP to realize the size of accomplishment and the challenges that should have been undertaken during their governance. *Die Tageszeitung* reported by Spiegel Online compared FJP to Turkish AKP explaining that both parties took the elections that brought them to rule for granted, believing that they could maneuver the politics their way, as long as they are in the rule. Always within the same reason of the party's internal organization, FJP has centralized the decision-making process and made decisions of its elites binding, creating internal conflicts among members coming from different social backgrounds.

Another reason that affected the FJP performance was its inability to cope with social change. This incapacity was not strictly due to its ideology, it rather was due to its hierarchy and the lack in responding entirely to the demands of the ruled society, creating contrast in opinion of the members and leading to loss of credibility. Ashraf el Sherif added in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the ideology of FJP also contributed in their failure to approach Egyptian people and comply with democratic rule. He also agreed with Bernard Siman and Stephan Roll that FJP failed

to transform its victory into sustained politics adding that the latter was driven more by a delusion of grandeur following the striking victory through the first democratic election after the fall of Mubarak's autocratic regime. El Sherif added that the attitude of MB was also opportunistic and not based on an invariable ground; FJP was ready to sacrifice elements of their ideology for short term political victory, i.e. their claim that democracy could comply with their Sharia and later contradicting itself by stating that parts of democracy could not go along with their ideology, whenever opportunity demanded so. In an attempt to highlight the ideological failure, Sherif added that the problem was not based on the Islamic nature of the ideology, but was based on the ambiguity of their claimed principles without an "authentic vision of their Islamic project".

Barak Barfi, in his article "Why the Brotherhood Failed" saw another reason contributing to the fall of FJP, that of their inherited distrust in Egypt political actors after being chased during Nasser until Mubarak. This built suspicion created an obstacle against FJP officials to make strong coalitions, whether with the secular factions or even the Islamists like the Salafi and Al-Nour, which was obviously shown during the last surviving days of Morsi; both Salafi and Al-Nour members backed the decision for his topple though they did not publically participate in the demonstrations.

5.1.2 Social Factor

FJP came to govern Egypt after a long struggle against an autocratic and corruptive regime. This governance came with an enormous challenge, not only to rule the people, but also to create solidarity among different State's apparatus and institutions. The ouster of Mubarak did not result in the change of all the Army Officials, Security Forces Key Persons, or Society's elites. FJP's agreement with the military did not ensure their survival while it lacked control over internal security and

judiciary system where laws related to elections never passed the system and got blocked.

Also, the economic burden that was one of the main fuels for the Arab Spring Uprising played against FJP. Although it is normal to have difficulties to re-establish the country's economy after a long corruptive authoritarianism, yet many analysts considered FJP reluctant in this domain while some other blamed the economic process' gains; they were uneven. Nader Habibi in a Crown Center for Middle East Studies publication highlighted the reasons behind the FJP's failure for economic reform. Habibi stated the intensified economic crisis arising from the toppling of Mubarak then elaborated further on the economic plan of FJP; there was an obvious economic growth, though the resulting wealth was unevenly distributed. Also, President Morsi supported the proposal from IMF regarding a loan, but the Guidance Bureau of FJP refused it. This example did not only show FJP's policy towards economy, but also highlighted, again, the impact of organizational problems within FJP leading to the loss of Morsi's credibility and charisma.

At the end, the situation reached its epic with Morsi's decision to undermine the society through constitutional amendments that would have placed him over all laws and created a new autocracy and constituted the climax of FJP's failure leading to its complete fall.

5.2 Struggle and Survival of Islamists (Ennahda):

Ennahda, founded on the Muslim Brotherhood principal, sharing with the latter almost the same fate, starting from the ouster of two respective authoritarian regimes and recording similar striking victories, did not follow the latter in its unfortunate fall and topple of its utmost representative, the President of the country, Morsi. Some

analysts believe that Ennahda was going through the same path of the former and rectified its mistake after the fate of FJP, while others advocate that Ennahda's performance and social existence differ from Egypt which has contributed in its survival.

5.2.1 Ennahda's Performance

First, Ennahda kept its promise to its people during the election campaign, that it would not rule the presidency, unlike FJP, whose credibility started to be lost since the beginning of its governing journey. Although Ennahda, like FJP, pledged for the inclusion of Sharia Law in the constitution draft, the resilience of the people to such decision urged the latter to modify its agenda and cope more with the governed society. This behavior with the resignation of Hamadi Jebali after the violent demonstration that erupted following the killing of Belaid proved that Ennahda was more keen and able to adapt itself to the Tunisian's demands. In addition, during the draft of the constitution, and following massive opposition of the people in Tunis, Ennahda integrated itself in coalitions and participated in dialogues in order to avoid unilateral decisions that would contribute in its fall. Anis Mili in his published article in Al-Monitor described the contrast between Ennahda and FJP highlighting a major difference between both parties, the ability to form coalitions. According to Mili, as many others, FJP and Ennahda think the same way, aspire the same goals, only their behavior differs; Ennahda was more able to absorb the growing tension that rose in the streets and smartly took prompt decisions to counter-attack the toppling forces. Unlike Egypt who ignored the people's demand and exercised bluntly its monopoly, Ennahda resorted to building coalitions with other state actors and accepted technocratic government, though it would have reduced its power to control. Ahmed Souaiaia also explained Ennahda's survival in his article "Tunisia's Ennahda Movement maybe

learning from Egypt and Turkey”. He considered Ennahda smart at being inclusive and capable of compromising through enriching social justice norms in the new constitutions; some of Ennahda’s cadre, despite their claims aiming at the implementation of Islamic law, and despite the fact that they would have favored the proscription of Takfir (infidels), accepted the “codification of the civil state and supremacy of the rule”.

5.2.2 Difference in the Inherited Society

Being smaller in size and further away from the Arab-Palestinian conflict, the inherited society governed by Ennahda is certainly different than Egypt’s. This does not, in any way, deny the involvement of Tunisian’s youth and political actors in the Palestinian Case, nor does it claim that they are less engaged in the geopolitical interests in the region, but the burdens posed on the ruling party normally differ. Youssef Cherif in the Majalla web page explained that both populations were found on Islamist movement despite their contrasted interest in other political topics.

On a different account, Ennahda did not face the problem of rapprochement to state’s institutions like FJP. Mili explained that unlike Egypt, Tunisia’s army has never intervened in politics nor has the country relied on this institution; the army “will not defend Ennahda and, in the best scenario, will leave it on its own to confront the people taking the streets”.

5.3 Political Influence of Islamists (Indonesia):

In the previous chapter, Indonesia’s society was explained thoroughly highlighting the reasons behind the ability of Islamists not only to survive in the emerged democracies, but also to secure influence in the political dynamics ongoing in the country. The study of Indonesia could also explain the differences between

Egypt and Tunisia's experience with Islamism as well as to predict to a certain extent the fate of Ennahda and whether the applicability of Democracy could be sustained.

5.3.1 Islamists in Indonesia

As described previously in the chapter, Islamists in Indonesia are widespread all over the country and under different parties with various ideologies. This abundance of Islamists in the country may have contributed in their inability to reach the rule unilaterally. In order to ensure their existence, and since these Islamic Parties were not able to reach a common ideology, they sought coalition with other secular parties. This step should be followed by Ennahda in the upcoming elections, especially with the registered rise of opposition against the latter. It is also to be noted that the lack of FJP to form these coalitions led to its rapid fall in Egypt.

Also, the Indonesian electoral law may have acted against the Islamists due to its extensive requirements, but it also served them in the sense of building trust among the people. The fear of radical religious approach has been reduced consequently. Moreover, the organization of Islamists in Indonesia and their activities performed on the level of society led to the Islamization of the society and also to their predominance in that field, which certainly urged the secular parties and the populist parties to ally with them in order to ensure additional competence for elections. This factor seems shy in Ennahda and FJP. Within the degrading state of economy in each of Egypt and Tunisia, Islamists could play a social role in order to build confidence with the people, rather than always depending on the religious factor to mobilize them. Ennahda and Egypt, like Islamists in Indonesia were elected based on their religious identity that resembled the majority of the people in the country and due to the sentiments of sympathy with parties who struggled the most under the authoritarian rule. It was clear through the Indonesian experience, that after the first winning election for the Islamist

that brought Wahid and after the fall of the latter, Islamist never gained the Presidency again; Muslim will not elect other Muslim who keeps him hungry. This scenario, if no corrective measures are taken by the surviving Ennahda, might also happen in Tunisia.

5.3.2 Indonesia's Society Vis-à-vis Islamists

The Indonesian society contrasts to a great extent with Arab society despite the fact that the three people share the same religions. It is also due to the geopolitical situation that the concerns of the Indonesian society are different than those of Arabs'. Adding to this, the historical factor played a very important influence on the organization of Islamic parties in Indonesia reducing their strength against that of the seculars'. As explained in the previous chapter, the situation of Islamists after the fall of Suharto was not much sympathized since they were not totally alienated due to their ideology. Also, Seculars in Indonesia did not totally reject the idea of religion, though they did not include it in their political agenda. Moreover, the development of economy during post-Suharto era and under the rule of seculars, such as SBY, made it harder on the Islamists to compete; a factor that still doesn't exist in each of Egypt and Tunisia. If the experience of El-Sisi was not aspiring enough, and if the economic situation in Tunisia did not flourish under Ennahda, the latter and FJP might still have chance to influence large number of supporters.

5.4 Democratization of Islam

People who went to the streets and shouted for democracy and freedom from autocracy were oppressed before being Muslims, they were hungry, unemployed, and demanded the departures of authoritarian regimes which undermined their rights for decades. These same people elected Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda; they elected the democrats, the reformist and the genuine nationals who would move their country towards liberty and development. These emerging democracies, if not up to the

aspirations of its people would fall, similarly to what had happened in Egypt. The fall of FJP was not due to the Islamic nature of the party, nor due to their willingness to implement Sharia in the first place. The fall came due to mistakable practices made by the latter who failed to respond to the people and to comply with their promise during the election campaign. It was not Islam that drove FJP to lose credibility, but rather was the unclear program and principles. It was not Islam that mobilized people against Morsi, but rather the amended constitution and the decree that placed him over the law that rules the sovereign people to express another form of Tyranny. It was not Islam that failed democracy, it was people who founded their parties on Islam and acted in line with their own interpretations of their ideologies.

5.4.1 Sharia and Democracy

Ennahda is an Islamist, yet its survival is linked to its continuous strive to comply with democracy and to become a model for democratic Islam. If people in Tunisia, Egypt, and Indonesia refused the inclusion of Sharia Law in their constitution, it is mainly because the interpretation of the latter may become a tool in the hand of Tyrants and used against democracy.

In the book of John O. Voll, “Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier?” it was written that many cotemporary scholars believe that the “Islamic doctrine as embedded in the test and traditions is conducive to democratic thoughts” (O. Voll, 2007: 173). Voll adds that this correlation between Democracy and Islam cannot be done without recognizing the contested concept of Democracy, the liberal democracy, the semi-authoritarian democracy, the radical democracy, the consociational democracy and the associative democracy. What Voll was elaborating is the constructivist point of view in approaching democracy, which claims that democracy is differently perceived by societies depending on their cultural heritage and, and its

criteria changes with the change of societies. Indeed, this theory was not only discussed by him, but also by David Chandler in his article “Promoting democratic norms? Social constructivism and the ‘subjective’ limits to liberalism” who explained that democracy viewed by Arabs may not be similar to what is seen by western, and that what can be considered an undemocratic practice by western, may still be considered democratic by Arabs. This theory increases the chance of correlating Sharia in all its aspects to democracy and implies that social status considering the women complementing the man and not equal to him is still considered democratic, and that the practices led by FJP or Ennahda could be tolerated by Muslims, since it represents their religion. This theory, although might be tolerable by some factions of the society, strongly contradicts with the rights for minorities and which was obvious in different referencing articles that the Sharia Law, it would create imbalance in the accountability of citizens before the laws, and would contribute in the inability of the country to comply with International Declarations for Human Rights. Moreover, despite the predominance of Muslims in Egypt and Tunisia, their people’s practice and perception of Islam may also differ.

5.4.2 Democratization of Ennahda

The lesson was learned; Islam, even in the countries of Muslims cannot rule alone. The fall of Morsi was an elaborative example of how unilateral governance could back fire on the governor. Also in Indonesia, and despite the Muslim’s predominance over the society, Islamists had to play the political game carefully. People wanted to practice their Islam in a stable and developed county, and being ruled by Muslim may not always provide this equality. This is why Tunisia compromised and secured for itself, until now, a certain place to compete in the future elections.

Although it was able to remain in power, Ennahda had struggled for its survival. The ruling attitude of Ennahda passed from strong aspiration for the inclusion of Islamic practices in the country, to a more tolerant attitude towards implementing a secular governance and pass a constitution that would answer the demands of the street. These corrective measures were able to calm down the tension that arose among the Tunisian, but wasn't able to completely assert them; on different occasions, Tunisian protestors marched the streets holding slogans attacking Ennahda and its rule and demanding the resignation of its top officials from the country's government. The protests that grew massively in the country during August 2013 were a live example of the growing opposition which outgrew the popularity of Ennahda. In an article published by Al Monitor, it became very clear how much of a social loss Ennahda was suffering. While the opposition was able to mobilize 12,000 to 15,000 people during a sit-in on the second of August accusing Ennahda of violence and discrimination, especially while dealing with issues related to women's rights, Ennahda was only able to organize a counter-protest that gathered no more than 2,000 people on 13 August.

5.4.3 What is Ennahda Missing?

Ennahda became aware that its popularity has been reduced and that despite its survival, it should act cautiously to remain politically active and represented. If compared to the Indonesian model, Ennahda may have a chance to become another model of successful democracy, though it should represent itself as a potential political rival able to respond to the Tunisians' demands and apply them.

5.4.3.1 A Social Factor

Michael Buehler described the social influence of Islamists in Indonesia as the Islamization of the population. This social engagement of Islamists increased their popular base and made them potential candidates for elections' coalitions (Buehler,

2009). It was also described by Mada Sukmajati that despite the inability of the Islamists to elect an Islamist president in Indonesia, their activities on the social level and the decentralization of their politics built more linkages with the society (Sukmajati, 2010). Ennahda should maintain this population-party relation to maintain political influence, gain credibility among its supporters, and focus on the establishment of its ideology without clashing with the secular nature of the constitution.

5.4.3.2 Economic Development

The country's economy has naturally been affected by the uprisings that ousted Ben Ali and later flared against Ennahda. This grown instability registered a decline in the country's tourism, investment sector that affected all other economic sectors. The government policy, as explained by Nader Habibi, was not up to the Tunisian expectations; it increased government spending and domestic borrowing leading to an increase in government deficit. Moreover, based on Ennahda published agenda during the preparation of the post-uprising elections, the party was leaning to establish equity in distributing economic benefits. Habibi described it as "Inclusive Capitalism", an economic system that allows free competition, and which benefits is distributed among all citizens. Ennahda should remain loyal to its promise before the Tunisian's watch who would assess the outcomes at the end of their tenures and elect accordingly. If Ennahda wasn't able to compete on this level, its struggle to compete would be even harder.

In order to highlight its tolerance, Ennahda was urged at a very critical stage to form coalitions. Ennahda does not only suffer from its relation with the society, but also suffers from a vertical division among its members, the pragmatic and the hardliners. Ennahda, in order to prove its credible intentions ruling Tunisia, has accepted the

exclusion of Sharia from the Tunisian constitution and accepted to let go key ministries, i.e. Interior and Justice, to independent candidates, when the situation in the streets worsened. In addition, the biggest challenge for Ennahda went beyond its internal rift to its competition with the Islamic base. Ennahda had to show tolerance, ally itself with seculars, show openness towards democracy, while maintaining its ideology, an Islamic identity that resembles to the Tunisian people's majority. Therefore, Ennahda must gain the trust of the Tunisians, keep its Islamic identity, respect the democratic norms, and choose the most adequate ally to reach its place in Tunisia, like Indonesia's Islamists, who despite their inability to name a president their existence is secured, to a great extent, through their coalitions.

5.4.4 Future of Muslim Brotherhood

Besides the analysis related to the reasons behind the failure of Muslim Brotherhood and whether the coup in July 2013 would lead corrective measures or create another autocracy, many speculations related to the future of Muslim Brotherhood are being posed trying to predict the fate of an influential Islamist party after its topple. Khalil al-Anani, wrote in Al Monitor that this is the toughest crisis MB has ever experienced since its establishment. He also described the acts led by the current government in Egypt as the most violent, trying, for the first time, to attack not only the leadership in FJP, but also reaching to the "lower rungs" of the organization (Al Monitor, 2014). Since it lost its power, the FJP's proclaimed goal was to work to overthrow the regime who took over the rule in Egypt. Although the invested power is aimed at one goal, the organization seemed to suffer a gap between the leadership and the base; a problem that had also contributed in its fall.

Caitlin McFall wrote that FJP remained denouncing violence, though its members have been forced by the government on different attempts to act against this pledge, and

despite the fact that its supporters believed to lead a religious task. This religious commitment and within this growing tension may break into an escalated violence. People in Egypt have to be careful reacting to the pressure exercised by the government and watch the performance of latter facing the challenges previously encountered by the FJP. If the government presented itself as a more moderate ruler and contributed in the development of the country, FJP might risk a bigger loss, otherwise, unless FJP played the card wisely, it might increase again its popularity, either through its ideology or even through the growing popular sympathy vis-à-vis the struggle of the party.

5.5 Conclusion

It has been obvious through the different examples addressed in this thesis, that the Islam can embrace democracy as long as the balance was established between the ideology and the practice. Every attempt for the Islamization of the democracy has failed; Islamists lost popularities when they tried to establish a law based on Sharia, like in Indonesia, they were toppled when sought to undermine people under the supremacy of the Islamists' leadership, like what happened to Egypt's president, Morsi. The democratization process in Tunis and Egypt has just been initiated, and it does not only require rulers to accommodate themselves to democratic practices. Accountability is at the heart of the implementation of democracy and the preservation of its criteria requires the integration of democracy in the society of the people who claimed it. An interview reported by SSRC (Social Science Research Council), Christiane Amanpour stated that Egyptian people were not ready for democracy. On the same account, James Madison, trying to draw a theory stating in which that factionalism can be transformed into public good, he described that the phenomenon of emerging factions is an "inevitable consequence of freedom", although it should be

supervised by the existence of robust institutions able to ensure that no faction dominates the other and the factions should be organized in coalitions in order to ensure that no faction or opinion is hindered by the other; a phenomenon that still maturing in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood did not fail to democratize its ideology, nor did it try to Islamize the democracy, it though tried to manipulate democracy in an attempt of autocracy, taking advantage of its religious affiliation. As for Ennahda, the democratization of its rule and practice has just begun, following its commitment to involve the majority of the country's factions in the process. If Tunisia remained loyal to its engagement in the democracy process, the world will be able to witness a new example of "Democratization of Islam".

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